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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The power of a state to control the uses of property has come to 
be regarded as~ basic characteristic of a sovereign st~te. The fact 
that the state could condemn private property for public use was recog-
nized as an inherent power of government long before the formation of 
the United States. When the Fe.derd Constitution w~s drawn up 9 no ex-
press grant of this power was inc.luded. The Fifth Ame.ndm.ent, added to 
the Constitu.tion ~s one of the guar~n.tees against feder!ill infringement 
on individual rights, provided th<Slt private. property should not be ta.ken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
The idea of 11 private 11 prope.rty and the rights associated with it has 
acquired a particular signific~nce under a constitutional republic. Ac-
cording to the concept inherited from European backgrounds, property is 
held or used at the plea,,sure of the ruling sovereign 9 and vestiges of the 
sovereignty concept remain in American law. The conditions under which 
the state may assert its rights of eminent domain are carefully circum-
scribed, however, and the interpretation 9f eminent domain has been the 
subject of extensive litigation in United States courts. 
1 
Exercise of the power to condemn private p;roperty fo,: public use 
places the interests of the individual at odds with the interests of the 
state and calls for a critical evaluation of the conditions and values 
associated with the action. With a limited amount of new land available 
for private uses, an expanding population, new uses for land as a result 
of technological developments, 1 and new concepts of the role of govern~ 
ment,2 the variety, complexity, and importance of the issues concerning 
eminent domain can be expected to increase. 
Concern for individual rights in the appropriation of property has 
been expressed recently in the following terms: 
••• when the state impinges upon substantial individual 
interests, whether of liberty or property, courts must go 
beyond the limited review of expenditures to consider whether 
:the state's interest outweighs the individual 1 s •••• The lack 
of effective political safeguards also jusitifies increased 
judicial intervention •••• forcing the state to justify its 
action seems required to prevent the use of eminent domain 
to deprive condemnees of fundamental rights.3 
In the United States, the responsibility for formal education has 
2 
been developed by both public and private institutions, but in either case, 
the objectives and consequences of education have social significance. It 
is not surprising, then, that schools and colleges have been granted the 
power to take private property under various conditions in order to carry 
1For a case involving a 11 taking 11 of air space near an airport see 
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 82 s.ct. 531 C962). 
2Two recent cases on the condemnation of private property by a public 
agency to be turned over to another private party for urban renewal purposes 
are Rabinoff v. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961), and 
Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y. 2d 210, 182 N.E. 2d 395 (1962). 
311state Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain," 
Harvard Law Review, 77 : 717, Feb., 1964, pp. 718, 720. 
3 
out their purposes. A number of factors seem to indicate that the resources 
devoted to education, and potentially the amount of private property that 
may have to be condemned by schools and colleges, may be expected to increase. 
Larger numbers of students are to be educated as a result of population 
growth and the cultural requirements which result in a longer period of for-
mal education for the individual and a greater percent of the population 
who need education. The multiplying amount of knowledge available and the 
development of new methods in education also lend weight to the prediction 
that the resources involved in formal education will be expanded. 
At least three factors, then,--concern for private or individual in-
terests, societal pressures of expanding population in a limited environment, 
and the increasing importance of education--indicated that a study of the 
situations in which the exercise of the right of eminent domain by schools 
and colleges has been challenged would be appropriate and useful. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
A major purpose of the study was to identify issues litigated in United 
States federal and state appellate courts concerning the exercise of the 
right of eminent domain by schools and colleges. 
A second purpose of the study was to describe the situations which have 
given rise to controversy over the condemnation proceedings instituted by 
schools and colleges--the facts of the cases. Because only appellate court 
decisions have been examined, this description could not include all the 
controversies litigated by schools and colleges on these issues, but only 
point out the situations which gave rise to the decision of important points 
of law. 
4 
Third, the reasoning of the courts in arriving at their decisions wa$ 
examined for the purpose of determining what principles and rules of law 
have been developed by the courts in eminent domain cases to which a school 
or college was a party. 
Among the questions to be answered by the study were the following: 
What limitations have been placed upon the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain by schools and colleges? Are there particular features of the edu-
cational enterprise that have affected the judicial decisions in eminent 
domain cases? Is there a difference in the condemnation rights of public 
schools and the rights of private institutions? WhaJ: rights to the property, 
or what nature of title, do schools and colleges secure as a result of con-
demnation proceedings? Are there any uses for which a school or college may 
not exercise the right of eminent domain? In what ways do the various States 
differ, and what reasons have been noted for varying rulings according to 
jurisdiction in the school and college condemnation cases? Are different 
standards applied in cases involving institutions of higher learning than in 
cases involving elementary and secondary schools? What standards have been 
adopted by the courts in reviewing the amount of property that may be taken 
or the amount of compensation that must be paid in cases involving schools 
and colleges? May a school or college condemn property already devoted to a 
public use? What considerations apply when other agencies seek to condemn 
property of educational institutions? 
NEED FOR THE STUDY 
Cases in which schools and colleges have been involved in eminent domain 
proceedings have been mentioned by a number of writers, but there has been 
5 
no comprehensive treatment of the problem. 
Hamilton and Mort, conunenting on the operation of the law as it affects 
schools, state: 
The greater part of the law as we know it today is still 
basically common law •••• Th~s the basic principles of contracts 
between a board of education and its teachers, the right of 
eminent domain, are not, normally, the result of any statutory 
or constitutional provision, but rather exist by virtue of what 
is known as the common law. 4 . 
Edwards, on the other hand, makes . the statement that 
The right to take private property for public use is an 
attribute of sovereignty. Such right lies dormant in the state, 
however,, until legislative action points out the occasions, the 
modes, and the agencies for its exercise. A board of education 
cannot, therefore, exercise the right of eminent domain unless 
expressly authorized to do so by statute.5 
Edwards also cites authority for statements that where land is t~ken for 
school purposes the fee remains in the owner and when no longer used for school 
purposes the land reverts, that a school cannot appropriate land already being 
used for other public purposes, and that the necessity of taking a particular 
piece of land is not a matter to be reviewed by a commission or jury. These 
are all matters that could vary from one jurisdiction to another. A number 
of important decisions since the time of this S.tudy may require modification 
of these statements. 
Remmlein makes a number of general statements about the issues involved 
when a school distri.ct attempts to condemn property, such as 11 Em:inent domain 
4-aobert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public Education 
(Brooklyn, 1959) p. 4. 
5Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago, 1933). 
p. 282. (Both text and reference material on eminent domain are identical in 
the 1955 and 1933 editions.) 
6 
cannot be used except when the property is needed for a public use.n6 A 
number of interesting questions could be raised such .as, 11Are all school 
uses of property considered public uses? n or 11What st~ndards have been used 
to determine if the use is public'? n 
Recent is.sues of the Yearbook of School Law contain comments on school 
cases involving eminent domain. 7 These relate to effects of statutory 
restrictions 1 determinaition of "necessity" by a school board, and the ap-
propriation of school land by a\ state highway departmento This publica-
tion, being a periodic~l" is designed primarily to report on cases as they 
are decided, and only in occasional articles are specific subjects treated 
historically or comprehensivelyo 
A recent study by McC.a.nn was concerned with eminent domain as an 
example of a problem ~re~ in the ~dministration of education by non-educa= 
tion~l agencieso 8 He pointed out th~t in Delaw££re eminent domain proceedings 
~re initiated for schools by the State even though the town council there is 
the .agency authorized to procure school sites by purcho?i,Seo In three states, 
New Hampshire, Vermont 9 &i.nd New York~ municipal authorities prosecute co'n-
demnation proceedings for the sc.hools. A relatively new concept, that of 
"superior public use~" or 11more necess®ry public use 11 is mentioned by McCann 
in the c~ses involving two governmental agencies seeking the use of the same 
propertyo He ®lso discusses the problem of the me~sure of damages when one 
6Madeline Ko Remmleinj ~ L~w of Local Public School Administration 
(New York 9 1953) po 1170 
7 Lee Oo G~rber, edo, The Ye~rbook of School Law (Danvillej 1960, 1961 
1962, 1963j and 1964)0 
8 Lloyd E o McCann 9 The Le..sa.!. Problems in the Administration of Education 
.2,1. Educciitiond and Non=Educ1mtional Government ~encies (Tucson~ 1964) o 
7 
government agency takes property from· another. 
Blackwell states that there is no question as to the legitimacy of the 
use of eminent domain for the acquisition of property to be used by a tax-
supported college, but that the current issue is the extent to which the 
power may be exercised by privately controlled institutions. 9 He points 
out a case in "7hich the fiction of .the separate entity of an auxiliary corpora-
(._,,.· 
tion was.disregarded in allowing the university. to condemn private property 
for the use of the corporation. 
Elliott and Chambers, in their first volume of· The Colleges and the 
Courts, included a chapter on The Exercise of Eminent Domain by Universities 
arid Colleges. 10 Later volumes by Chambers either om.it the topic or deal 
with it as part of a general chapter on property.ll In the most recent 
volume covering the· period 1950-1964, cases are cited dealing with the taking 
of a fraternity by the university for use as a campus center, condemnation 
of property by a university for lease to a hospital, and securing of property 
by colleges for parking lots and veteransr housing.12 
The time spread of these publications and their topical or selective 
treatment of the problems indicated a need for a comprehensive, analytical, 
historical study of the cases involving schools and colleges in eminent domain 
proceedings. 
9Thom.as E. Blackwell, College Law (Washington, 1961) p. 38. 
lOEdward C. Elliott and M.M. Chambers, The Colleges and the Courts 
(New York, 1936) Chapter 24. 
11M. M. Chambers, The Colleges and the Courts (New York, 1941, 1946, 
and 1952). 
12M. M. Chambers, The Colleges and the Courts Since 1950 (Danville, 1964). 
The study should be useful in at least th~ following ways: 
1. as a guide to schools and colleges contemplating condemnation by 
delineating the rights secured in other cases and the rationale or princi-
ples according to which the institutions may operate, 
'2. as a·convenient reference to case materials on the subject, and 
3. as a stimulus for discussion of desirable changes.· 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
8 
This study involves description and analysis of appellate court 
decisions identified in the National Reporter System, including both State 
and federal court reports. The scope was restricted to the use of cases 
decided at the appellate level both because they were more accessible than 
trial court reports, and because they are more authoritative concerning the 
issues of law involved. The decisions selected for study were those in which 
a school or college was one of the parties to a controversy over eminent 
domain issues prior to 1965. A few cases not involving a school or college 
as a party were included in the study because the issues litigated pertained 
to the condemnation rights of a school or college. Because of their importance 
to the exercise of the right of,;;etninent .. i:iomaln~issues that might be classified 
as procedural, as compared to substantive issues, were included in the study. 
The terms 11 school 11 or 11 college 11 were used to include educational institutions, 
both public and private, whose primary function can generally be classed as 
educational as distinguished from religious, social, military, or governmen-
tal. 
9 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study was not designed to be a legislative history, and there may 
be statutes in some states relating to eminent domain proceedings by schools 
or colleges that have not yet been interpreted by the courts. This limita-
tion of the study is justified on the basis that until the meaning of a 
statute has been adjudicated, its status is indefinite. Statutes are 
evaluated through judicial construction, and unless a contest is joined at 
t~e trial level and the issues of law appealed, the meaning of a statute may 
remain in doubt even though it is used by many as a guide to action or 
restraint. 
Due to the relatively small number of cases that have been located in-
volving colleges or universities, the application of the findings to other 
situations in higher education should be done with caution. 
The study is not a treatise on the law of eminent domain in general. 
It has been limited to those cases in which a school or college was a party 
because of the researcher's primary interest in how the law has been applied 
to educational institutions. 
The study should not be regarded as a substitute for the legal research 
that may be essential in a given situation, although it may furnish valuable 
information. This limitation is due to the nature of the judicial process in 
the United States: 
For all our cases are decided, all our opinions written, 
all our arguments made on certain four assumptions. 1.) The 
court must decide the dispute before it, 2.) The court can 
decide only the particular dispute which is before it, 3.) 
The court can decide the particular dispute only according to 
a general rule which covers a whole class of like disputes, 
4.) Everything, everything, everything, big or small, a 
judge may say in an opinion, is to be read with primary 
reference to: the 'part±ctilaf·udi:,put.e,;:ithe ... patttcuiar· question:·before 
himo l3 
No two cases are exactly alike, and the applicability of one principle or 
10 
another may depend on the extent to which the facts of a case can be shown 
to provide a basis for distinction. Caution should be exercised in evalu-
ating how the law of one jurisdiction may apply in another. 
Because of the fact that a total of more than 30,000 decisions On all 
subjects are being reported by appellate.courts each year, no guarantee can 
b~ made that all the cases on the single issue of eminent demain in which a 
s~hool or college was a party have been located. Within the limitations of 
the researcher's ability and the accuracy of the digests, citators, and 
annotations, the study is comprehensive. 
PROCEDURES OF.THE STUDY 
Steps taken to complete .the study were as follows: 
lo Location of the cases in point by use of the Century, Decennial, 
and General Digests, Annotated Statutes, and other sources such as legal 
encyclopedias and treatiseso When the study was planned, it was anticipated· 
that Shepherd's Citations would be used to locate additional cases, but 
because the headnotes seldom indicated whether a school or college was a 
party, the citator was found not to be a productive source of information. 
Considerable difficulty was encountered in use of the digests because the 
method of analysis did not indicate which cases involved schools or colleges, 
except on the topic of the use for which the property may be takeno Because 
13Karl No Llewellyn, "The Bramble Bush, 11 in The Legal Process by 
Carl Auerbach, Lloyd K. Garrison, Willard Hurst, and Samuel Mennin 
(San Francisco, 1961) P• 13. 
11 
the statutes under which a school or college may proceed could be found in 
the school sections, general eminent domain sections, or, especially in 
the case of colleges and universities, in sections establishing each insti-
tution, a considerable amount of cross reference checking .of annotated 
statutes was necessary, and it would be entirely possible that some cases 
have not been located. Annotated statutes were consulted for each State 
and the District of Columbia, but in a few States no cases on the subject 
were foundo 
2o Analysis of the cases for facts, issues, decisions, dicta, and 
rationaleo An attempt was made in the use of these terms to follow the 
suggestions of Price and Bitner14 as acceptable legal practice. 
3. Organization of the findings under appropriate sub-topics. A 
certain amount of arbitrary decision was required for this step, and there 
may have been a number of other organizational plans that would have been 
appropriate. 
4. Reporting the findings. The method of citation suggested by Price 
and Bitner15 was followed with the exception that a single source was cited 
for quotations from the opintons, usually the National Reporter series 
volume and page number. 
14Miles o. Price and Harry Bitner, Effective Legal Research (Boston, 
1953) Chapter 11. 
15rbid., Chapter 320 
CHAPTER II 
THE AUTHORITY FOR THE E~ERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN BY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
One of the most basic issues litigated in the cases involving. schools 
~nd colleges in eminent domain proceedings has been the question of the 
power or authority of the institution to take private property for its pur-
poses. This issue is not peculiar to the cases involving !fohools and 
colleges,and it is necessary to coni;;ider the historical background of the 
right of eminent domain in order to clarify the issue. It is also the 
purpose of this chapter to distinguish eminent domain proceedings from 
other closely related legal problems involving schools and colleges. 
Other sections are devoted to problems of delegation of authority to ex-
ercise the right of eminent domain. 
THE COMMON LAW BASIS OF EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 
One of the cases frequently cited as authority for the power of a 
school or college to exercise the right of eminent domain is Valentine v. 
Lamont. 1 Actually, the issue decided in the case concerned the nature of 
the estate acquired by the Board of Education of Jersey City by condemnation 
proceedings in 1922. The case was an ejectment action by the successors in 
120 N.J. Super. 454, 90 A. 2d 143, affd. 25 N.J. Super. 342, 96 A. 2d 
417, affd. 13 N.J. 569, 100 A. 2d 668, cert. den. 347 U.S. 966, 74 S. Ct. 
776 (1953). 
12 
13 
interest of those whose property had been condemned against those to whom 
the Board had sold the property after it was no longer needed for school 
purposes. The Board was made a third-party defendant, and while it is not 
discussed in any of the opinions, there could be some question about whether 
the Board was a necessary party. The case is mentioned here because the 
Justices of both the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court 
discussed more extensively than in any other school or college condemna-
tion case the historical development of the right of eminent domain. Most 
of the discussion on this topic would be regarded as obiter dicta, but the 
other cases are not in conflict with the statements madlet,' and the authority 
for the st?tements were treatises by Kent, Cooley, Nichols and Lewis, as 
well as prior eminent domain cases, most of which did not involve schools 
and colleges. 
Historical Backgrounds. 
Justice Goldmann of the Appellate Division cited the Annals of Tacitus 
as one of the early references to the power to take private property for 
public use. 
The term "eminent domain" ( 11 dominium eminens 11 ) seems to 
have originated with Grotius, who declared that the state or 
he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy the 
property of its subjects for the ends of public utility, but 
added that 11when this is done the state is bound to make good 
the loss to those who lose their property. 11 2 
Justice Oliphant of the Supreme Court discussed the basic nature of 
eminent domain in similar terms. 
296 A. 2d at 420. 
The right of eminent domain is of very ancient 
origin, is inherent in all governments and requires no 
constitutional provision to give. it force. It is an 
inherent and necessary right of .the sovereignty of the 
stateo 
It is gener$lly spoken of in reference to those 
cases in which the government seeks to appropriate 
property against the will of the owner and is said to 
be that superior right of property pertaining to the sover-
eignty by which private property acquired by its citizens 
under its prote.ction may be taken and its use controlled 
for the public benefit without regard to the wishes of its 
ownerso More accurately~ it is the rightful authority 
which exists in every sovereignty to control rights of a 
public nature which pertain to its citizens in common and 
to appropriate and control property for the public benefit 
as the public s~fety, necessity 9 convenience 9 or welfare 
may demando It is the highest and most exact form of prop-
erty, notwithstanding the grants to individuals, which 
remains in the .government or in the aggregate body of the 
people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right 
to assume possession of the property in the m,a.nner directed 
by the Constitution and the laws of the State, whenever the 
public interest requireso In theory.it exists in absolute 
form in the ultimate source of authority in every organized 
society) 
Both of the opinions quoted referred to the absolute, unlimited, in-
herent, and sovereign nature of the right of eminent do~ain, but both of 
the opinions ~lso discussed limit~tions on the righto The Supreme Court 
opinion emphasized the common law origin of the limiti=\tion, referring to 
. 
11 the equitable principle that property cannot be taken for public use 
without just compensi\tion," .and.st~ting that the taking "should not be 
greater th.an necess$ry to effectuate the public use, 11 implying, at least, 
that the historic dete.rmin~tion of the bounds of the· right. is judicial. 
The opinion of the Appella\te Division, however, stressed the limita-
tions imposed by constitution~l provisions. 
oco/-S /uch provisions neither directly nor indirectly grant 
the-pow°er of eminent domain~ but are simple limitations on 
3100 Ao 2d at 670-671. 
.. 14 
the power already in existence which would otherwise be un-
limitedo 
The history of eminent domain in the American Colonies 
seems to sustain the doctrine that "the power of eminent 
domain, as it exists untranuneled by constitutional limita-
tions, extends to the taking of any property within the 
jurisdiction of the state for the public good, subject only 
to the moral obligation of making compensation. 11 When the 
Colonies broke away from the Crown, each became a sovereign 
state in its own right, with absolute control over persons 
and property within its jurisdiction. Each became vested 
with the general power of eminent domain. The power could 
be exercised directly by the legislature, or could be dele-
gated to municipalities or other governmental subdivisions. 
The legislature could also grant the power of eminent domain 
to public corporations, such as school districts or boards 
of education. 
Under the terms of the typical constitutional provision 
private property cannot be taken for public use without 
making just compensation. Such provision is contained in the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a limi-
tation on the powers of the Federal Government. The same 
provision, variously worded, appears in the constitutions of 
all but one of the states.4 
If on the basis of this authority it may be concluded that eminent 
domain actions involve litigation of issues concerning the taking of 
private property for public use, the questions of which acts of a school 
or college may be classified as "taking" property, and how eminent domain 
cases are distinguishable from other types of cases involving schools and 
colleges are raisedo 
Eminent Domain Actions and Issues Distinguished. 
Classifying as eminent domain cases those actions in which the plead-
ings of the party bringing the complaint--the plaintiff or petitioner--are 
15 
stated as condemnation or appropriation is a relatively precise and effect-
ive way to limit the scope of cases to be considered. Most of the cases 
4 96 Ao 2d at 420. 
involving schools and colleges in which issues of the right of eminent 
domain have been litigated ar~ of this type, and this criteria is the 
basic one employed for this.study. There are a number of cases, however, 
which concern eminent domain issues, that do not fall within this classi-
fication, such as those in .which injunctive relief is sought, or an 
action to quiet title. In order to distinguish the types of cases and 
issues which are considered, some of those which are not included in 
the study will be mentioned. 
Cases Involving Purchase. 11 Taking 11 of pri,vate property fo-r public 
use could possibly be accomplished by a school or colle~in a number of 
ways, such as by purchase, gift, or devise, but "taking" as construed in 
the eminent domain cases usually involves the element of an act adverse 
to the interest or without the consent of the party whose property is 
sought. 
There is some dicta in Gogarty v. Qoachella Valley Junior College 
Districts about eminent domain, bu~ the land sought by the District was 
pu chased, and the case is distinguishable from eminent domain cases on 
th t basis. 
Gremillion v. Rapides Parish School Board6 was an action for specific 
16 
pe formance of a contract to compel th~ Board to take title to property. 
Th~ Board did not want the property after it had contracted for it because 
of restrictive covenants found in the title. The Court of Appeals discussed 
eminent domain as illustrative of sovereign rights, but the Supreme Court 
557 Cal. 2d 727, 21 Cal. Rptr. 806, 371 P. 2d 582 (1962). 
6134 So. 2d 700, rev. 242 La. 967~ 140 So. 2d 377 (1962). 
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distinguished the case from eminent domain actions and pointed out that the 
only issue was whether there was a substantial defect in the title. 
The only issue decided in Board of Kublic _!r.lstruction of Dade County 
Vo Town of B!!,Y Harbor Islands7 was that the trial court had not abused 
its discretion in allowing an amendment to the pleadings and denying a 
motion to dismisso The parties conceded that a contract or agreement 
existed between the school and the town regarding sites, and the state-
ment by the court that "the condemnation of lands for school purposes, 
standing alone, is one vested in the discretion of school authorities," 
was not germane to the decision. 
In St. Paul Foundry Co. v. Burnstad School District8 the Company 
sought to recover for steeLfurnished for construction of a gymnasium. The 
court found that the contract was illegal and distinguished the case from 
those involving taking without just compensation. 
An injunction was sought by the School District to prevent mining of 
coal under a public school building in Commonwealth~ rel. Keator v. Clear-
view Coal Co. 9 The site had been purchased in 1896 by contract and deed 
reserving minerals and waiving support of the surface. The building was 
abandoned by the District in 1914 after coal had been mined without ade-
;t quate supports causing injury to the building. The dismissal in the trial 
court was affirmed on appeal because the District was found to have waived 
its rights at purchase. The court suggested that to prohibit mining would 
774 So. 2d 786 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954). 
810 No D. 403, 295 N. W. 659 (1941). 
9256 Pa. 328, 100 Atl. 820, L.R~A. l917E 672. (1917). 
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be taking private property without compensation and that the District could 
take the coal under the right of eminent domain, but since these points 
were not at issue, the statements must be regarded as dicta. 
A number of statements regarding the power of a school district to 
exercise the right of eminent domain were made in Kingsville Independent 
School District Vo Crenshaw10 but the court made it clear that the neces-
sity for condemnation of a park by the School District had been averted 
by a conveyance by the town and a waiver of rights to reversion by the 
town 1 s grantoro There was no occasion, the court said, to litigate the 
question as to paramount public use. The action was brought by residents 
of the town of Kingsville who owned property adjoining the park in an 
attempt to enjoin condemnation by the School District. There was no reso-
lution by the Board that the property be taken by condemnationo 
A result that would seem in some ways to be in conflict with the 
Crenshaw case was reached in Jury v. Wiest, 11 a taxpayers' action to en-
join purchase of property by a School District, but the facts of the Jury 
case are quite different. The School Directors passed resolutions on 
February 2, 1925, and January 27, 1927, for condemnation of land to increase 
school and playground facilities. On August 13, 1927, the Directors entered 
into an agreement with the owner fixing the value of the property at $87,000 
and providing that the grantors could retain possession prior to payment by 
the Directors which could not be demanded prior to August 1, 1930, and then 
10164 SoWo2d 49 (Tex. App. 1942). A suit to enJom erection of the 
building was brought later but the court said there were no new facts or 
law involvedo 252 SoW.2d 1022 (Tex. App. 1943). 
11326 Pa. 554, 193 Atl. 5 (1937). 
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only with six months notice. The Directors agreed to pay taxes and insurance 
and the deeds were to be put in escrow on payment of the sum fixed. On 
August 20, 1930, the grantor gave notice that he would expect payment on 
February 2, 1931, and the School Directors procured taxpayers to restrain 
them from paying on the ground that the constitutional debt limit would be 
exceeded if this payment were made. At trial, the Chancellor found that 
there had been no effective condemnation since the Board had never physi-
cally entered and marked off the boundaries, and that a contract to purchase 
had been executed at a time when the debt limit would have been exceeded. 
The court en bane, reversing the Chancellor, dismissed the bill for injunc-
tion on the basis that the debt limit would not be exceeded by enforcement 
of the contract. On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed, but for a differ-
ent reason. The Supreme Court held that the lower court had erred in find-
ing no effective cop,9J~n:r11ation. The important point to be noted here is 
the holding that by i.t.s resolutions to condemn, which, the court said, pre~ 
suppose an inability to agree with t.he owner, the Directors had effectively 
condemned the property. The court said it was not necessary for the Direc-
tors to take physical possession, and where the entire tract was taken it 
was not necessary for t:h.e Directors to mark it. Condemnation, the court 
held, was not ineff ecti.ve because the owners cooperated in fixing the price 
or arranging for payments and delivery of the deed. 
When a corporation, municipality, or other govern= 
mental body having the power of eminent domain passes 
resolutions condemning land and effects a taking of it, 
the validity of this condemnation procedure is not im-
paired by a subsequent settlement and acceptance of a 
deed to the property from its owners, but such deed is 
rather in furtherance of the condemnation proceedings.12 
20 
This case, then, is one of those in which the pleadings are not an adequate 
criterion for determination of whether it should be included in the study, 
and it will be discussed further in Chapter VIII. 
The question of what acts constitute an appropriation was discussed 
in Borough of Braddock v. Bartoletta. 13 While a school district was a 
party in the case~ it was not involved in the condemnation proceeding. The 
Borough and the District were attempting to collect a tax they had levied 
on transfer of real estate within their boundaries. In 1959, the Redevelop-
ment Authority of Allegheny County had passed a resolution to condemn real 
estate within these boundaries and subsequently entered into an "Agreement 
in Confirmation of Condemnation Proceedings" with the owners. The court 
held that the property had been legally taken by condemnation prior to the 
Agreement and that the tax was not collectible on these transactions. The 
tax ordinance of the Borough and the tax resolution of the District provided 
that there were to be no exemptions, but the court ruled that in this case 
there was no transfer as the condemnation had divested the owners of all in-
terest. Had the owners appealed instead of negotiating the Agreement, the 
court reasoned, there would have been no instrument to tax. 
Cases Involving Boundaries and Taxation. The constitutionality of an 
12 193 Atl. at 7, citing Boalsburg Water Co. v. State College Water Co., 
240 Pa. 198, 87 Atl. 609 (1913). From the title of this case, it was 
thought that perhaps the case would be pertinent to this study, but on 
examination of the case, it was found to deal with no school or college 
eminent domain issues but condemnation of water rights, and no educational 
institution was a party. 
l3186 A. 2d 243 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
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act of the Tennessee Leg:i.s.ature changing the boundary of a school district 
was challenged in a plea for mandamus to require the board to show cause 
why the plaintiff's children should not be permitted to attend Memphis city 
schoolsol4 A demurrer to the complaint was overruled and on appeal the 
action of the trial court was affirmed, but in rejecting the argument that 
the act was unconstitutional because it deprived the plaintiff of property 
without just crnnpensation:i the court stated that in no senae was property 
"takeno 11 
Washington Heights School District v. Fort Worth15 was a suit by the 
District to prevent annexation in which the District argued that provisions 
of the constitution would be violated. The court held that since the legis-
lature had authorized the parties to reach settlements concerning their prop-
ertyj. and neither party was deprived of judicial proceedings, that annexa-
tion in no manner resulted in taking of property without compensation. 
The plaintiff in Thie v. Consolidated Independent School District of 
Mediapolis 16 sought to enjoin the levy and collection of taxes against his 
property in the consolidated district, but the court pointed out that a 
consolidation does not present a situation in which the property is taken. 
An act of the Oklahoma Territorial Legislature providing for separate 
schools for colored children, and that an injunction may issue to prevent 
disposal of separate schools by districts already maintaining them17 was 
14Edmonson Vo Board of Education, 108 Tenn. 557, 69 s.w. 274, 58 L.R.A. 
170 (1902)0 
15251 s.w. 341 (Tex. App., 1923). 
16197 Iowa 344, 197 N.W. 75 (1924). 
17Act of May 8, 1901, p~ 205, ch. 28, art. 9. 
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contested in Board of Education of City of Kingfisher v. Board of Conunissioners.18 
The Conunissioners sought an injunction to prevent the sale of existing facili-
ties, . and the Bo.ard maintained that the Ac.t was unconstitutional because 
it interfered wi.th property rights without just compensation. The court 
referred to school districts as quasi~public corporations, "simply agencies 
of the higher power," in distinguishing its property rights from those of 
private corporations •. Construction of school houses was regarded as part of 
the general exercise of sovereignty over its entire domain by the Territory, 
and it was held that the law did not restrict or divert the property.to a 
use other than its original purpose. 
An injunction to restrain the collector of taxes was affirmed in Waldrop 
v. Kansas City Southern~· Co.19 on the basis that the proceedings under 
which the Town of Ogden was attempted to be organized were void. The Town 
had been incorporated to include an .area seven miles long and five miles wide 
·along the railway, and the court found that the land was not of such character 
as c6uld form an incorporated town. Evidence in the ·record indicated that 
the purpose of incorporation was so that a Spec.i&,l School District could be 
formed under the Arkansas statutes, coterminus with the Town. The court also 
noted that it was. 11 to get·rid of the·negroes." After finding the incorpo-
ration of the Town invalid,. the· court als.o found the formation of the School 
District void, and added "we think this is a case of taking private property 
.for public use under the form of taxation without giving any protection or 
other compensation therefor. 11 20 It is not clear from the opinion whether the 
1814 Okl. 322, 78 Pac. 455 (19q4). 
19131 Ark. 45j, 199 s~w. 369, L.R~A. 1918B 1081 (1917). 
20 199 s.w. at 372. 
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injunction depended on this conclusion, and no other cases involving schools 
or colleges have been located in point. 
21 Glendale Development Inc. v~ Board of ~egents was a taxpayers action 
to set aside a sale of lands by the Board to a Foundation for development of 
a shopping center as an investment with returns to be used for the benefit 
of the University of Wisconsin. It was held that the sale did not involve 
a taking of .public property for private use. 
Charter Cases. Board~ Regents of the University of Maryland v. 
Trustees of the Endowment Fund22 is characteristic of a number of cases 
since the Dartmouth College Case23 concerning the power of the state to 
alter the charter or articles of incorporation of an organization, and 
these should be distinguished from eminent domain proceedings on the basis 
of the intent of the party seeking the change. A 1952 Act of the Maryland 
Legislature, passed over the Governor's veto, provided for an amendment of 
the Endowment Fund charter to provide that the Regents be the Trustees. 
There was no intention of the Legislature to make compensation in the event 
that the Act was regarded as a 11 taking 11 of property. The decree which was 
affirmed held the Act unconstitutional and restrained the Regents from con-
trol of the Fund. In this case the Board argued that there was no impairment 
of the obligation of the charter as constitutional amendments in 1851 and 
1867 provided that Maryland charters be subject to repeal or modification. 
The court, however, found in the ~ct a fundamental change, a legislative 
2112 Wis. 3d 120, 106 N.W. 2d 430 (1960). 
22206 Md. 559, 112 A. ~d 678, cert.den. 350 u.s. 836, 76 s.ct. 72 (1955). 
23 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, (U.S.Sup.Ct. 1819). 
attempt to remove a private self-perpetuating board and replace it with a 
public one appointed by the Governor.. The court said that "Since we hold 
that the Act of 1952 exceeds the permissible limits of the reserved power 
to amend the corporation charter it is unnecessary to discuss the other 
points argued in the briefs." But in response to the Trustees contention 
that the change in the charter violated Article III, Sec. 40 of the Mary-
land Constitution prohibiting taking of private property for public use 
without just compensation, the court made the following statement: 
The rule that an alteration that defeats or 
fundamentally changes the corporate purpose is beyond 
the constitutional power of the Legislature is conceded 
on both sides. Whether this is true because it is a 
violation of the contract clause of the Federal Consti-
tution we need not decide. The Supreme Court and our 
Court of Appeals have both adopted the rule as a consti-
tutional principle which has the status of a vested 
right, whether it stems from the law of implied contract, 
the law of property or the corporation law. If the right 
is violated, we are constrained to hold that it violates 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well 
as the provisions of Article 23 of our Declaration of 
Right~ an? Se~tion 40 of Article III of the Maryland 
Constitution. 
24 
Other Cases Distinguished. In two New Hampshire cases, True v. Melvin, 25 
and Board of Education of Nashua v. Vagge, 26 the form of the plea was mandamus. 
The authority of the True case concerning any eminent domain issue would be 
doubtful as the court found laches between the decision to build a school-
house in 1857 and bringing of the action in 1861. The District alleged it 
was not bound by law to lay out a schoolhouse lot as it had decided on another 
24112 A. 2d at 684. 
2543 N.H. 503 (1862). 
26102 N.H. 457, 159 A. 2d 159 (1960). 
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location which had been purchased, In the Vagge case the Board sought to 
compel the mayor and aldermen to convey unused city real estate to it for a 
junior high school. The court found no statutory provisions or provisions 
in the city charter which would compel the city to transfer the land to the 
Board. It is apparent that eminent domain issues were not involved here, 
either by allegation of the board or construction of the courto 
Two cases in which the complaint alleged that acts of the school 
authorities caused injury to property have been noted, and in both cases 
the principles of eminent domain were used to avoid the rule that the 
school is immune from liability for tort. In Griswold v. Town School 
District, 27 dynamiting to explore for water to supply the school had 
diverted an underground channel supplying water to the plaintiff's spring. 
The trial court sustained a demurrer to his complaint in tort on the basis 
that the District was immune. In reversing, the Vermont Supreme Court 
indirectly criticized the doctrine of immunity as follows: 
•••L I_/t is difficult to find any good reason why 
there should be liability for a taking through no negligence, 
but non-liability if the same taking is the result of negli-
gence. Such a doctrine it seems to us would be most unjust 
and indeed a monstrous doctrine permitting a way for avoid-
ing liability under the constitutional provision.28 
The court felt that if property has to be so taken it must be under the right 
of eminent domain and speculated that the District had not chosen to exer-
cise the right. It would seem doubtful if the necessity for exercise of the 
right ever occurred to the District, however, under the facts of this case. 
27 117 Vt. 224, 88 A. 2d 829 (1952). 
28 88 A. 2d at 831. The constitutional provision. was that "whenever any 
person's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to re-
ceive an equivalent in money. 11 
26 
Johnson v. Independent School District No. 129 was cited, but in this case 
inununity was not discussed, and relief was denied even though the plaintiff 
had alleged that he had no adequate remedy at law, because of inability of 
the court to assess compensation for damages resulting when the school sewer 
flowed onto the plaintiff's land. In the Johnson case the-court suggested 
that the district should condemn the land, but issued no order for it to do 
so. Similar facts were involved in Eller v. Board of Education of Buncombe 
Gounty. 30 The plaintiff alleged that his dwelling and natural spring water 
supply had been damaged by a sewer built by the Board. In this case, however, 
the Board's demurrer was overruled, and in affirmina - the action the court 
attempted to distinguish between liability for tort .and liability for payment 
of compensation for private property appropriated: 
The creation -and maintenance of a governmental project 
so as to .constitute a nuisance substantially impairing the 
value of private property, is, in a constitutional sense, 
a taking within the principle of eminent domain.31 
The court thought that a sufficient taking to require compensation had occurred 
if the value of the property had been 11 subst;antially impaired," and the 
amount.of compensation would be-based on the impairment of value caused 
by the injury inflicted. The Board maintained that the-sole remedy, then, 
was to petition as .provided by the eminent domain statute, but·the ·court 
rejected the argument because it was not a case in which the Board was 
undertaking to condemn or take possession for-school purposes and the Board 
292.39 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W. 2d 421 (1947). 
30 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E. 2d 144 (1955). 
3189 s.w. 2d at 146. 
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apparently had no intention to "take" the land and pay for the rights to it. 
Another case in which the "taking" of property was put at issue was 
32 Casey County Board of Education v. Luster. The principal of the school 
had ruled that no students were allowed to enter a restaurant nearby nor 
any other business establishment in the town between 8: 15 a.m. and 3 :00 
p.m. An injunction granted by the trial court was reversed on appeal on 
the basis of the authority of the school officials to make reasonable 
rules, and these were not considered arbitrary or malicious. But the 
plaintiffs also alleged that the regulation v:id.ated the constitutional 
provisions forbidding the taking of private property without just com-
pensation, and to meet this argument the court held that no property was 
taken from the children or their parents. 
Stone v. Fritts33 was an action to enjoin the County Superintendent 
from revoking a license to teach, and here, too, the court found that there 
was no taking of private property. 
Legal Classification of Eminent Domain Capes. Assuming that the 
nature of the pleadings is a valid criterion for distinguishing eminent do-
main cases from others to which a school or college is a party, the legal 
classification or form of the action may be helpful in further distinction. 
However 9 due to the joining of equity and law in most jurisdictions of the 
United States and to the acceptance by the courts of more liberal rules of 
pleading, the importance of this classification is probably minimized. 
There seems to be general agreement that eminent domain proceedings 
32282 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. App. 1955). 
33 169 Ind. 361, 82 N.E. 792, 15 L.R.A. (NS) 1147, 14 Ann.Gas. 295 (1907). 
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are special in nature, as compared with the historical division of actions 
into equity and law, but this question has been adjudicated in very few cases 
involving schools and colleges. In Kraemer v. ~ of Education of 
Cincinnati34 the court noted that appropriation is a special proceeding 11not 
necessarily adversary 11 and held that the trial court had erred in assigning 
the burden of proof regarding the value of 1is property to the owner. 
The court deciding Torrance Unified School District v. Alwag35 recog-
nized that an 11 action to condemn property is not of the same nature as 
ordinary civil litigation, 11 and po~nted out that the owner was required to 
defend even though there was no allegatiQn that he had wronged the plaintiff. 
In this case the District dismissed its own action and the judgment of the 
trial court denying attorney fees to the defendant was reversed. 
In Arkansas, where the equitable and legal functions are carried out 
by separate courts, an eminent domain action has been recognized as a 
special proceeding. The issue in Burton v. Ward36 was whether the defendant 
had stated sufficient equitable defenses to deprive the circuit court of its 
,usual jurisdiction in eminent domain proceedings. On July 8, 1950, the 
District, which already held two acres for its school, proceeded to condemn 
an additional tract of 10.35 acres of Burton 1 s property. His answer alleged 
the taking was excessive, arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, unnecessary, 
and unauthorized, and that these defenses were exclusively cognizable in 
equity. His motion to tra,nsfer to Chancery was granted. The Chancellor 
348 App. 428 (Ohio App. 1917). 
35145 Cal. App. 596, 302 P. 2d 881 (19~6). 
36218 Ark. 253, 236 S. W. 2d 65 ( 1951). 
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transferred the cause back to the Circuit Court and on November 13, Burton 
prayed for a writ of mandamus to require the Chancellor to try the case. The 
District's application to the Circuit Court of November 15 for determination 
of the amount of deposit and right to enter was refused pending the mandamus 
action, so the District also sought mandamus, but to compel the Circuit 
Court to assume jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found Burton's allegations 
on excessiveness sufficient on the basis that the proposed taking was over 
five times the amount already held by the District. Two justices dissented 
from the holding that the case should be tried in Chancery, distinguishing 
the cases relied upon by the majority, and questioning the adequacy of 
Burton's answer which they regarded as a "mere statement of conclusion not 
sufficient to invoke equitable relief. 11 The case illustrates the special 
nature of eminent domain proceedings, the statute providing that the action 
begin in the Circuit Court, but defenses being considered of an equitable 
nature.37 In these three cases the recognition that eminent domain is a 
special proceeding has had the result of affording greater protection for 
the defendant, although in the Burton case there was no actual settlement of 
property rights. 
In Burlington City Board of .Education v. Allen,38 because the North 
Carolina statute39 provided that the Clerk of the Superior Court appoint the 
appraisers, eminent domain proceedings were declared not to be judicial, but 
a political and administrative measure, at least until the question of com-
pensation is raised. Therefore the defendant was not enti~led to notice, 
37Ark. Stat. 80-403 
38243 N.C. 520, 91 S.E. 2d 180 (1956). 
39c.s. 115-125. 
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and his appeal on the denial by the Clerk of his motion to dismiss was con-
sidered premature. 
Three cases have been found in which the question of whether an eminent 
domain proceeding is against the person of the title holder or against the 
property was discussedo Herren v. Board of Education40 was denominated in 
the report an "action in ~ to condemn, 11 but there was no discussion on 
this pointo 
In~ Oronoco School District41 is slight authority to the effect that 
a condemnation proceeding is in~ and not in personamo The discussion on 
- I 
this point in the case was not for the usual purpose of settling the problem 
of adequacy of notice. The court stated that the proceeding was in~ in 
holding that damages awarded to two parties may be assessed by the jury in 
gross and divided between the parties. The award of the jury was considered 
a fund standing in place of the land. It is not clear that the court decided 
this issue on that basis, however, as the objection of the defendant was held 
to be too late as it was made after the verdict had been rendered. 
The more acceptable vie~ would seem to be that held in Board of Educa-
42 tion of City of Stillwater v. Aldredge. In this case the major issue was 
sufficiency of notice. The case was before the court three times, and in 
the second action, the court held that where the statute of the territorial 
legislature did not provide for notice, the requirement would not be inferred. 
Notice by publication was held to be insufficient, and the court observed that 
cases which say eminent domain is a proceeding in~ are ~istaken. Other 
40219 Ga. 431, 134 S.E. 2d 6 (1963) •. 
41170 Minn. 49, 212 N.W. 8 (1927). 
42 13 Okl. 205, 73 Pac. 1104 (1903). 
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problems involved in the case will be considered in Chapter VIII. 
DELEGATION OF THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
Judicial opinions have consistently stated that the authority for 
exercise of the right of eminent domain is inherent in government, and that 
the legislature may determine when, how, and by whom the power may be exer-
cisedo Statements typical of those found in many of the school and college 
cases are as follows: 
The right to appropriate private property to public 
uses lies dormant in the state until legislative action 
is had, pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions, 
and agencies for its appropriation.43 
0 • • • • 
/-T /he right to exercise the power must be con-
ferred by-stcrtute, either in express words or by necessary 
implication. and is not to be gathered from doubtful infer-
ences.4?1-
. . . . . 
••• L-T~he power to take is found in the broad scope 
of eminent domain inherent in the ultimate source of authority 
in every organized society, which is exercised through:proper 
legislative enactment, subject to the constit~tional limita-
tions set forth. 45 
• • • • 0 
It is the exclusive prerogative of the Legislature--
limited only by our organic law which requires that just 
43Richland School Township v. Overmyer, 164 Ind. 382, 73 N.E. 8).1 
(1905). 
44nean v. County Board of Education, 210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923). 
45valentine v. Lamont, 13 N.J. 569, 100 A. 2d 668, 673 (1953). 
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compensation shall be paid for the land so appropriated--
to prescribe the method of taking land for the public use.46 
Two cases are of special interest concerning the delegation of authority 
by the legislature for exercise of the right of eminent domain. 
The Code of the District of Columbia providing far condemnation by Com-
missioners of the District for schoolhouses·"or for any other municipal use 
authorized by Congress 1147 wc;1s c:onst,:i::uecl. Jn GQIIUI!.issioners ,.of the District of 
Columbia Vo Shannon and Luchs Construction £2.• 48 An Act of Congress making 
appropriations for the District of, Columbia,tqr.t~e fiscatyear>ending June 
30, 1925, provided 11For athletic field (or the Western High School, $125,0Q0. 1149 
In the decision, the court stated: 
We are of the opinion that the mere act of appropriat:i.ng the · 
money by Congress, for the purpose spedfied in the act, is. 
sufficient to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent .· • 
domain by the commissioners to carry the purpose into effect.so 
The situation concerning the District of Columbia can be distinguished from 
a similar situation in oneof the States, and it would.seem doubtful if this 
case could be relied upon c1s authority for a rule that a legislative appro-
priation without an express grant of authority t{> exercise the right of emi-
nent domain is sufficient delegc1t:i.on of.thc1t right. 
The authority cited by the .appeltant in Denson v. Alabama Polytechnical 
46Burlington City Board of Education v~ Allen, 243 N.C. 520, 91 S.E. 2d 
.· '.·· ·' ·- ·.-.-.-.- ' 180 (1956)0 
47 · DoCo Code 483. 
4857 Appo Do Co 67, 17 F. 2d 219 (1927). 
49 43 Stats o 558. 
5017 Fo 2d at 221. 
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Institute51 to the effect that statutes on eminent domain must be strictly 
construed and that the power must not be granted by implication was mentioned 
in the opinion. No express grant of power to the Institute in the school 
code or in the general eminent domain statute, was found however. The court 
thought that, according to the language of the general statute, the legis-
lature had assumed that the power existed for the Institute, but under the 
strict rule urged by the appellant,the statute could not be construed as a 
grant of the right of eminent domain. In holding that the Institute could 
condemn the property, the court said: 
But this institute is a state institution, owned, controlled, 
and supported by the state, receiving also federal aid •••• 
Such state institutions are a part of the state, and their 
property is in fact the property of the state. They are held 
to be immune from suits under the terms of our Constitution 
prohibiting suits against the state, though the charter may 
expressly provide otherwise. ••• If therefore such institu-
tions are so far an integral part of the state as to enjoy 
immunity from suits because of a constitutional prohibition 
against a suit against the state, we are of the opinion, by 
logical sequence, it must follow they also enjoy that other 
incident of sovereignty, the right of eminent domain, for 
the property to be acquired is in fact the property of the 
state and used for state purposes, the educational advance-
ment of its citizens. ••• We think section 7476 of the Code 
of 1923 discloses a legislative recognition of this power 
of eminent domain as existing in petiti·oner and makes pro-
vision for its enforcement. The power comes from its 
inseparable connection with the state of which it forms a 
parto The power is therefore derived from the sovereign 
state, and needs no express statutory declaration to that 
endo52 ' 
A later Alabama decision53 insists that the basis for this case was the con-
stitutional independence of the Institute from the legislature, but, if so, 
51220 Ala. 433, 126 SO. 133 (1930). 
52 126 Soo at 134. 
53Gerson v. Howard, 246 Ala. 567, 21 So. 2d 693 (1945). 
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that basis.was not stated in explicit terms by the court. Whatever the basis 
for the decision, it:would be doubtful if it could be relied on. by schools 
with a less direct relationship to the State as authority to the effect that 
legislative delegation of the right of eminent domain is not essential to 
its exercise. 
The question of whether property outside the boundary of a school 
district may be condemned has been considered in two cases. The tract sought 
by the Board in Bertagnoli v. Baker54 was situated partly within the Salt 
Lake City School District .and partly within the Granite School District. 
The owner's demurrer and motion for pleadings to be made more definite and 
certain were overruled and denied, so he petitioned for a writ of prohibi-
tion which was granted. The statute provided that the right of eminent 
do~ain may be-exercised in behalf of public buildings and grounds for the use 
of :any county, city or incorporated town, or board of education. Boards of 
education were classified as municipal corporations with purely statutory 
powers, and authority was cited to the effect that municipal corporations 
could not condemn land outside their corporate limits unless the power was 
expressly delegated by the legislature. The Board cited cases in which authori-
ty of a city to take property for water, sewer, and power plants without 
express statutory provisions was upheld, but the court reasoned that in these 
cases the authority could be clearly inferred, since the grant of power to 
construct the plants would be worthless otherwise. But the court found no 
persuasive reason why the legislature would contemplate that efficient school 
systems could not be maintained without the power to condemn land outside 
54117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950). 
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the boundaries of the district.; : 'l'h'e:' 'court thought that the only natural 
conclusion to be drawn from the silence of the statute was that the legis-
lature did not intend to confer extra-territorial powers of condemnation 
on school districts. The Board argued that if the legislature had intended 
to limit school district condemnation to within the boundaries it would have 
done so, and pointed out that the legislature had so limited counties. This 
suggestion was met by the Court with the observation that the legislature 
had expressly given the power to cities to take land outside their corporate 
limits. A less convincing position of the court was its observation that if 
boards had possessed the authority to construct schools outside their dis-
tricts, a 1947 enactment authorizing them to participate in joiijt construction 
and operation of schools attended by resident or adjoining district students, 
either within or without the state, would have been unnecessary. A concur-
ring opinion suggested that if the right to condemn were exercised jointly, 
an inference of the grant of power might be found, but pointed out that this 
question was not before the court.· 
The decision in Sterkel v. Mansfield~ of Education55 was in agree-
ment with the Bertagnoli case. The case began as a petition for1 injunction 
which was denied. The first appeal was dismissed, but the Supreme Gourt re-
versed the decision and granted the injunction. While the case was on appeal, 
the Board sought a writ of mandamus to compel determination of the proceeding, 
and after the injunction was granted, this action was determined moot. 56 · The 
Board relied on a provision in statutes authorizing purchase of property 
55172 Ohio St. 231, 175 N.E. 2d 64 (1961). 
56state v. Comm.on Pleas Court, 172 Ohio St. 259, 175 N.E. 2d 67 (1961). 
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"either within or without the district," but the-court construed the meaning 
of "purchase" in the-restricted sense of acquisition after-voluntary agreement. 
A case involving the attempt by a city to t_ake a cemetery was cited as authori-
ty for the rule that power to take land exempted from appropriation must 
be expressly granted. 
Legislative Provision~ Statute for Condemnation. 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the types of statutory 
provisions by which schools and colleges have been granted authority to 
exercise the right of eminent domain. It·is not an attempt to pre~ent a 
complete historical account of eminent domain·legislation, nor will all of 
the types of statutory provisions be mentioned. Other types of statutory 
provisions will be c:onsidered in subsequent chapters. 
A co'inmon form of pro;iding the authority ·for ·schools or colleges to 
condemn property is for the express grant of the-authority to .appear in 
the -school co~e of the State, or in the statutes creating the ·college or 
·university. Oftet:t this provhion will specify that the procedure to be fol-
lowed by the -school or -college is that provided in a general eminent domain 
siatute. In many cases the·express authorization for schools and colleges 
to condemn property is repeated in the general statute. Some of the litiga-
tion has resulted. from confusion over which of these sources provides the 
authority for condemnation. One of the cases,57 -while critical of the fact 
that alternative methods were available, upheld the method pursued by the 
57union School District of City of Jackson v. Starr Commonwealth !..2E. 
Bo~, 322 Mich. 165, 33 N.W. 2d 807 (1948). 
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school district. A Michigan Judicial Council study was mentioned in the 
opinion, in which it had been found that there were 17 methods in that State 
by which property could be condemned. 
General Eminent Domain Statutes. Authority for the Board to condemn 
land on which it had constructed a gymnasium through a misunderstanding 
regarding the boundaries of its property was found in a general statute 
in Ouachita Parish School Board v. Clark.58 The code contained the 
rationale in a somewhat unusual fashion. It provided that every individu-
al who possesses property is tacitly subjected to the obligation of 
yielding it to the community whenever it becomes necessary for the general 
use, and that if the owner refuses to yield or demands an exhorbitant price, 
he may be divested of his property by authority of law.59 
A general statute containing provision for the right of eminent domain 
to be exercised in behalf of a number of public uses, including public 
buildings and grounds for the use of any school district, was authority for 
the condemnation in Board of Education of City of Minot v •. Park District. 60 
There was no grant of the power of eminent domain in the statutes relating 
to special school districts, although the grant of authority had been made 
for common school districts. The court held that the absence of the provision 
in the special district law did not indicate·a lack of the power, and upheld 
the condemnation on the basis that special districts were granted all the 
powers and duties usual to public corporations. 
58197 La. 131, 1 So. 2d 54 (1941). 
591a. Code 2626, 2627. 
6070 N.W. 2d 899 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
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In a number of states, schools or colleges authorized to exercise the 
right of eminent domain are required to follow the procedure established for 
other agencies, such as municipal corporations, railroad corporations or 
counties. In Cousens v. L)7!Uan School District,61 one of the objections of 
the owner was that there was no record of the proceeding in the town clerk's 
office as provided by the statute on laying out of ways. The court held 
that while the District was following the procedure of the statute, the 
proper place for the record was.in the School District, and to that extent 
the details of the statute should not be followed. 
Interpretation of two sections of the Texas statutes was required in 
County School Trustees of Upshur County v. Free. 62 By a section which re-
lated only to schools, the County School Trustees were given power to acquire 
the fee simple title to real property by exercise of the right of eminent 
domain for all common school districts and the Independent School Districts 
of their county having less than 150 students. The action was brought to 
acquire title to the surface estate of two strips of land adjoining the site 
of East Mountain Common School District. The defendant argued that the 
statute provided only for school districts having less than 150 students, 
and since East Mountain School had more than 150 students, there was no 
statutory authority for exercise of the right of eminent domain. Another 
section of the statutes provided that all cities and towns in Texas and all 
Independent School Districts having 150 or more students may exercise the 
right of eminent domain. The court interpreted the school section to provide 
6167 Me. 280 (1877). 
62154 s.w. 2d 935 (Tex. App. 1941). 
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authority for the Tnistees to contemn property for all common school districts 
and like authority to condemn for Independent Districts of less than 150 
students. 
Provisions of the School~· Many of the school and college condem-
nation cases present the problem of which of the school statutes apply to a 
particular type of district. This question is raised most frequently in 
regard to specific provisions of the statute by which the board is required 
to meet certain conditions, and these statutes will generally be discussed 
in Chapter VIII. 
The defendant in Consolidated School District :t-l"o. ~ v. 0 1Malley63 in-
sisted that the statutes under which the proceedings were brought directed 
the Board to the statute for consolidated districts which he maintained did 
not contain authority for condemnation. The statute under which the pro-
ceedings were begun by the District provided; 
Whenever any district shall select, at the annual or any 
special meeting, one or more sites for one or more school-
houses, or the Board of Education in a city, town, or consoli-
dated school district, under the provisions of the statute 
applicable thereto, shall locate, direct and authorize the 
purchase of sites for schoolhouses, libraries, offices and 
public parks and playgrounds, or additional grounds adjacent 
to schoolhouse site or sites, and cannot agree with the owner 
thereof as to the price to be paid for the same, or for any 
other cause cannot secure a title thereto, the Board of Direc-
tors or Board of Education aforesaid may proceed to condemn 
the same in the same manner as provided for condemnation of 
right of way •••• L-emphasis by court.:J64 
The court agreed that the italicized portion required the District to find 
authority to condemn in the statute relating totown, city or consolidated 
63343 Mo. 1187, 125 S.W. 2d 818, 232 Mo. App. 1116, 115 s.w. 2d 171 (1938). 
64 Sec. 9215 R.s. 1929, Mo. St. Ann., Sec. 9il5, p. 7087. 
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districts. That statute did not contain an express authorization for exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain but it did authorize consolidated districts 
to perform the same duties as Boards of other school districts under general 
school law "except as provided." The·court held that "except as provided" 
referred to the provisions of the statute quoted above. The result was 
that by a bit of circular reasoning, authority was found for the District to 
condemn. It would seem that the italicized portion of the.statute quoted 
could be construed to refer only to the method of selecting the site by city, 
town or consolidated districts. If this construction were adopted, the act 
.could be held to grant authority to 11 any district" without reference to other 
sections of the statutes. It is not clear why the court did not .adopt this 
construction. 
Statutory Limitations~ the Amount and Kind of Property That May Be 
Taken. Virginia statutes illt,istrate the situation in which eminent domain 
proceedings are authorized by both the school sections and a general eminent 
domain act. The court considered these sections together in School Board of 
City of Harrisonburg v. Alexander65 in ruling that .a city board is subject 
to the same limitations as those imposed on county boards of edu.cation. 
Prior to 1903, the court explained, there was no general statute and the power 
was exercised under separate statutes relating to each agency. The 1904 Gode 
contained general provisions, and a section was added conferring the right 
of eminent domain on school districts. The same legislature amended the school 
s~ctions, but left in the chapter relating to county boards the provision that 
no dwelling, yard, garden, or orchard could be invaded. The chapter relating 
65126 Va. 407, 101 S.E. 349 (1919). 
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to city boards did not contain this provision, but did state that the pro-
visions of the chapter applying to counties should apply in like manner to 
cities, and that city boards could have the same powers in relation to con-
demnation as county boards. In the case cited, the Board attempted to 
avoid the limitations on condemning a dwelling by considering this provi-
sion a grant of power. The court found the grant of power in the general 
a~t, which it said applied to cities, towns and counties alike, and the 
limitations stated applied to all as well. An earlier case, Burger v. 
State Female Normal Schoo166 was noted which reached an opposite result, 
but the court thought that a general statute should be restrained by 
special enactment. The Burger case may be distinguishable, as there the 
court held that the words, "any company chartered by this State," in refer-
ence to the limitation on condemnation of dwellings did not include state 
institutions. The court also held that the provision in the general act that 
11 the proceedings in all such cases shall be according to the provisions of 
this act so far as they can be applied to same," did not refer to the limi-
tation against taking dwellings, but to the procedure to be followed. 
Dennis v. Independent School District of Walker67 was an application 
for certiorari to have the action of the Board to condemn declared null and 
void. The dismissal of the writ was affirmed as the question of the autho-
rity of the District to condemn had not been raised in the trial court. 
The District began condemnation proceedings in July, 1911, to acquire a 1.3 
acre tract owned by two parties which adjoined the established site. One 
6614 Va. 491, 77 s.E. 489 (1913), 
67 166 Iowa 556, 148 N.W. 1007 (1914). 
of the parties accepted the award of the referees without objection. The 
other party contended that the Board had no authority to take or hold more 
than one acre. An earlier law had provided that the Board could take and 
hold so much as necessary; provided "real.estate so taken, otherwise than 
by consent of the ow:ner or owners, shall not exceed one acre. 11 68 A re-
enactment of this section resulted in the wording: 
Any school corporation may take and hold so much real 
estate as may be required for schoolhouse sites, for the 
location or construction thereon of schoolhouses, and the 
convenient use thereof, but not to exceed one acre, exclu-
sive of public highway except in a city, town, or village 
it may include one block exclusive of the street or highway 
as the case may be: or in districts consolidated ••• , or in 
school townships holding not more than two school sites, 
may consist of not to exceed four acres for any one site, 
unless by the owners consent, ••• 69 
It was the plaintiff's position that this statute had two distinct parts 
and that the District was under the first part and therefore could not 
hold over one acre or one block. The court nqted that in rewriting the 
statute, the provision for consolidated districts had been inserted, and 
that by reading the entire statute, the consent of the owner referred to 
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in the last part could also refer to the one acre or one block limitations. 
Since the amount of land to be taken from this plaintiff was less than one 
acre, and the other party was not complaining, the District was authorized 
to condemn the property. 
The court in Nelson v. Ottawa County School District No. 170 held that 
the District may proceed either under the act applicable to second class 
68 Acts, 13th Gen •. Assembly, ch. 124. 
69 1907 Code Supp. 2814, cited at 148 N.W. 1009. 
70100 Kan. 612, 164 Pac. 1075 (1917). 
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cities, which limited the amount that could be taken to l~ acres, or under 
the act which applied to Districts wherein third class cities were located, 
which did not contain a limitation on the amount that could be condemned. 
The legislative history of enactments by which various types of dis-
tricts in Kentucky could condemn property was discussed in Bell's Commit-
tee v. Board of Education of Harrodsburg.71 Of a 300 acre tract owned by 
--r--
Bell, who was 11 of unsound mind," the Board sought 12.9 acres within the 
corporate limits for a public high school. A motion to dismiss was sus-
tained, but overruled on appeal. After a verdict for a total of $20,400, 
the denial of a motion for a new trial was affirmed. The defendant thought 
that if the Board had authority to condemn, it could not take over one acre, 
nor any land on which there was a residence. The earliest act mentioned, 
passed in 1893, authorized District Trustees to condemn not over one acre, 
but no residence, garden, orchard, or burying ground. In 1908, County 
Boards of Education were given authority to condemn in the manner provided 
for railroad purposes. A re-enactment of the 1893 statute in 1916 included 
the County Board of Education as one of those authorized to exercise the 
right of eminent domain. The result was one grant of the power without the 
limitations, and one limiting the amount that could be taken to one acre 
not to include any residence, garden, orchard or burying ground. In 1920, 
fourth class cities were authorized to institute c;ondemnation proceedings in 
accordance with railroad company statute provisions. Under the 192© act, the 
defendant insisted, the legislature intended to limit the city board to pro-
visions of the 1916 act. The court reasoned that the Board had been granted 
71192 Ky. 700, 234 S.W. 311 (1921). 
power to purchase the amount it deemed necessary, so it should not be 
limited in the amount it could take by condemnation. 
The situation that resulted from one act applying to County Boards 
limiting the amount and kind of property that could be taken and another 
without a limitation was considered in Cunningham v. Shelby County Board 
ot Education.72 In this case, the court coneluded that the purpose of 
the legislature was evidently that each of the sections of the act should 
be effective and neither destructive of the other. This result could be 
accomplished only by ascribing to the act the meaning it had when first 
enacted for county boards of education--no limitation. 
The legislative history of provisions in North Carolina statutes 
limiting the amount of property that could be taken was considered in 
Board of Education of Wake County v. Peg~am73 for the purpose of settling 
the issue of whether the power of eminent domain was exhausted after one 
instance of its exercise. In 1901, the statute provided that a school 
could not take more than one acre; in 1903, the amount was changed to two 
acres; in 1913, three acres; and in 1923, not more than ten a~res. The 
court concluded that it was evidently contemplated by the legislature that 
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a school site was 11 an elastic quantity" va,;,ying as the expansion and needs 
of school systems might require. The court found no reason why the power 
should be exhausted by one exercise of the ri~ht unless the maximum quantity 
of land had been reached. 
The fact that the Board already QWned an adjoining tract of six acres 
72202 Ky. 763, 261 S.W. 266 (1924). 
73 197 N.C. 33, 147 S.E. 622 (1929). 
on which a high school was situated did not prevent condemnation of 7.5 
acres more for a grammar school according to Wayne County Board of Educa-
t!ori v. Lewis.74 The statute75 provided that a site may not contain over 
ten acres if any part must be obtained by condemnation. The fact that the 
sites involved were adjoining was considered incidental, as they were re-
garded as separate sites. The granting of a writ of assistance to obtain 
possession was affirmed. 
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A district owning three acres, all secured other than by condemnation, 
sought adjacent land for an athletic field and playground in Schaefer v. 
76 School District No. 18. The statute provided that as much real estate as 
necessary for the location, construction, and convenient use of the school 
could be taken by eminent domain provided that the real estate taken other-
wise than by consent of the owner did not exceed three acres "in any one 
place or location," or if within a platted town, not over one block. The 
court suggested that "in any one place or location" had been added in 1941 
in contemplation of efforts to secure multiple school sites, and held that 
the District could not hold for school purposes more than three acres tn 
one location. The District contention that unless and until the right of 
eminent domain had been exercised this statute could be invoked at its pleas-
ure was answered in the opinion by the statement that the whole purpose of 
the statute was here anticipated and accomplished. A Pennsylvania railroad 
case was cited to the effect that rights acquired under eminent domain are 
74 ( 231 N.C. 661, 58 S.E. 2d 725 1950). 
75 G.S. 115-85. 
76111 Colo. 340, 141 P. 2d 903 (1943). 
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the same as those acquired by purchase. The judgment for the District was 
reversed. It would seem that:in this case, the confusion between a legis-
lative limitation on the amount to be taken by eminent domain and a legis-
lrtive determination of the amount of land necessary for a school site, was 
not well clarified by the court. 
The opinion in Ferree v. Alegheny Sixth~ School District77 stated 
there was no reason to exclude from the power of a school district the 
authority to enter upon and occ;upy improved lots. There was no reference 
to statutory provisions but the court added that ownership of an adjoining 
lot would not prevent the District from taking as much as necessary where 
the quantity allowed by the act had not been exce~ded. 
The court permitted condemnation of a piece of property in Board of 
Education of School District !!2• 1 v. Harper78 even though it contained a 
homestead. The reason given was that the section of the education law 
which prevented taking a homestead applied to a building lot of ordinary 
terminology and not to an estate of the character involved in this case. 
Proceedings to condemn part of the property of the d~fendant in 
Center School District N.o. 1 v. Sen Previvo79 were dismissed and- affirmed 
- - -,.--
even though the land had been found reasonably necessary for public use. 
Condemnation was precluded by the statute which prohibited acquisition with-
out the consent of the owner of a yard necessary to the use of buildings. 
Evidence had established that the property sought by the District was 
77 76 Pa. 376 (1872). 
78191 N.Y.S. 273 (1918). 
79257 App. Div. 1029, 13 N.Y.s. 2d 593 affd. 282 N.Y. 631, 25 N.E. 2d 
979 (1939). 
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reasonably necessary to the owner as a range for poultry in connection with 
poultry houses constructed at large expense on tpe part of the property that 
was not taken. 
Dicta in the ~ase of Union Free School District No 0 10 v. Baumgartner80 
ip.dicated that a school district would not be prevented from condemning a 
golf course on the basis that it was a yard or enclosure within the statu-
tory exclusion of this property from being taken by eminent domain. 
Remedial Provisions. Statutes cited in Buchwalter v. School District 
Noo 4281 were of a remedial nature, providing that a school district which 
constructed a building on land without holding the equitable title could 
apply to the probate judge for appraisers and on payment by the District 
to the County Treasurer, title would vest in the District. The issue liti-
gated was whether the owner was entitled to notice, and the court held that 
none was required either by the statute or the constitution. 
In Long v. Monongahela City School District82 a statute providing that 
a district which held a previous lesser interest may acquire the fee by reso-
lution and publication was men.tioned, but was not at issue in the case. The 
statute was important to schools in Pennsylvania where a previous decision 
had held that when abandoned for school purposes, the interest that had been 
condemned would r~vert to the original owner.83 
80277 App. Div. 998, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 151 (1950). 
8165 Kan. 603, 70 Pac. 605 (1902). 
82395 Pa. 618, 151 A. 2d 461 (1959). 
83Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. St. 128, 61 Atl. 815 (1905) discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
In ~ Application of ~ York University84 involved the statute of 
limitations on a condemnation award, and the University had been involved 
in condemnation as the defendant. The proceeding was brought by the Uni-
versity to review a determination of the State Comptroller rejecting its 
claim for payment of a condemnation award, The award had been made by 
decree for damages against New York City on January 5, 1916. The award 
was not paid until May 19, 1944. The Comptroller's position was that the 
statute of limitations prevented payment, but the University made its 
claim under an Abandoned Property Law in which the court found no limita-
tionso The dismissal of the University's petition was reversed on policy 
grounds. 
Theories of Statutory Construction. 
Some of the opinions in school and college condemnation cases contain 
statements similar to that made in Schooi Board of City of Harrisonburg v. 
Alexander85 that: 
••• The taking of private property, however, is a matter of 
serious import, and is not to be permitted except where the 
right is plainly conferred and the manner of its exercise 
has been strictly followed •••• 86 
While the opinions of some of the cases indicate that the strict construe .. 
tion of eminent domain statutes is a generallyaccepted rule, there are 
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enough instances of exceptions to doubt whether it is meaningful to attempt 
84271 App. Div. 131, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 556, rev'g 185 Misc. 40, 57 N.Y.S. 
2d 158 (1946) 0 
85126 Va. 407, 101 s.E. 349 (1919). 
86101 s.E. at 351. 
49 
to state a rule. How a statute is construed may depend on the facts of the 
case involved. A good illustration is the case of Davis v. Board of Educa-
tion of Anne Arundel County.87 The statute in question provided that when 
land was required for school purposes and the Board was unable to purchase 
it, proceedings to condemn it according to the general eminent domain 
statutes may be initiated, 11but no lot so taken or enlarged shall exceed, 
in the whole, 10 acres, including the land occupied by the school building. 1188 
On November 3, 1931, the Board acquired title to a tract of more than 10 
acres subject to the right of Davis to use an alleyway 20 feet wide which 
crossed the property. The building constructed completely covered the alley-
way for 162.4 feet of its length, depriving the owner of the easement of its 
use. On April 1, 1933, the Board petitioned to condemn the easement. The 
defendant, Davis, entered a plea in bar of condemnation proceedings on the 
basis that the Board owned a tract exceeding 10 acres in area. The Board's 
demurrer to the plea in bar was sustained, and on appeal affirmed. The court 
based its holding on the fact that acquiring the easement would not enlarge 
the lot, but only increase the rights of the owner. If taking the easement 
were said to enlarge the owner's rights in the lot, the court reasoned that 
the action would not be within the scope of the grant of powe.r by the legis-
lature, as the power granted to condemn land would not apply. On the other 
hand, if the building were removed to permit the right in the easement to 
be exercised, the area of the lot would not be diminished, The 10 acre limi-
tation was held to be a limit on the amount that could be condemned, not on 
87 166 Md. 118, 170 Atl. 590 (1934). 
88 1931 Acts, Ch. 157. 
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the amount the Board could acquire and hold. The court regarded the purpose 
of the statute as empowering the Board to exercise the state's power of 
eminent domain to acquire land needed to establish new sites or enlarge sites 
already established, provided the lot so taken or enlarged did not exceed, 
in the whole, 10 acreso In t;.he words of the cot.1.rt: 
It may be conceded that the general rule is that 
statutes of eminent domain are to be strictly construed, 
but, while such statutes are in derogation of common 
right, they are not in derogation of the common law, and 
not subject to the same rigid construction applicable to 
such statutes. But while they should be strictly con-
strued, the purpose and intention of the Legislature when 
clearly manifested in the statute should not be defeated 
by any narrow, strained, forced, or artificial construc-
tion of its language.89 
The admonition to read statutes according to their most natural and obvious 
import and to construe them strictly in order to effect the intention of the 
framers, as suggested in Board of Education of Village School D;i.strict v. 
O•Rourke,90 could hardly be. said to have been given much consideration in this 
· case. 
The O•Rourke case was an attempt to condemn two village lots each 100 feet 
wide fronting on opposite sides of a block. Both lots contained gardens. 
The judgment of the referee who had held that the provision preventing taking 
against the owner's consent of a garden was not applicable when part of a 
whole piece of property, was reversed. The court was of the opinion that 
this was contrary to the plain reading of the statute, and that the legis-
lature intended to protect such property (gardens) without qualification. 
89 170 Atl. at 59. 
90191 App. Div. 317, 181 N.Y.S. 21 (1920). 
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The explanation given in Bertagnoli v, Baker91 for the fact that a 
school district could not take territory outside its district, was that 
the right of eminent domain being in derogation of rights of individual 
ownership has been strictly construed so that no person would be wrongly 
deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property. 
The suggestion in some of the cases that statutes in pari materia 
should be read together is not very dependable as a rule. The question can 
always be raised as to when statutes are, in fact, in pari materia. In 
the Alexander92 case, the court followed this "rule" concerning a general 
eminent domain statute and a statute relating specifically to schools. In 
the Sterkel9' case, the Board suggested that statutes in pari materia should 
be read together and that the statute authorizing purchase of property out'-
side the district should also authorize condemnation of property outside the 
district, but the court was not willing to follow this suggestion. 
Delegation of Authority~ Provisions 2£. Charter _.Q!. Constitution. 
' . 
While many charters are granted by legislative enactment, the rights 
granted by charter are usually thought of as subject to little change. The 
effect of a grant of authority to exercise the right of eminent domain by 
charter provisions has been considered in a few school cases. 
The issue in the case did not directly involve the authority to condemn, 
91117 Utah 348, 215 P,· 2d 626 (1950). 
92126 Va. 407, 101 S.E. 349 ( 1919). 
93172 Ohio St. 231, 175 N.E. 2d 64 (1961). 
b\.lt in Board of Education of City of Hollandv. VanDerVeen94 the authority 
of the Board to select a site by resolution was challenged. Provisions of 
the city charter were cited by the court as authority for the resolution 
instead of election: 
The board of education shall have authority and it 
shall be their duty to designate and establish such num-
ber of sites for schoolhouses as may be necessary and to 
purchase and procure the lands therefor •••• 95 
An earlier Michigan case96was distinguished on ·the basis that there was no 
such provision in the Detroit charter. 
The issue of whether charter or statutory provisions apply in a given 
case was litigated in Waukegan v. Stanczak.97 In 1859, the City had been 
incorporated by a special charter with a co-extensive School District. 
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According to the general school law, a referendum for selection of a school 
site would have been necessary, but the Board proceeded by resolution to 
determine the site and requested the City to condemn the land under the 
authority of the eminent domain powers of the special charter School Dis-
trict. The defendant contended that the City's adoption of the Cities and 
Villages Act of 1890 brought it under the general law and that, therefore, 
the School District was under general school law. The general law, however, 
was held to abrogate only inconsistent charter powers, and the general school 
law contained exceptions regarding special charter districts. The defendant 
94169 Mich. 470, 135 N.W. 241 (1912). 
95135 N.W. at 242, citing 1899 Local Acts No. 427, p. 257. 
96Board of Education of City of Detroit v, Morass, 151 Mich. 625, 114 N~W. 
75 (1907). . 
976 Ill. 2d 594, 129 NoE. 2d 751 (1955). 
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also objected to the taking on the ground that there was no authorization 
in the charter for the Special District to condemn, but the court found 
that the charter granted the authority, if not expressly~ then by necessary 
implication. 
An act of the General Assembly to amend the charter provisions relative 
to condemnation for school purposes was upheld in Sheppard v. Edison98 on 
the basis that it did not violate constitutional prohibitions against 
special legislation. 
Authority for condemnation was found in constitutional provisions in 
99 Gerson v. Howard. The court regarded the Board of Trustees as the gov-
erning body for the purpose of carrying out the constitutional functions 
of Alabama Polytechnical Institute, also known as Auburn: 
This body is, pro hac vice, its legislature and can do those 
things which pertain to the purposes for which the Alabama 
Polytechnical Institute was created.100 
There was no need in this case, the court felt, for an express statutory 
declaration of the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain. 
The interesting situation of the condemnee insisting that the Univer· 
sity was constitutionally independent of the legislature and therefore 
could not rely on a statute authorizing the State to condemn was 
101 presented in People v. Brooks. The court recognized the University 
as a separate entity but a department of the State government 
created by tne Constitution, and the opinion of the court pointed out 
98161 Ga. 907, 132 S.E. 218 (1926). 
99246 Ala. 567, 21 So. 2d 693 (1945). 
l0021 So. 2d at 695. 
lOl224 Mich. 45, 194 N.W. 602 (1923). 
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that the real estate it holds is public property belonging to the State. 
Constitutional Limitations Upon Delegation of!!!.!. Authority.!£ Exercise the 
Right of Eminent DQmain. 
I. 
The constitutions of all but one·of the States have been found to con-
tain clauses limiting the power of eminent domain by providing that just 
compensation shall be made.when private property is taken for public use.102 
Another source indicates that two States are without this type of provision, 
but that in New Hampshire the common law has been held to require just com-
pensation, and in North Carolina just compensation is a part of the require-
ment of due process of law.103 In Eller·v. Board of Education of Buncombe 
Countyl04 the court noted that the principle that just compensation must be 
made for property taken 
••• is deeply imbedded in our constitutional law. It·was 
incorporated in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Consti-
tution. While the principle is not stated in express 
terms in the North qarolina Constitution, it is regarded 
as an integral part of the 11 law of the land" within the 
meaning of Article I, Section 17.105 
102valentine ·v. Lamont, 20 N.J. Super 454, 90 A. 2d 143, affd. 25 N.J. 
Super. 342, 96 A. ~d 417, .affd. 13 N.J.·569, 100 A. 24 668, cert. den.347 U.S. 
966, 74 S. Ct. 776 (1953). 
103 49 Iowa L.R. 193. See footnote p. 194. Part I, Article 12 of the 
·New Hampshire'Constitution provides in part that 11 ••• no part of a man 1s 
property shall be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his 
own consent, or that of the representative body of the people." 
104242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E. 2d 144 (1955). 
l0589 S.E. 2d at page 146. Article I, Section·l7.provides that "No 
person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liber-
ties or privileges, or outlawed or ·exiled, or in any manner·deprived of his 
life, liberty,or·property but by the·law of the land." 
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The authority of the Missouri Board of Regents to condemn property for 
a dormitory was challenged in Board o~ Regents v. Palmer106 on the basis that 
a recent revision of the Constitution contained an article which specified 
only that the state, county, or city may acquire property by eminent domain.107 
In spite of the fact that this provision was more in the nature of a grant or 
extension of power than would be found in most of the State constitutions, 
the court held that the power to exercise the right of eminent domain did not 
depend on a grant in the constitution, but is inherent in a sovereign state. 
Constitutional provisions are limitations on the power, the court said, and 
in this article the provision that the state, covnty, or city may acquire 
property in excess of that actually to be occupied was in no manner a limi-
tation on who may exercise the right of eminent domain. 
Compensation. An Act of the Tennessee Legisiature was held to be un-
constitutional because it did not provide an adequate remedy for the 
enforcement of the constitutional provision for payment of jui;t compensation 
in Bragg v. Yeargin.108 109 The Act·· was entitled 11 An act to extend to County 
106356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
107Article I, Section 27 of the Constitution adopted in 1945 provided 
11That in such manner and under s'-'ch limitations as provided by law, the 
state, or any county or city may acquire by eminent domain such property, 
or rights in property, in excess of that actually to be occupied by the 
public improvement or used in connection therewith, as may be re-a.sori9bly 
necessary to effectuate the purposes intended and may be vested with the 
fee simple title thereto, or the control of the use thereof, and may sell 
such excess property with such restrictions as shall be appropriate to 
preserve the improvements made. 11 
108 ( ) 145 Tenno 643, 238 S.W. 78 1922 • 
109chapt'er 149, Acts 1915. 
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Boards of Education and County High School Boards the right of eminent domain 
and to provide for a board of appraisers." It provided that the County Judge 
or Chairman of the County Court, the County Court Clerk, and the County 
Superintendent should constitute a board of appraisers, and in case of a 
failure of the school authorities and the owner to agree on a price for 
property sought, the appraisers were to fix a "fair and equitable value." 
On this point the court held the statute too indefinite as 11 fair cash value" 
was the proper measure of damages. The Act also provided that either party 
could appeal from the report of the appraisers, and that the school authori-
ties may, by depositing-with the County Trustee .a fund equal to that set 
by the appraisers, enter -and construct school buildings. The owner was not 
required to convey the deed until final adjudication. The reasoning of the 
court was that the owner, if awarded a larger sum on appeal, had no remedy 
to collect it, but his land was already taken. The constitutionality of the 
Act was raised by the owner's demurrer to the High School Board's bill for 
a mandatory injunction to prevent the owner from entering or interfering 
with the Board's possession. The Board had taken possession after the ap-
praisers reported the value of the property at $400 and the amount was 
tendered and refused. From the facts stated it would seem that the Board 
·had not complied fully with the requirements of the statute that the fund be 
deposited with the County Trustee. It would seem, also, that to .say the 
owner was without remedy, disregarded the facts that the court had not-final-
ly disposed of the case, that the deed had not been delivered, and that the 
owner could seek equitable relief. 
The fact that the.statute did not provide for compensation did not make 
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it unconstitutional according to the opinion in Dean v. County Board of 
Education. 110 The court thought the legislature had enacted the statute with 
full knowledge of the constitutional requirement. 
The statute construed in Huber v, Steetlll provided that the freeholders 
appointed to assess damages should allow 11 at least cash value, 11 and this was 
held by the court to impose on. the freeholders the duty to allow 11 compensa-
tion11 as required by the constitution. 
The constitutionality of an act providing that the jury determine 
".o o. the amount of compensation in mo.pey that shall be paid to the owner ••• 
which shall be the amount found by the jury to be .the fair and full value 
of such premises•••" was considered in State~ rel. School District No. 
56 of Chelan Co. v. Superior Court.112 The owner claimed this section 
limited recovery to the naked value of the land taken, whereas by the con-
stitution he would be entitled to damages for depreciation of land not 
taken. The court agreed that the owner was entitled to damages and held 
that the statute was directory rather than mandatory. Protection of rights 
of the owner were to be left to the court since the court was to instruct· 
the jury. 11 The power to condemn is the principal thing," said the court, 
11 and, when this is granted, the provisions relating to its exercise need 
not be prescribed to the utmost detau. 11 113 
110210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923). 
11114 Del. Ch •. 302, 125 Atl. 673 (1924). 
11269 Wash. 189, 124 Pac. 484 (1912). 
113 124 Pac. at 486. 
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Equal Protection. Many State constitutions provide that·the State shall 
guarantee·to its citizens the-eq~al protection of the laws, and this provi-
sion has been the basis for rulings that the legislature may not enact.s~at-
utes which apply only to a special class. Eminent domain ·statutes followed 
by schools and colleges have been questioned on this basis and held to be 
reasonable classifications applying to all similarly situated, or for-some 
similar reason, with very little connnent in Wendel v. Board of Education,114 
Knapp v. State~ 115 Sheppard v. Edison, 116 Russell v. Trustees of Purdue 
University, 117 University of .southern California v. Robbins,1 18 Cochran v. 
Cavanaugh,119 and Waukegan v. Stanczak.120 
The plaintiff seeking to enjoin condemnation proceedings in Munn·v. 
Independent-school District ~.Jeffersonl21 challenged the constitutionality 
of the Iowa statute on the basis that it was lacking in some of the elements 
contained in the·eminent .domain statute relating to internal improvements 
and therefore made an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination. The court 
rejected the .argument on the basis that there was a distinction in the pur-
.poses for which the acts were passed, but did not illustrate the distinction: 
11475 N.J.L.·70, 66 Atl. 1075, rev. 76 N.J.L, ·499, 70 Atl. 152 (1908). 
115125 Minn. 194, 145 N.W. 967 (1914). 
116161 Ga. 907, 132 S.E. 218 (1926). 
117 ( ) 201 Ind. 367, 168 N.E. 529 1929. 
1181 Cal. App. 2d 523., 37 P. ·2d 163, cert. den. 295 U.S. 738, 55 S. 
Ct. 650 (1934). 
119 
.. 252 s.w. 284 (Tex. App. 1923). 
120 ( ) 6 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E. 2d 751 1955. 
121188 Iowa 757, 176 N.W. 811 (1920). 
There is a manifest distinction between the exercise of ~he 
right of eminent domain by a school district for school pur-
poses, solely in the public interest, and the exercise of the 
same power by a railway company for its right of way, or by 
a mill owner to acquire the right to flood adjacent land by 
the erection of a mill dam to promote an interest which is 
only quasi-public; and if the Legislature, recognizing such 
distinctions, provides distinctive methods of condemnation, 
there is no infraction of the property owner's constitu-
tional rights.122 
The unreasonable character of any discrimination, the court said, must be 
clear and admit of no reasonable doubt • 
.An unreasonable classification by t.he legislature was found in 
Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler,123 a case that involved a Chautauqua Society 
instead of a school or college, but because of its educational purpose and 
the issues discussed it is included in the study. The Act of the General 
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Assembly of March 2, 1923, provided that any voluntary association organiz~ 
ed for the purpose of establishing a chautauqua, which had existed 15 years 
giving a program of not less than 16 days each year and leasing a tra.c_t of 
timber land for· 15 years was endowed with the right of eminent domain· insofar 
as necessary to acquire the leased land, not exceeding 40 acres. Provisions 
of the Indiana Constitution relied on by the defendant were that the General 
Assembly shall not grant to any ciUzen or class of citizen$ privileges or 
immunities which shall not equally belong to all citizens; 124 nor pass local 
or special laws, but those that shall be general and of uniform operation 
throughout the state.125 The court was of the opinion that there was no 
122176 N.W. at 816, 817. 
123199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518 (1927). 
124rndiana Constitution, Article I, Section 23. 
125rndiana Constitution, Article !Vt Sections 22 and 23. 
reason for different legislation for a society which operated 16 days a 
year for 15 years from that for one which operated 14 days a year for five 
years, and held that these were not reasonable or natural differences, but 
enacted to single out a small sub-class as a recipient of the benefits of 
the legislation. An old line of cases was noted which contained dicta 
that it was for the legislature alone to judge whether a law can be made 
applicable to the whole State, but these could not change the law that the 
power to. construe the constitution is a judicial power. "The present 
legislative tendency toward special and local legislation under the guise 
and verbiage of general laws should be chec;:ked, 11 126 the court said, if not 
by the legislature itself, then by the courts. 
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Issues Regarding the Title of the Statute. Another ground for raising 
constitutional objections to school or college eminent domain legislation is 
that the statute contains material not germane to its title in violation of 
provisions that laws should not contain more than one subject nor contain 
subjects different from that expressed in the title. In State ex rel. School 
District No. 56 .£t. Chelan County v. Superior Court127 the validity of the en-
tire section of the Code of Public Instruction was questioned on the basis 
that the section granting the power of eminent domain to schools was not ger-
mane to the title of the Act authorizing the Code. The title recited that 
the act was to establish, provide for the maintenance of, and relate to a 
general and uniform public school system for the State. The court held that 
the purpose was to enact a complete code, pointing out that if eminent domain 
126155 N.E. at 468. 
12769 Wash. 189, 124 Pac. 484 (1912). 
was not ~ithin the gene~al scope of the title, much·else.would have to be 
excluded and that it· .would be difficult to find one provision. more germane 
·than others. 
The MichiganConstitutiori128 provided that 11 No law shall embrace 
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·more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title," and the defend-
ant· in People· v. Brooks129 maint.ained that 11An ·act to authorize proceedings 
by the state to condemn private property for public use" did not include 
authority for the Board of Regents to exercise the·right of eminent·domain. 
The court found every section of the act germane to the object expressed in 
the title and held that it.was not necessary for the various institutions 
for-which property was to be·taken to be designated in the title of the act. 
A similar issue was raised. in the recent case of Sheppard v. DeKalb 
County Board'of Education.130 In this case, the title of the act read, "An 
Act to authorize County·Boards of Education .and certain Independent .and 
public·school systems to condemn private property for·public·school purposes 
or any public educational program which is now or may be hereafter author-. 
ized by.law." In ,answer to the defendant's contention that the act.involved 
.more than one subject in providing for county, independent, existing, 
.and indefinite programs, the court ;found condemnation as the single·subject 
of the act, and added that in the taking of property there was no denial 
of due process of law as the taking had been authorized by the legislature. 
An·emergency.clause was.added to the.statute authorizing the Board of 
1281908, Article V, Section 21. 
l29224 Mich. 45, 194 N.W. 602 (1923). 
130138 S.E. 2d 271, 220 Ga. i19 (1964). 
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Regents to condemn land for a dormitory and contested on the basis that the 
preamble or bill did not express that an em~rgency existed in Board of Regents 
Vo Palmerol31 The court found that section 10 of ~he a~t, referring to a 
great incre·ase in the number of students enrolled in state educational inst;i-
1 
' tutions a~ a result of conditions existing after World War II, was a suf-
ficient s~atement of emergency. 
SUMMARY 
For the purpose of this study, eminent domain actions of a school or 
college have been classified as those by which the educational institution 
seeks to take property against the wish of the owner or without his consent 
with the intention of making compensation. This classification, in general, 
excludes those cases adjudicating the rights of parties who enter into vol-
untary purchase agreements. The constitutional prohibition against taking 
private property for public use without just compensation has been the basis 
for litigation of a number of issues that may be distinguished from eminent 
domain actions because the intent of the parties did not involve an attempt 
to take property against the will of the owner while making just compensa-
tiono Examples of this distinction are cases involving boundaries, taxation, 
torts, rules and regulations, and charter revisions. A few cases which in-
volve important considerations of eminent; domain principies are included, 
such as those in which the property of a school or college has been sought by 
another agency or those litigating the rights of parties who claim to be sue-
cessors in interest to land condemned by a school or college. 
131356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
Condemnation has been regarded as a special proceeding, and does not 
fit the classifications of "legal-equitable," or "in rem-in personam. 11 
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The consequ~nces of this recognition have generaHy been to afford greater 
protection to the rights of the party whose property is sought in the school 
and college cases. 
The power to exercise the right of eminent dqm.ain has been regarded as 
a fundamental characteristic of government. Theoretically, the power may 
be regarded as unlimited, but, at lrast in the United States, a number of 
limitations have been imposed as a result of both constitutional provision 
and common law. 
There is general agreement that the authority for a school or college 
to exercise the right of eminent domain must be delegated by legislative act. 
Most of the opinions add the requirement that the delegation must be expli-
cit, but in a few cases the delegation of authority has been implied to a 
limited extent. In states where constitutional provisions establish colleges 
or universities as relatively independent from the legislature, there is 
authority to indicate that the institution need not rely on a delegation of 
authority from the legislature. This conclusion should be hedged with the 
suggestion that other considerations particular to the case and the juris-
diction involved may apply, however, The two cases located on the issue·of 
whether a school district may condemn property outside its boundaries have 
held that unless the legislative authorization express\y provides otherwise, 
such property may not be taken. 
Authority for schools and colleges to exercise the right of eminent 
domain is found in general eminent domain statutes, sections of school codes 
or school statutes, charters, statutes for special purposes, or statutes 
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creating and organizing educational institutions. The question of which 
statute should apply to a given case has been the basis for considerable 
litigation, and there is no general conclusion that can be drawn from the 
school and college cases. It would seem that the judiciary has on occasion 
been called upon to remedy unsatisfactory legislative practices. A number 
of problems have resulted from the historical factor of specifying that 
schools and colleges follow procedures previously enacted for condemnation 
of right of way by railroad companies. 
Statutes limiting the amount of property that may be taken by a school 
or college or preventing the taking of dwellings and their surroundings or 
other kinds of property have also been adjudicated, '.I:here has been no con-
sistent pattern of interpreting the meaning or application of these statutes, 
and the results of the cases seem to depend as much on the facts involved as 
on any legal principle. 
Constitutional limitations on delegation of the authority to exercise 
the right of eminent domain are applicable in all the States. Those most 
generally urged in opposition to the attempt to condemn property deal with 
just compensation, special legislation, and material in the statute not 
germane to the title. A liberal construction has usually applied to the 
latter plea and a wide variety of subjects have been found properly within 
the title of acts providing either for schools or for condemnation. Most 
of the statutes have been upheld when challenged on the basis of class or 
special legislation. The requirement of just compensation has been strictly 
applied in some cases, but in other cases the wording of the statute has not 
been considered crucial as the 11 just-ness 11 of compensation is regarded as a 
matter for judicial determination. 
CHAPTER II I. 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC USE AND NECESSITY 
APPLIED TO SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
A basic principle involved in the right of eminent domain noted in 
Cpapter II is that when private property is ta~en against the will of the 
owner it must be taken for a public use. This chapter is concerned, first, 
with questions of how educational institutions have been found to fulfill 
public purposes sufficiently to qualify them to exercise the right of eminent 
domain, and second, with cases in which particular types of uses have been 
questionedo The third section of the chapter involves the principle that 
property must be necessary for the use of a school or college in order for 
it to be taken by eminent domain. 
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF EDUCATION 
In a number of eminent domain cases, the courts have discussed in 
general terms the function of education in society, Some of these comments, 
while they usually do not constitute a legal rule or establish precedent, 
are important as recognition of basic principles upon which the law dependso 
Features of the Educational Enterprise~~ the Courts. 
One of the oldest eminent domain cases involving a school was Williams 
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v. School District No • .§. .1 The issue of whether the taking of the defend-
ant's property by the·school district-was for a public use-was discussed. 
The court-referred to the activity of the legislature in providing for 
-school districts, their-support, requirements, corporate-existence, annual 
meetings, the duty to erect buildings, authority to tax, the use ot 
federal funds, and the creation of the office of state superintendent to 
show that the legislature had regarded education as a public responsibility. 
The court said: 
••• Enough has already been stated to show that the 
whole subject of the maintenance and support of coillillon 
schools has ever been regarded in this state as one not 
only of public usefulnes_s, but of public necessity, and 
one which-the state in its sovereign character was bound 
to .sustain •••• 
Every public use is to :some extent local and benefits 
a parti.cular section. more than others •••• It is a benefit 
and advantage to.the whole .country that all the children 
should be educated, and thus any means of educating the 
children in a single district benefit the-whole.2 
The Williams case was cited in Board of Education v. Hackmann,3 a case 
in which the facts were not reported. 
In Long y. Fuller4 the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute 
authorizing the district to condemn was challenged and the -court ·said: 
The common school system pervades the whole 
Commonwealth, and is its creature, acting in the 
several school districts by its boards of direc-
tors or controllers, who are simply the.agents 
of the.state in -carrying out the wise, benevolent 
l33 Vt. -271 ( 1860). 
233 Vt. -at 279. 
348 Mo. 243 ( 18 71). 
468 Pa. St. 170 (1871). 
and far-sighted policy of the government •••• Every man, 
woman and child in a republic should be able to read 
and write, and this is the object aimed at by the Com-
mon School Law. Schoolhouses are an essential part of 
the system and the compulsory pow~r is as necessary to 
it, as the taking of land for a public highway.5 
Appeal of Rees6 was brought as a bill for injunction by lessees of 
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lots along the Allegheny River to prevent the Pittsburgh Exhibition Society 
and the City of Pittsburgh from occupying buildings along the wharf.which 
would interfere with the plaintiff's uses. While the Society, strictly 
speaking, was not a school or college, the issues in the case involved 
educational purposes. The plaintiff claimed that the act of the Pennsylvania 
Legislature authorizing the Society to condemn the property was unconstitu~ 
tional because the purpose of the Society did not warrant the conclusion that 
the taking was for a public use. In answering this objection, the court said: 
The question of public use is one difficult to determine, 
but it may be assumed as sound that wherever the taking is a 
public necessity, as in the case of highways, or is for the 
welfare of the people, it is taking for public use;- ••• the 
purpose for which such corporations can be created••• is for 
the educating of the public by exhibiting artistic, mechanical, 
agricultural, and horticultural products and providing public 
instruction in the arts and sciences •••• It need not now in 
this day be argued that the education of the citizens of the 
commonwealth is a necessity, or that education conduces to the 
welfare of the public.7 
The question of whether Purdue University was an institution belonging 
to the state was raised in Russell v. Trustees of Purdue University.a In 
order to show the public nature of the University, the court cited cases 
568 Pa. St. at 173. 
612 Atl. 427 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1888). 
712 Atl. at 430. 
8 . 
201 Ind. 367, 168 N.E. 529 (1929). 
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from a number of jurisdictions to show that a university incorporated by 
the State had been treated as a public institution. The court also pointed 
out that Indiana accepted public federal lands and donations of John Purdue 
by legislative act in 1869 and that other acts of the legislature dealing with 
I 
the duties of the State and its control of the University had also,been passed. 
The legislative appropriations for the 1929 University budget were listed by 
the court and the court commented that the University by accepting the funds 
acceded to the claim of the legislature that it held title to all receipts 
as well. 
In upholding the right of the School District to dismiss condemnation 
proceedings without being liable for the property owner's attorney .fees, the 
court in Meadow Park Land Co. v. School District of Kansas City9 noted that 
t~e School District did not exist for private gain but wholly for public and 
beneficent purposes. The court pointed out that the School District was 
created a quasi-corporation for specific purposei; and that it was the local 
agent of the State for promotion of the education of children of the District. 
The District's power to.levy taxes was limited, and the funds derived from 
taxation were to be devoted to specific uses, the court said, and it was the 
policy of the State that these funds be jealously guarded. 
The issue litigated in Town of Atherton v. Superior Court10 was whether 
the zoning ordinance of the town could prevent the School District from lo-
eating a school in an area that had been :.::oned residential. In holding that 
the State has occupied the field in the matter of location of school sites 
9 257 S.W. 441 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1923). 
l0159 Cal •. App. 2d 417, 324 P •. id 328. (1958). 
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and that the Town zoning ordinances could not exclude the school, the court 
said: 
The public school system is of statewide supervision 
and concern and legislative enactments thereon control over 
attempted regulation by local government units. P. 
0 0 0 ct O 
The comprehensive system of school control and operation 
by the school districts as shown in the statutes herein dis-
cussed is completely inconsistent with any power of a munici-
pality to control the location of school sites..... If ••• 
the construction and maintenance of a school building is a 
sovereign activity of the state, it is obvious that the 
location and acquisition of a school site is necessarily 
and equally such an activity. Obviously, too, neither the 
Constitution nor the Legislature has consented to a munici-
pal regulation of school sites.11 
Another case which involved a zoning ordinance was State ex rel. St. 
Louis Union Trust Company v. Ferriss.12 In this case, the court regarded 
schools as a governmental function and stated that control of public insti-
tutions could be accomplished through zoning ordinances only where they 
involved proprietary functions of the State. 
These quotations all related to institutions or organizations that could 
readily be classified as public on the basis of their organization and ad-
ministration or use of funds secured by public taxation. These opinions may 
apply only in certain respects to institutions and activities generally 
regarded as private because they are not operated by a political unit of 
government. 
11 324 P. 2d at 331, 335-336. 
12 304 S.W. 2d 896 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1957). 
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Private Education and the Public Use Principle. 
No case has been discovered in which a private school below the,coll~ge 
level has sought to exercise the·right of eminent domain, but the two cases 
involving .colleges that would be considered private, as compared with state 
or municipal institutions, resulted in conflicting decisions. 
In Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert13 a demurrer to the peti-
tion of the'Trustees for appointment of appraisers was sustained and affirm-
ed on appeal. The College was organized by .a special legislative act of 
1911 under the name of Thames College. By its charter its sole purpose.was 
stated to be the higher ·education of women, and control and disposition of 
property and the-management of affairs of the College were·vested in a Board 
of Trustees elected b.y members of a corporation. Its property was exempt 
from taxation, and later·in the session the name was changed to Connecticut 
College for Women. A special act amending the charter·was passed still 
later in the 1911 session of the·legislature giving the College the power to 
take such real estate in ijew London and Waterford as was necessary upon the 
payment of just .compensation according to the procedure outlined in the 
statutes for condemnation of land for the site of county buildings. The 
demurrer of the property owners challenged the constitutionality of the act 
granting the power of eminent domain to the College on the basis that it was 
a private corporation. The-question of whether a private corporation adminis-
tering a public charity may exercise the right of eminent domain was recog-
n.ized by the court as one of first impression, and the court stated that: 
However elastic and indefinite the term "public use" 
l387 Conn. 421, 88 Atl. 633, 48 L.R.A. (NS) 485 (1913). 
may be, it is certain that no additional or 
novel application of the power of eminent 
domain can justify the taking of property 
for a pri~ate use.14 
Tpree classes of public uses were outUned by the court: 
71 
1. Uses exclusively governmental, such as forts, post offices, jails, 
and court houses, 
2. Uses governmental in nature but administered by private organiza-
tions, such as cemeteries, markets, turnpikes, bridges, wharves and other 
pub lie services, 
3. Property taken and administered by private corporatipns for purposes 
governmental in their nature when the community has a common right upon equal 
terms to the use, or to benefit from the property taken. 
The first two uses, the court said, were properly within the discretion of 
the legislature but when the right of eminent domain is delegated to a 
private corporation, the justification for taking depends on the character 
of the use and the manner in which the use is to be administered. In the 
third class of uses would be cas.es which have been called "flowage cases," 
but the court distinguished these from the case at bar on the basis that the 
water powers of Connecticut were a public asset of great value and "directly 
for the benefit of the state as the owner in sovereignty of its own terri-
tory.1115 The court recognized that t;he higher education of women was govern-
mental in nature but paraphrased a cemetery case to the effect that there 
are many colleges for the higher education of women in which the public have 
not and cannot acquire the right to be educated. 
1488 Atl. at 635. 
1588 Atl. at 635. 
The vital question is whether it appears that the 
pub lie wi 11 have a common right upon equal terms, 
independently of the will or caprice of the corpora-
tion, to the use and enjoyment of the property sought 
to be taken.16 
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Counsel for the College argued that higher education should be regarded 
as a public utility in the same manner as water resources and not necessarily 
as a public right. The court, in answer to this contention, cited cases in 
which the right to use public funds for educational institutions had been 
denied because the institutions were not under public control and stated 
that if the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain were granted: 
ooo we should be logically unable to restrain the 
exercise of the same authority in favor of private 
corporations operated for profit and administering pur-
poses governmental in their nature for the exclusive 
use of their own members and selected beneficiaries. 17 
The court felt that in order to grant the power, a public benefit should 
result from the taking which could not otqerwise be realized, and concluded 
that: 
The fact that these public universities exist and 
flourish in so many states is conclusive proof that the 
necessity which justifies the grant of eminent domain to 
private persons in order to develop the material resources 
of a state does not exist in the case of ·institutions for 
the higher education of women.18 
In the dissenting opinion, it was pointed out that the charter did not 
specify that all must q):1ve the right to attend the College, nor did it pro-
hibit some from attending. The dissenter also thought the change of name 
indicated an intent of the legislature that the College should serve all 
1688 Atl. at 637. 
1788 Atl~ at 639. 
18Ibid. 
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women of the State. The facts that it was a charitable trust engaged in 
service and not for profit, and that it was exempt from taxation, were 
cited by the dissenter as evidence of a quasi-public purpose carried out 
by the College. It was noted that the right of eminent domain had been 
supported when granted to individuals and corporations in private business 
in such enterprises as public utilities, mining, grain elevators, cemeteries, 
grain mills, petroleum transportation, drainage and irrigation, and mills 
for manufacture of ax handles and tinware, none of which, the dissenter said, 
were uses which might properly·be administered by the state. He felt that 
every valid exercise of the right of eminent domain could be supported on 
the principle of public utility. The dissenting justice pointed out that 
the public right or common right on equal terms doctrine had been repudiated 
in another case of the Connecticut court and that: 
No good reason can be suggested why purposes which 
benefit the body and mind of citizens or which educate, 
uplift, and enable a community, should not be esteemed 
of as great public good as the tQings which add directly 
to its wealth or give employment to its citizens.19 
According to the dissenting opinion, a college is open to the public on equal 
terms although admission to it is surrounded by reasonable ;regulations which 
do not prohibit the public in a partial way from the right to enjoy the 
benefits of the institution. 
A result opposite to that reache~ in the Calvert case was the decision 
. U ' . t f S h C 1 . f . . R bb . ; 20 in n1vers1 yo out ern a 1 ornia v. o 1nsi- This case began as an 
action by the University to acquire a tract of land fpr use as a portion of 
19 88 Atl. at 646. 
· 
201 Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P. 2d 163, cert. den. 295 u.s. 738, 55 s.ct. 
650 ( 1934) 0 
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the grounds surrounding a newly constructed library.· No structures were to 
be erected on the parcel sought, but it was for the purpose of suitable 
landscaping and making the entrance to the library more readily accessible. 
Located on the tract were a drugstore, a residence, two cottages, and two 
garages. The owner conceded that the University was a benevolent, non-
profit institution offering cultural facilities valuable to the community, 
but he contended that the taking of the property was for a private use. In 
answer to this contention, the court noted California statutory provisions 
that the right of eminent domain might be exercised by any institution within 
the State of California which was exempt from taxation under the provisions 
of the Constitution, which included any educational institution of collegiate 
grade whose resources were used exclusively for the purpose of education. 
The court also noted that the Articles of Incorporation of the University 
provided that the University should be open and equal privileges accorded to 
each and every resident of the State whether male or female, and regardless 
of nationality, race, or religious belief, who possessed the required 
qualifications for entrance. The Articles also provided that these quali-
fications should be of the same general character as those required by State 
colleges and universities of Cal;i.fornia. The case was distinguished from 
the Calvert case on the basis that there the College lacked in its organic 
structure the elements upon which the University in this case relied. 
Noting that private property had been taken by a private cemetery for a 
public use in 'California, the court saidc. 
It could not reasonably be urged that the da~elopment 
of public utilities and natural resources or the burial of 
the dead are more truly public uses than the intellectual 
development of our citizens.21 
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A decision of the United States Supreme Court in a case involving irrigation· 
water rights was noted, and the court concluded from that case that it was 
not essential that the entire conu:nunity directly enjoy or participate in the 
benefits from the use acquired. The appellant owner said that if the current 
use was regarded as public, the University might later amend its articles or 
make arbitrary rulings to infringe the rights the public enjoyed at the time. 
In response to this suggestion, the court said: 
The illustrious record of respondent university for 
half a century is a matter of conu:non knowledge, and the 
creative altruism of its graduates who have become inte-
grated into the life of our state bears impressive 
testimony to its ideals and pu:rposes. 22 
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to suppose that the institution would, 
by trickery or evasion, act to deprive the public of benefits in the property 
in question. However, the bulletin of the School of Pharmacy stated that 
the University reserved the right to reject. any applicant for admission even 
though he may meet the requirements listed. The court found testimony in 
the record to show that the purpose of this regulation was to permiti the 
exclusion of those whose purposes were inimical to the University and to 
society on moral and eth~cal gounds. Such a reservation was not regarded 
as a denial of full rights to one who was otherwise qualiff.ed. The state-
ment by the court that the land was devoted to a high public use and that 
11 its dedication to that objective is made further apparent py the fact .that 
the respondent seeks to acquire such property by these proceedings rather 
2137 P. 2d at 166 
22 Ibid. 
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than by purchase'' may be open to question. It would seem that this was the 
precise issue to be litigated. This case is an important precedent for the 
fact that a private educational institution may follow proceedings outlined 
by constitutional and statutory provisions for the condemnation of private 
property when the right of the public to benefit from the institution is 
clearo It could not be said that this case overruled the Calvert case, 
but it is, instead, distinguishable on the factso 
Fountain Park Company v. Hensler23 did not involve a school or college, 
as such 1 but the attempt by a Chautauqua Company to condemn private propertyq 
The defendant maintained that an act of the legislature, granting any volun-
tary association organized for the purpose of establishing a Chautauqua the 
right of eminent domain, was void as an attempt to confer the power ori a 
private corporation for purposes which did not constitute a public use. The 
court agreed on the basis that the constitutional inhibition against, taking 
private property for public use without compensation "by necessary implica-
tion prohibits taking private property for private use. 11 The holding was 
also based on the finding that Indiana had not recognized the "benefit, 
advantage, or utility rul~ 11 for determination if a use is public. In other 
words, it was essential that the public have a right to a definite and fixed 
use of the property in question. The cases based on the utility rule wer~ 
distinguished as being decided according to a different public policy at the 
time or place of decision. The court admitted that the Chautauqua Company 
might render public service, but said it would not follow that every organi-
zation wielding public benefit could be endowed with a power of eminent 
23 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518 (1927). 
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domain or there would be a list including churches, lodges, clubs, civic 
organizations, temperance organizations, theatres, circuses, public halls, 
hospitals, homes for the aged, and an endless chain that would know no 
boundso There was an abs·ence of showing, the court felt, that the meetings 
of the Society were for the whole public or that the general public had a 
right and power to compel the Society to serve it. 'l'he Calvert case was 
cited as authority for the decision • 
. A private educational organization was the defendant .in Union School 
District of City of Jackson v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys.24 The defen-
dant said its property was owned by a non-profit ~orporation and used for 
a public purpose. The court held that the Commonwealth was not a govern-
ment agency or supported by the government, that there was nothing in the 
statutes or constitution to immunize it, and that its property was private 
and subject to condemnation. 
SOME SPECIFIC USES FOR PROPERTY CONDEMNED 
BY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
Even though the agency seeking to exercise the right of eminent domain 
is clearly public, the use to be made of the property condemned may be 
questioned. In many of the cases, the use to be made of the property is 
assumed to be public, but in a few, the issue has been litigated. 
Schoolhouse Sites. 
The use most frequently assumed to be of a public character is that the 
condemnor wants land on which to erect a schoolhouse of classrooms. The 
24322 Mich. 165, 33 N.W. 2d 807 (1948). 
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opinion 6f In re Application to Condemn Land in Rock County25 was to the 
effect that there was no question that the taking for a schoolhouse site 
was authorized and a public use. In the Ouachita Parish School Board v. 
Clark26 case, the answer of the property owner was that the petitioner had 
no cause of action. The court dealt with the allegation in a summary state-
ment that the petitioner had alleged that his site was inadequate, that this 
was the only property suitable, and it was needed for public use. 
Playgrounds, Athletic Fields, and Gymnasiums. 
The taking of property for use as playgrounds or athletic fields has 
been contested in a number of cases. 
The owner attempted to defeat condemnation proceedings in State ex rel. 
School District No. 56 of Chelan County v. Superior Court 27 by asserting 
that the land taken for a playground was for the use of the pupils, and to 
that extent, not a school purpose. Physical development was recognized in 
the opinion as just as important as mental growth, and it was held that the 
school could not be without suitable places for physical activity. 
The Board in Kern County Union High School District v. McDonald28 passed 
a resolution to condemn land for a gymnasium in anticipation of a bill not 
yet passed by the legislature which would require the school to provide two 
hours per week of physical training for each student. One of the issues of 
25121 Minn. 376, 141 N.W. 801 (1913). 
26197 La. 131, 1 So. 2d 54 (1941). 
27 69 Wash. 189, 124 Pac. 484 (1912). 
28 180 Cal. 7, 179 Pac. 180 (1919). 
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the case was whether condemnation of land for ·a gymnasium.was within the 
authority of the district. The court held that the district was clearly 
empowered to condemn land for the purpose alleged, if not expressly, then 
by necessary implication. Other sections of the California Code were cited 
which provided that attention should be given to the physical exercise, 
health, vigor, and physical development of pupils, and that the high school 
course may include training in athletics for.which credit may be given. 
The petition for condemnation filed by the conunissioners of the District 
of Columbia for land for an athletic field for Western High School was dis-
missed by the trial judge because he found this use would violate the zoning 
·law. The zoning law provided that educational, philanthropic, or eleemosy-
nary institutions could be located within the residential district. In 
Commissioners of District.of .Columbia v. Shannon and Luchs Con§Jtruction 
Company29 the F·ederal District Court reversed the trial court and held that 
the athletic field was accessory to and part of the high school and properly 
located within the residential district without conflict with the zoning·law. 
In the opinion of the court: 
An educational institution consists, not only of the 
buildings, but of the grounds necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the full scope of educational instruction. 
More properly defined, a modern educational institu-
tion embraces those things which experience has taught us 
are essential to the ment'al, moral, and physical develop-
ment of the pupils. It is not the modern conception of a 
public school that it be erected on a lot merely large 
enough in area to contain the school building. In addi-
tion to the buildings there should be playground space, 
basketball stops, chinning bars, room for ·calisthentics, 
all in the open air. It is also for the general welfare 
2957 App. D. C. 67, 17 F. 2d 219 (1927). 
and safety that the school children be furnished a place 
in which-to play, removed from the dangers of street 
traffic.30 
A similar factual situation was presented in Herren v. Board of 
Education.31 The objection to the condemnation in this case was made by 
abutting property owners who intervened, seeking an injunction against 
construction of a football field or stadium. The case was decided on other 
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grounds, but the court did comment that 11 ••• the challenge of the authority 
of the ·condemnor to condemn for the purposes as stated is utterly without 
merit. 11 
The court in People v. Pommerening32 found evidence in the record to 
support .. the· verdict· that taking· 10\ acres for a golf course was for a neces-
sary educational purpose .• The relationship of athletics and physical educa-
tion became a critical issue as the property taken-was to be paid for from 
funds of the Board of Control of Athletics. It was probably-most essential 
to the decision that the court found the BQard of Control an operating 
agency of the Regents rather than a private corporate entity, but the-opinion 
also noted that the-resolution of the Regents declared the property essential 
to the development of physical education .as an integral part of a broad 
program of education. There was no error found in the instructions to the 
jury, which had not specified that the property was sought for -a golf course, 
because this fact was understood. 
3017 F. 2d at 220. 
31219 Ga. 431, 134 S.E. 2d 6 (1963). 
32250 Mich. ·391, 230 N.W. 194 (1930). 
The importance of physical education in the school curriculum was 
discussed in Town of West Hartford v. Talcott33 as a basis for the finding 
that it was reasonably necessary to provide a playing field. The opinion 
included information about the dimensions of baseball fields and how they 
might be located on an 8.62 acre tract in order to show that the entire 
tract was needed. The Town also maintained Beachland Park, but the court 
indicated that it was not part of the educational program, and access to 
the park would be difficult for school children. 
The Board sought to acquire a site for a gymnasium in Seba v. 
Independent School District No. l,34 and the court was of the opinion that 
part of a block in the town of Leedey was not too much for such a building 
when modern conditions and the popularity of athletics among high school 
students were considered. 
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Dicta in Board of Education of City of Minot v. Park District35 indi-
cated that the use of an area for an athletic field was quite different from 
use of an area. for a park. The court recognized that the time had long since 
passed when schools were devoted exclusively to mental training, and that the 
physical development of a child was as essential as his mental development. 
Many proper activities of the school, the court added, took place outside the 
classroom. 
Three other cases in which the authority of the school district to take 
property for athletic fields or playgrounds was upheld with very little 
33 138 Conn. 82, 82 A. 2d 351 (1951). 
34208 Okl. 83, 253 P. 2d 559 (1953). 
35 70 N.W. 2d 899 (N.D, Sup. Ct. 1955). 
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corrnnent were Lipscomb v. Bessemer Board of Education,36 Board of Education 
of Kanawha County v. Camp be 11 1 s Creek B:Y_. Co. 3 7 and Vier ling v. Independent 
School District No. 720~38 
Donnitoriesa 
People Va Brooks39 resulted when an alumnus offered the University of 
Michigan $1,500,000 to build a Lawyer's Club, which was accepted by the 
Regentso With State money, the Regents sought to purchase two blocks im-
mediately south of the campus as a site for the club, but eleven of the 
owners refused to sell, so the Regents sought to condemn the propertya A 
jury verdict finding necessity for the taking and awarding damages totalling 
$230,870 was accepted by six of the owners, but five sought a review on 
certiorario One of the bases for their appeal was that the use for which 
the property was sought was not a public use~ The court thought that this 
argument was so plainly without merit that it needed no extended discussion. 
Citing from the letter of the donor, the opinion pointed out that the build-
ing was to furnish sleeping and study roC>lllS for 150 law students and dining 
accomodations for 300 students and that dues and profits from the building 
would be used to further legal research. 11 It will be for the lawyers to 
hold this great republic together, without sacrifice of its democratic 
institutions," the court added. 
36258 Alao 47, 61 So. 2d 112 (1952). 
37138 W. Vao 473, 76 S.E. 2d 271 (1953). 
38 129 N.W. 2d 338 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1964). 
39224 Micha 45, 194 NoW. 602 (1923). 
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Two other cases irt which the public nature of an exercise of the right 
of eminent domain for dormitory purposes was upheld were Russell v. Trustees 
of Purdue University40 and Board of Regents v. Palmer.41 In the Russell case 
the court defined a dormitory as a building containing sleeping rooms especial-
ly connected with a coll:ege and noted that the early usage of "college" meant 
a place of residence for students, a "group of buildings in which scholars 
are housed, fed, instructed, and governed under college discipline •••• " 
The taking of title to a tract across the street from a student dormitory 
for parking purposes was upheld in Wampler v. Trustees of Indiana University.42 
General Community Uses. 
While it may not have been entirely pertinent to the eminent domain 
proceeding, the issue of whether the school district could provide recrea-
tional facilities for surrounding communities was raised in State~ rel. 
Tacoma School District v. Stojack. 43 The court noted that the petition of 
the condemnor referred only to school use, but that evidence in the record 
indicated that the school intended to permit use of the playgrounds and 
athletic fields when school was not in session. While it may have been 
regarded as a limited right, statutory authority for use of school facilities 
40201 Ind. 367, 168 N.E. 529 (1929). 
41356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
42241 Ind. 499, 172 N.E. 2d 67, 90 A.L.R. 2d 204 (1961). 
4353 Wash. 2d 55, 330 P. 2d 567, 71 A.L.R. 2d 1064 (1958). 
by non-school grq~ps was relied upon in order to support the condemnation 
proceeding~44 
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The Board sought to condemn over 97 acres of land in addition to the 
32 acres it had already purchased in Independent School District of Boise 
City v. Lauch Construction Co.45 The land was to be used for a campus type 
high school and the remainder of the entire tract developed as a community 
educational-recreation area. The judgment favoring the school district was 
affirmed on appeal. The dissenting opinion, which took the position that 
there was no reasonable necessity shown for taking so much land, recited 
that, besides land for the buildings, the District wanted a gymnasium to 
seat 5,000 people, three or four football fields, 10-15 acres for a band 
drill area, four baseball fields, possibly a golf course, two sbccer fields, 
eight basketball courts, 20 tennis courts, four volley ball courts, croquet 
and horseshoe areas, game and picnic grounds, 15 .... 20 acres far parking, and 
space for nature study. The dissenter coll,cluded that the statutes had 
never contemplated that school districts should be permitted to go into the 
real estate or parking business. 
Phi Delta Theta v. Sachtjen46 was an application for writ of prohibi-
tion against the judge to canmand him to desist fJ;:'om proceeding further in 
a condemnation action by the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents. The 
Board sought the property of the Fraternity for development of a continuing 
education center. The Fraternity insisted that the Regents were without 
44 R.c.w. 28.58.050. 
45274 Idaho 502, 264 P. 2d 687 (1953). 
46260 Wis. 206, 50 N.W. 2d 469 (1951). 
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authority to condemn in this case when the funds and contract for the 
building would be provided by a private non-profit Foundation and there 
was no contract between the Regents and the Foundation. The court held 
that the public purpose was clear and that the statutes clearly authorized 
the Regents to acquire land for the purposes of adult education, short 
courses, institutes, and conferences. It was noted that the Foundation had 
no interest other than accomplishing the purposes of the Board of Regents. 
Other Uses Held Public. 
The University of Louisville, a municipal institution, proceeded to 
condemn property in the area of the Louisville Medj.cal Center for a site 
for Methodist Evangelical Hospital, which would be used as a teaching 
hospital in connection with the University's School of Medicine. Both 
University and Hospital funds would be involved in the construction of the 
building, but title to the land, it was proposed, would be held by the 
University and the building leased to the Hospital. In Craddock v. Univer-
sity of Louisville47 the owners objected on the basis that the agreement 
between the Hospital and the University was a subterfuge for aliowing the 
Hospital to invoke the University's power of eminent domain to avoid a 
free-market deal. The court thought this objection imputed bad faith where 
there was none. Unquestionably, the court said, the University would own 
the fee in the property and for practical purposes would own the physical 
improvements since they could not be removed but would be attached to the 
land. While the Hospital could establish p<;>licy for the use of the buildings, 
47303 S.W. 2d 548 (Ky. App. 1957). 
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it would be required to allow the University to carry out its program. The 
defendants also objected on the basis that clergymen of the Methodist Church 
and other classes had preferred status and access to the facilities of the 
Hospital, but the court replied "these little t~ills of creedal purpose are 
merely human approaches to the divine design of service to all mankind, and 
hence not unconstitutiona1. 11 48 
The condemnation of property for use as an agricultural experiment 
field was upheld in Gerson v. Howard.49 Alabama Polytechnical Institute 
sought to condemn 664 acres in a county other than the one in which the 
Institute was located. A demurrer to its application to condemn was over-
ruled and the owner petitioned for mandamus to set aside the order 
overruling the demurrer. The owner's petition was dismissed and the dismissal 
affirmed on appeal. While the authority of the Institute to take property 
by eminent domain had earlier been affirm.ed, 50 the owner's position was that 
building expansion on the campus was quite a diffe'.!:'ent matter from taking 
land for an agricultural experiment field in another county. Experiment§ltion 
and research, reasoned the court, are most important methods of education, 
and the climatic conditions, soil, disease, and insects involved vary in 
the different parts of the State. Since Alabama Polytechnical Institute was 
the land grant college and had as one of its primary purposes the teaching 
of agriculture, and since an experimental farm had been established there 
too, the power of condemnation was not limited to the campus at Auburn. The 
48303 s.w. 2d at 552. 
49246 Ala. 567, 21 So. 2d 693 (1945). 
50nenson v. Alabama Polytechnical Institute, 220 Ala. 433, 126 So. 133 
(1930). 
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court·said there was no need to discuss the contention that.there was no 
power of ·eminent·domain given in the Agriculturcal Experiment St;ation·system 
Act.as the legislature probably considered that the·power-was already extant. 
Knapp v. State51 involved the attempt of the University of Minnesota to 
_acquire land onwhich to construct a railway connecting·the University farm 
with the -street car ·system of the City of Minneapolis. The action was 
brought by the Attorney Oeneral in the name of the State under a Minnesota 
statute which specifically provided authority for the Board of Regents to 
provide a means of transportation from the farm to the campus and to acquire 
the necessary land by gift, purchase or -condemnation. According to the 
court, the fact.that the land was taken in order to provide transportation 
did not change the character of the use unless it could be shown that the 
facilities could not legitimately serve public purposes. · In emphasizing the 
public nature of the University, the court said: 
The state in its governmental capacity maintains 
and conducts the University ••• and may condemn for 
its use any property needed for the purpose of provid-
ing the institution with proper·and convenient facili-
ties for performing its work. The taking of property 
.for such purposes is a taking for public use.52 
Smith v. City Board of Education of Birmingham53 was a taxpayen class 
action to.enjoin condemnation. The Board's demurrer was sustained and the 
action of the trial court affirmed on appeal. The issue raised by the action 
was whether the Board had statutory authority to condemn property for the 
purpose of construction of a building to house the superintendent and his 
51125 Minn. 194,.145 N.W. 967 (1914). 
52145 N.W. at 969. 
53272 Ala. 227, 130 So. 2d 29 (1961). 
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assistants. By construing together three sections of the code relating to 
the general grant of powers for administration and management of the schools, 
the provision of quarters and equipment for administration, and the authority 
to condemn, the court found that this was a purpose within the intent of the 
legislature. 
Whether a county junior college was a public education program authorized 
by law so that the county board was authorized to condemn property for the 
college was an issue in Sheppard v. DeKalb County Board of Education.5~ A 
very small portion of the opinion was devoted to discussion of the issue but 
the court cited a constitutional provision for county districts, the Junior 
College Act of 1958, and the county election to establish a junior college, 
as bases for the public purpose of the program. 
THE NECESSITY OF TAKlNG PROPERTY FOR USE 
BY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
Not only must property taken by a school or college against the will 
of the owner be for a public use, but also the use to be made of the property 
must be one that is necessary. The question of whether a particular use of 
property is necessary has been raised frequently in school and college 
condemnation cases. The purpose of this section is t.o document this 
litigation. 
Necessity Defined. 
An immediate question that may be asked when the principle of necessity 
54220 Ga. 219, 138 s.E. 2d 271 (1964). 
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-- is applied to the facts of any case is "How much of a need must there be for 
the use of the property for it to be considered necessary?" 
The terms "needful and advantageous" we:t;'e suggested as synonymous with 
necessity in Graded School Trustees v. Hinton~5 In Board of Education v. 
Forrest56 the issue was whether the statute conferred authority only to 
acquire property by condemnation for schQol buildings. The Board selected 
a site for Efland High School on June 9, 1924, and purchased one of the two 
parcels on which the high school was built. The Board attempted to purchase 
the other parcel, but was unable ta do so, and condemnation proceedings were 
ardered in December, 1924, The proceedings were begun in April and after 
that, the defendant, Forrest, conveyed his interest to the defendant Webb. 
Webb entered the property and the Board secured a restraining order against 
himo He appealed the case, and the restraining arder was dissolved, but on 
the Board's appeal the dissolution of the restraining order was reversed. 
The trial co.urt had held for the defendant on the basis that the high school 
had five acres and condemnation proceedings were not begun at the time the 
building was erected. The court stated its opinian that the term "suitable 
sites" in the statute was: 
••• broad enough to embrace such land, net exceeding the 
statutory limit, as may reasonably be required for the 
suitable and convenient use af the particular building; 
and land taken for a playground in conjunction with a·· 
schoal may be as essential as land far the schaalhouse 
itself. 
· This opinion suggests the use of the term "reasonable necessity" as well as 
55165 N.C. 12, 80 S.E. 890 (1914). 
56190 N.C. 753, 130 S.E. 621 (1925). 
the terms "suitable," "convenient," and "essential" to explain the meaning 
of necessity. 
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A reasonable necessity for the taking of land was conceded in Town £f 
West Hartford v. Talcott57 but the defendants objected to the finding by 
the court that all the land asked for by the Town was necessary. 'l'wo 
petitions were brought by the Town, one for 1.36 acres and one for 7.26 
acreso The tracts adjoined each other and the cases were tried together. 
A 50 foot frontage on the tracts was zoned for business. The Town owned 
3~2 acres east of these tracts on which was located Talcott Junior High 
School. The land was sought for a playground. The order of the trial 
court appointing commissioners to assess damages was based on the finding 
that a reasonable, rather than an absolute, necessity was required, and 
that, in this case, all the land was reasonably necessary. The order was 
affirmed even though the defendants objected that there was no formal, 
detailed, specific plan designating what part was needed for what purpose 
and that the taking of the 50 foot strip zoned for business was not neces-
sary. The court said there was no requirement in the statute that a plan 
showing the need be presented. Whether the necessity for taking the 50 foot 
strip could be upset depended on the construction given to "necessary. 11 The 
court said it had been found "highly desirable" for the school to have 
full-sized baseball and softball fields and on this basis held that a 
reasonable necessity existed. 
57138 Conn. 82, 82 A. 2d 351 (1951). 
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The term "necessary" was construed in County Board of School Trustees 
v. Batchelder58 to mean" ... expedient, reasonably convenient, or useful 
to the public," and not "indispensable" or 11 an absolute necessity. 11 59 
The Issue of Immediacy. 
The problems of providing for future needs by condemnation have been 
set against the wish of the owner to protect his property from being taken 
unnecessarily in a few cases. Determination of how closely related in time 
a taking of property must be to its actual occupation and use for the pur-
poses stated in order for the taking to be classified as necessary depends 
largely upon the facts of each case. Kern County Union High School District 
v. McDonald60 presented a situation in which the Board was seeking to 
anticipate its needs by constructing a gymnasium in order to be able to 
offer physical education as required by a bill under consideration in the 
legislature. In answer to the defendant's objections the court stated that 
it was not essential that the District should already have a prescribed 
program of instruction in athletics, and that the District could exercise its 
discretion in anticipation of the mandatory requirements of the new law. 
Immediate future needs are ordiparily an essential 
factor in the determination of the question of whether or 
not there is a present necessity. The mere fact that land 
proposed to be taken for a public use is not needed for 
the present and immediate purpose of the petitioning par.ty 
is not necessarily a defense to a proceeding to condemn it.61 
587 Ill. 2d 178, 130 N.E. 2d 175 (1955). 
59 130 N.E. 2d at 178. 
60180 Cal. 7, 179 Pac. 180 (1919). 
61179 Pac. at 184, citing a New York case. 
The question of public use can also be raised in consideration of the 
issue of irrnnediacy as illustrated by the case of Cochran v. Cavanaugh. 62 
In reversing an injunction against the taking by the Board of Regents for 
land adjacent to the State University, the court said: 
••• It is true that the act shows that the Legislature 
realized that all of this property could not at once 
be used for the purpose for which it was taken. The 
Legislature is not required to act only for the present; 
it has the power to determine the future needs of the 
University with reference to land, and to provide in the . 
present for that which it believes to be a future necessity.63 
The court added that the act in authorizing the Board of Regents by short 
rental contracts to realize some revenue from the excess of what could be 
irrnnediately used did not constitute a taking for a private use. 
An interesting and somewhat unusual piece of evidence for 11 future 
necessity" was cited in Independent School District of Boise City Vo 
Lauch Construction Co:64 
In Reader 1 s Digest for the month of December, 1953, 
there appears a thought-provoking article condensed from 
Time Magazine entitled 11 The Great Baby Boomo 11 The article 
considers the impact upon our economy of the large and 
unanticipated increase in the rate of growth of our popu-
lationo It forcibly points out the great expansion which 
will have to be made in the next few years in our private 
industrial plants and in our public faciliti.es such as 
public schools.65 
A dissent to the holding of the majority was based on the opinion that no 
reasonable necessity had been shown for taking over 97 acres in addition 
62252 NaW. 284 (Tex. App. 1923). 
63252 SoW. at 286. 
6474 Idaho 502, 264 P. 2d 687 (1953). 
65263 P. 2d at 690. 
to the 32 acres the District h.ad purchased. The Superintendent of Schools 
had testified.concerning the reasonable necessity for 130 acres for a 
campus type high school, community recreation area, and future needs. 
Testimony also.showed that the Board had employed J.F. Weltzen of the 
University of Idaho, who had reported on needs of the District in 1944 and 
1949. On the basis of these studies the projection of enrollment was 
2,300.high school students. 
Testimony by the Superintendent was apparently·not as effective in the 
case of Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids v. Baczewski.66 The 
Board sought to take a tract of vacant land in an area surrounded by homes 
which was located about 3/4 of a mile from the Union High School of 1500 
students. The court found nothing in the record to justify condemnation 
for playground uses, and concluded that economy was the dominant motivation 
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of the l3oard. .The report of the case included the testimony of the Superin-
tendent·and Business Manager as follows: 
We think it is wise for public boards to procure sites in 
adYance in order that the taxpayers today may spend a small 
sum of money in order to .save future taxpayers a vast sum of 
money. 
. . . . . 
What we. are trying to do is save the taxpayers of this 
city some money by acquiring property which is not now 
developed so we don't have to do it after it is developed.67 
The court thought this reasoning would be highly commended in purchase of 
property, but held it did not meet·the test of necessity required for 
cond61llnation of property. Necessity, ·said the court, did not mean an 
66340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W. 2d 810 (1954). 
6765 N~W. 2d at 811. 
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indefinite, remote, or speculative future, but now existing or to exist in 
the near future. Noting that instructions which told the jury they could 
not award speculative future damages were correct, the court observed that 
if necessity could be extended into the future so should damages be extended. 
The Board thought that the denial of the right to condemn would have far 
reaching consequences of importance to government units seeking future 
condemnation, and the court answered with the suggestion that granting the 
condemnation would have far reaching effects on the right of property 
ownership. 
The holding in the Baczewski case was approved in a law review comment 
by Andrew Foster, Jr.: 
The principal case is one of first impression •••• In 
no modern case has the test of necessity to condemn property, 
for future use so speculative, been challenged, and it is 
submitted that this court has not placed an unwise restric-
tion upon condemning agencies by adding the additional 
requirement that property sought to be condemned will be used 
within a reasonable time in the future.68 
One of the grounds of the defendant's appeal in Waukegan v. Stanczak69 
was that the property taken was excessive in area and estate. The City 
sought a 15.2 acre tract in fee simple. The discretion of the condemning 
authority to take land sufficient not only for present but also for future 
requirements that could and should be anticipated was recognized. In this 
case, the Superintendent had testified that 15 acres was a minimum and 20 
acres would be better. At the time the action was brought, there were 810 
pupils in the grades 7-12, and prospects reported of 1400 to 1700 in five 
6818 Detroit L.J. 233,235. 
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or six years •. A formula of 10 acres plus one acre for every 100 students was 
mentioned with approval by the court. 
SUMMARY 
The function of education in society has been discussed in judicial 
opinions as a basis for determination of whether the taking of property 
by schools and colleges in eminent domain proceedings meets the test of 
public use. In one of the early cases on the subject, the court referred 
to the fact that the public usefulness and public necessity of edu~ation 
had been recognized by the legislature in establishment of schools. The 
fact that a particular locality of a State may benefit from a taking more 
than others will not prevent exercise of the right of eminent domain. Some 
relationship of the condemning agency to a government unit has been found 
in cases upholding the right of schools and colleges to take the property 
by condemnation. 
Two cases adjudicating the right of a privately operated institution 
of higher education to exercise the right of eminent domain resulted in 
opposite holdings, but the cases are distinguishable on the basis of the 
facts involved. It would seem to be essential that for a privately organized 
and operated college or university tq condemn property, the public must have 
a right on equal terms to benefit from the use of the property to.be taken. 
This right is not denied by reasonable entrance requirements. 
The attempt to classify uses as (1.) Exclusively governmental, (2.) 
Governmental in nature but administered by private organizations, or, 
(3.) Governmental uses administ;rated by private organizations which benefit 
the public, would not seem to establish dependable rules or principles. The 
important conclusion from this attempt at classification is that some 
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jurisdictions have less stringent tests than others for finding that property 
taken will be used for public purposes. 
There is authority for condemnation of private property by a privately 
organized and operated university, but no case has been found in which a 
private school of less than college grade has attempted to exercise the 
right of eminent domaino It would be reasonable to assume that similar 
principles would apply, however, and that in a jurisdiction following a 
liberal test of public use:, an institution not directly related to a govern-
mental unit may be authorized by the legislature to exercise the right of 
eminent domain if the public has access to the benefits of the institution. 
A wide variety of uses have been upheld when the condemnor is clearly 
a public agency, including schoolhouse sites, playgrounds, athletic fields 1 
gymnasiums, golf courses, dormitories, parking lots:, community centers, 
agricultural experiment stations, hospital construction, transportation, 
office buildings, and a junior college campus. 
The "rule of reason" has been applied by the courts to the determination 
of the extent of need a school or college must show in order for property to 
be taken by condemnationo The opinions have generally interpreted the 
requirement of necessity liberally rather than making the necessity absoluteo 
The amount of land that may be taken and the urgency or immediacy of its 
use have also been considered. Necessity has been held to require that the 
use for which the property is sought not be remote, indefinite or specula-
tive, but no case has been located in which the school or college was 
prevented from taking a certain amount of property as long as statutory 
requirements were met. 
CHAPTER IV 
COMPETING. PUBLIC USES 
The issues discussed in Chapters II and III concern the taking of 
private property for public useo Closely related but somewhat different 
questions are raised when a public body seeks to condemn property already 
devoted to p~blic use by another organizationo Schools and colleges have 
been in the position of both petitioner and respondent on these issues, 
and the purpose of this chapter is to summarize the case reportso The 
cases in which schools and colleges have attempted to condemn property 
devoted to public uses will be considered first, followed, by a discussion 
of cases in which the property held by schools or colleges is sought by 
other agencies. 
ATTEMPTS BY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES TO CONDEMN 
PROPERTY ALREADY.DEVOTED TO A PUBLIC USE 
In the absence of any apparent logical order of consideration, the 
cases in this section are presented in chronological order~ with the ex~ 
ception of three cases which have been located that deal with zoning 
ordinances. 
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Streets, Parks, Public Utilities, Cemeteries, and~ Poor Farm. 
The defendant in Jordan v. Haskelll proposed that the location of a 
schoolhouse lot sought in condemnation proceedings was void because it 
included part of a public way. The action was brought as a bill in equity 
for an injunction to prevent erection of the schoolhouse. The trial court 
sustained the demurrer of the school district, and on appeal the action was 
dismissed. The holding was based on the fact that the plaintiff whose 
property was sought was in no position to complain and on the fact that 
the school did not plan to block the public way. Therefore, the case does 
not really settle any issue regarding the right of a school to take property 
devoted to a public way. 
McCullough v. Board of Education2was an action for damages on a 
contract which had been awarded by the Board for building a schoolhouse on 
Hamilton Square. In this sense, it was not an eminent domain action, but 
the decision of the court was based on principles of eminent domain. The 
court found the contract ultra vires, and held that the plainti.ff was bound 
to take notice that the Board could not "under any circumstances" acquire 
a right to occupy a public square for school purposes. A resolution of the 
Board of Supervisors authorizing the Board of Education to use a portion 
of the Square, which had been ratified by the legislature, was declared 
inoperative. Erection of a schoolhouse was not considered·as one of the 
purposes for which public squares may be used. 
163 Me. 189 (1874). 
251 Cal. 418 (1876). 
Tyrone Township School District Appeal3 was dismissed on the basis that 
land devoted to public use as a poor farm could not be taken as a site for a 
schoolhouse. The action was brought as a bill for injunction to restrain the 
School District from appropriating three-fourths of an acre of a 172 acre 
tract belonging to the Countyo The opinion of the trial court appeared along 
with the appealo According to the trial court there was no question that 
the legislature may authorize taking of public property for another public 
use either by express words or necessary implication, which the court was 
unable to findo In order to imply the authority, the court thought it 
should appear that some special object could not be reached in any other 
place or mannero The legislature would not be presumed to abandon the former 
use without a clear expression of that intention. The opinion of the Supreme 
Court noted that the claim of the County that the tract was scarcely large 
enough and that no part could be taken without great prejudice to the poor 
had not been denied so must therefore be accepted as a complete answer to 
the claim of the School Districto The court here stated that the legisla-
ture did not intend that land already appropriated and actually acquired for 
such an important use as care and support of the poor could be taken in whole 
or part for school purposeso 
Another case involving the attempt of a school district to take a public 
square was Davis Vo Nichols.4 By an election in the District the northwest 
quarter of the public square in Tremont had been selected as a site for the 
schoolo The Village Trustees and School Directors had failed to agree on 
3 1 Manago 20 1 15 AtL 667 (Pao Supo Cto 1888). 
439 Illo Appo 610 (1891)0 
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transfer of the property. A petition for -mandamus to require the School 
Directors to condemn the property was brought by residents of the District. 
The sustaining of a demurrer to the petition was affirmed on appeal, the 
cqurt holding that public square and schoolhouse uses were entirely inconsist-
··-. 
ent. The court recognized a general rule that land held for a public use 
could be condemned for .another public use when the latter was different from 
the former and not inconsistent with or destructive of the rights of the 
public. The rule was illustrated-with the hypothetical argument .as follows: 
Suppose the voters were to select as a site for a new 
schoolhouse, the middle of a public street, or the court·house 
of the county; would it .seriously be contended that such site 
could be enforced?5 
In re South Western State Normal School6 concerned the attempt of the 
school to close a street. In 1873, an addition to the town of California, 
Pennsylvania, was laid out containing 36 lots with streets and alleys. Prior 
to 1901 the school purchased 12 lots. Under the authority of a legislative 
act of 1901 authorizing condemnation of real estate for use of State Normal 
Schools, the school sought .to close the street between Lots 10-15 on one -side 
of the street and Lots 28~33 on the other side of the street. Its petition 
. for -approval of a bond required by the_, statute was dismissed and the dismissal 
was affirmed on .appeal. The-condemnation was prevented by the holding that 
the school was already the owner, seeking to condemn a public right of ·way 
.over its own land. The court referred to the proceedings as an attempt to 
appropriate property without the apparent necessity to do .so. The act by 
which the proceedings were brought was construed as referring to ground or 
5 
.39 Ill. App. at 612. 
626 Pa. Super.Ct. 99 (1904). 
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land other than that of the petitioner. Dedication of streets and alleys 
was considered a contract with the public, a franchise which could not be 
violated except by express legislative authority. This franchise could not 
be terminated in the absence of an absolute necessity for the street to be 
closed. 
Higginson v. Slattery7 has been cited as a case on the subject of 
eminent domain, but the opinion clearly reveals that eminent domain issues 
were not involved. The case began as a petition in equity to restrain 
erection of a school building in a park, Back Bay Fens, as authorized by a 
statute. The City had acquired the fee by eminent domain in 1879. The 
court held that the State had the power to appropriate the property to 
another public use without the consent of the City, but found that the plans 
of the School Committee to devote 21% of the building to administrative 
offices was not within the purpose of the statute. In the opinion, the court 
stated that "Land appropriated to one public use cannot be diverted to 
another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit legislation to 
that end. 118 The court intimated that without the administrative offices~ the 
construction of a high school might have been permissible. 
The question of whether a board of education could appropriate property 
already devoted to public use as a cemetery was raised in Board of Education 
of City of Akron v. Proprietors of Akron Rural Cemetery. 9 The suit was for 
injunction by the Cemetery Proprietors to prevent the Board from taking a 
7 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523, 42 L.R.A. (NS) 215 (1912)~ 
899 N.E. at 527, 528. 
9110 Ohio St. 430, 144 N.E. 113 (1924). 
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1.94 acre tract acquired by the Cemetery in 1885. The tract had not been 
improved by the Proprietors nor had any lots been platted or sold. In 1914, 
the Cemetery had leased the tract to the Board for use as a playground, and 
the Board had fenced and filled the lot which was located in the northwest 
corner of the Cemetery property. One of the findings of fact by the trial 
court·was that the Cemetery was the principal burying grounds for the City 
of Akron and the entire tract would be needed in a few years. Another fact 
found was that the Board did not have special authorization to appropriate 
property devoted to a public use. The court held: 
Before property appropriated to a public use can be 
appropriated to another-public use, which will later 
materially interfere with the original use, or be partly 
destructive thereof, it should be made to appear clearly 
that the same is necessary and not destructive of the 
public use to which the land is already devoted •••• Land 
exempt from appropriation.cannot be taken under a mere 
general power of appropriation.10 
In the case, the Board also challenged the right of the Cemetery to hold 
over SO.acres as provided in the special act by which the Cemetery had been 
incorporated. The Cemetery, however, was found to come under a general law 
authorizing cemeteries to acquire and hold not over 100 acres. The granting 
of an injunction was affirmed. 
In~ Oronoco School District11 involved condemnation by the District 
of a public square which had been platted as a park. The statute12 specifi-
cally authorized any school district to acquire any tract designated as a 
public square if not in an incorporated village, borough, or city. The 
10 6 144 N.E. at 11 • 
11170 Minn. 49, 212 N.W. 8 (1927). 
121925 Laws, Ch. 286. 
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issue of the authority of the District was not discussed in the appeal, which 
the court said was limited to the same issue heard by the commissioners, that of 
damages. The court did say, however, that if the District lacked the power to 
take the property, the power of the commissioners to award damages would also be 
lacking. 
An action to take property owned by the City of Chicago and used as a 
nursery to supply parks and grounds with shrubs, Board of Education of Cicero· 
Stickney Township High School v. Chicago,13 was not successful, but for reasons 
other than that the property was already devoted to a public use. A remark was 
made in the dissenting opinion that ownership by the City would not prevent the 
condemnation as the City was not using the property for a necessary public purpose. 
The proceeding in eminent domain to condemn railroad land for a play-
ground and athletic field was successful in Board of Education of Kanawha 
County v. Campbell's Creek B:Y_. Co.14 In this case, there was no express 
statutory authority for condemnation of lands already devoted to a public use. 
The Board conceded that land actually devoted to exercise of a franchise 
could not be taken but maintained that if it was not essential to a franchise, 
it could be condemned. The Railway Company attempted to rely on the fact 
that a 1931 revision of the statutes left out an 1881 provision that lands 
not used by one internal improvement company could be taken by another. The 
court cited cases both before and after the 1881 act holding that one agency 
may take the land of another provided that lands were not necessary to the 
franchise. According to the court, it was not inconceivable that the 
13402 Ill. 291, 83 N.E. 2d 714 (1949). 
14138 W. Va. 473, 76 S.E. 2d 271 (1953). 
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legislature intended to confer on internal improvement companies the 
authority to acquire and hold land in quantities wholly unnecessary for exer-
cise of their franchiseo Others with like authority might require the use of 
such land for a public useo 
The question of whether a board of education could condemn an easement 
of a public utility corporation was raised in Pike County Board of Education 
Vo Fordol5 The issue was not settled by the appeal, howevero In April 9 1954j 
the Board began proceedings to condemn an llo2 acre tract for a 12 grade 
schoolo On one end of the tract, lo3 acres were under lease to the Columbian 
Fuel Corporation for use as a pumping station and gas line. Conclusions of 
law by the circuit court were that the corporation was a necessary party to 
the proceedings, that land leased by the corporation could not be put to 
any public use by the Board, that the Board had no authority to condemn,it, 
and that the court was with out power to separate the tract. On appeal, the 
trial court was found to have exceeded its authority, and the Corporation 
was held not to be a necessary party as the easements were not incompatible 
with the use of the land for school purposeso The court said 
The fact that a portion of the land taken will continue 
to be put to private use by a public utility, holding a lease 
thereon until the needs of the Board require its use does not 
destroy the right of eminent domainol6 
The Board was held to have the right to take whatever interest the owners 
had, and the question of the Corporation interest was not part of the caseo 
For this reason, the authority of this case regarding the right of a school 
to condemn the easement of a public utility must be regarded as doubtfulo 
15279 SoWo 2d 245 (Kyo Appo 1955)0 
16279 SoW. 2d at 2480 
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A fee simple title to Lincoln Park of 12.91 acres which had been dedi-
cated to the use of the City with reversion to the parties who were defendants 
in the case was sought by the Board in Board of Education of City of Minot v. 
Park District. 17 After a demurrer was overruled, a jury trial resulted in 
damages of $25,820 in favor of the Park District and this judgment was 
affirmed. The North Dakota general eminent domain statutes provided that a 
fee simple could be condemned when for public buildings. The Board here was 
found to be a special district and under the general law. The reversioners 
of the Park District challenged the finding of the trial court that the pro-
posed Junior High School constituted a greater necessity than the Park under 
the statute which provided for condemnation in such case. Findings of the 
trial court were based on the fact that the site was not well developed for 
park purposes in that no permanent improvements of substantial value had 
been made. The findings were also based on the importance to the Board of 
a central location, available utilities, suitable contour, and absence of 
, 
hazards. The need of the Board for additional facilities was also mentioned. 
In answer to the defendant 1 s contention that the test of necessity is con-
venience, the court replied that either use was based on convenience 9 and that 
convenience to the public becomes a necessity to the Board of Education in 
establishing a junior high school. 
The attempt of the School Township to take property of a cemetery was 
unsuccessful in Cemetery Company v. Warren School Township.18 The school 
authorities proposed that the terminology in the statute, 11 any real estate," 
17 ( 70 N.W. 2d 899 N.D. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
18 236 Ind. 171, 139 N.E. 2d 538 (1957). 
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meant that the legislature did not intend to impose restrictions on exercise 
of the right of eminent domain by school townships. It was the opinion of 
the court that statutes in derogation of the common law should be construed 
strictly, and the logical consequence of the school's interpretation would 
place their interests over streets, highways, railways, and public buildings. 
In addition, cemeteries had been given authority to condemn as broad as the 
school authorities, and the court found no reason to imply that one had an 
overriding priority where the legislature had not so specified. 
A demurrer to the petition of the District to take cemetery property 
was sustained in Woodland School District v. Woodland Cemetery Association, 19 
but reversed on appeal. The trial court was held to have abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to allow the District to amend its petition. The 
provision in the Code of Civil Procedure20 that the right of eminent domain 
may be exercised as to property appropriated to public use if a more necessary 
public use than that to which the property was already appropriated was held 
to imply that cemetery property may be taken when the facts warrant it. The 
court held that the District should have been allowed to amend its pleadings 
to allege that the school use was more necessary, -stating that: 
It is conceivable that under such circumstances use 
for school purposes could be held to be a more necessary 
use. While burial is a necessity essential to the 
preservation of the health of the living it may not 
reasonably be urged that burial is a more truly public 
use than intellectual development of our citizens.21 
19 174 Cal. App. 2d 243, 344 P. 2d 326 (1959). 
20sec. 1240, subdiv. 3. 
21 344 P. 2d at 327. 
Zoning Ordinances and School Condemnation. 
The cases involving the attempts to prevent condemnation of property 
for school purposes by application of zoning ordinances are presented here 
for want of a more logical ordero They should be differentiated from the 
cases in which specific property is already devoted to a public use, and 
their inclusion here is not intended to indicate that similar principles 
apply. 
The petition for condemnation by cormnissioners of the District of 
Columbia was dismissed by the trial judge because he found an athletic 
field for Western High School within the prohibition of the zoning lawo 
The decision was reversed in Commissioners of District of Columbia Vo 
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Shannon and Luchs Construction Companyo 22 The zoning ordinance permitted 
institutions of an educational character to be located in the residential 
district and the court found that the athletic field was a public use 3 con-
demned without encountering the legal limits of the zoning law and regulations • 
. The school district of the City of Ladue brought a condemnation suit to 
acquire 32.26 acres of an 86 acre tract known as Lone Tree Farm owned by 
Joseph Pulitzer at the time of his death and devised to trustees to be held 
and maintained as a residential estate for his widow. A city zoning ordi-
nance enacted in 1948 under statutory authority prohibited erection of a 
schoolhouse on the land involvedo State ex rel. Sto Louis Union Trust Company 
Vo Ferriss23 was an original proceeding to prohibit the judge from hearing 
the action to condemn. Citing the constitution and statutes, the court said 
2257 App. D.Co 67, 17 F. 2d 219 ( 1927) o 
23304 SoWo 2d 896 (Mo. Supo Cto 1957). 
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it was too clear to argye that the school district had an express grant of 
authority from the legislature 
with the absolute and exclusive power to select, locate 
and procure by condemnation the site here in question unless 
the legislature by the enactment of Chapter 89 has invested 
the City with the police power of the State to restrict the 
selection and location of school sites to the extent herein 
asserted. 
O o O O O 
To suppose that zoning ordinances may limit or prevent the 
public use for which land is taken is to invest municipal-
ities with power to restrict the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain. Zoning ordinances are upheld on the 
theory that they bear a real and substantial relation to 
the public welfare •••• Through the medium of zoning 
ordinances municipalities may insist that private rights 
in real property yield to the general good of the com-
munity, but the presumption is that the use of public 
property is designed to promote the general welfare also ••• 24 
Cases which upheld the City's right to regulate facilities, sanitary condi-
tions, and building standards were distinguished from the selection and 
location of school sites. Zoning ordinances were found to contain no express 
grant of power to regulate the location of schools, and the court noted that 
no authority had been cited that such power was implicit. The only 
reference to schools found in the zoning ordinance was that regulations 
authorized should be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and 
designed to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewer-
age, schools, parks and other public requirements. If this were regarded as 
a grant of power, as the plaintiff contended, the court thought the authority 
to exercise the right of eminent domain would be nullified. A New York case 
holding that a village could not prevent the location of a school within its 
24 304 s.w. 2d at 899, 900. 
borders was cited, but that case·involved purchase of the property rather 
than condemnation. 
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Town of Atherton v. Superior Court25 was brought as a writ of prohi-
bition to restrain the Superior Court in an eminent domqin proceeding by the 
School District. The Court of Appeals held that zoning ordinances would not 
control the location of schools and the petition for a peremptory -writ was 
denied. On June 24, 1957, the City Council of Atherton passed an ordinance 
entitled 11 An Interim Zoning Ordinance Relating to Public Buildings and the 
Location Thereof Declaring Its Urgency and Providing That It Shall Take 
Effect Immediately." By the ordinance any property zoned residential was 
prevented from other uses, with a specific provision that property so zoned 
could not be used for public buildings, including, but not limited to, 
schools. On the same day, a resolution was passed proposing hearings to 
determine if a zoning district should be established in which public build-
ings, including schools, may be located. On July 3, 1957, the School District 
began its eminent domain action for nine acres within the city limits in an 
area which was zoned residential only. The court cited a California case to 
the effect that the State had preempted the field of regulating public 
school building construction so that the school was not subject to municipal 
regulation and a requirement of a .$300 permit. School districts were recog-
nized as agencies of the State for the local operation of the State school 
system, · and in the matter of location of school sites, the State was .found 
to have occupied the field. The plaintiff contended that the delegation of 
the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain was limited by the 
25159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 324 P. 2d 328 ( 1958). 
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police powers given to the municipality by the constitution and by the 
authority to enact zoning provisions given to municipalities by the legis0-
lature. It would seem, therefore, that the court put State control of the 
school system over State control of municipalities. The Education Code 
provided that Boards should give Planning Commissions notice of their pro-
posed acquisitions, but the ultimate determination of sites was left to the 
Board. A disapproval by the Planning Commission could be overruled by the 
Board. The Town maintained that its power to zone came from the constitu-
tion, and was therefore superior to the right of the legislature to provide 
for school sites. The Town also insisted that the legislature had desig-
nated municipalities as the agency to enforce the police power and that 
education was listed as one of the use areas specified in the zoning law. 
In the opinion of the court, the legislature did not intend to repeal the 
power given to school districts expressly as state agencies to locate schools, 
but had used general language in the zoning law to cover all situations. The 
interest of the State in school buildings was also supported by the fact that 
funds for capital outlay were provided by the legislature and a recent ap-
propriation of $30,000,000 was mentioned. The fact that the Town's ordinance 
was an interim ordinance would not prevent the District from exercising the 
right of eminent domain. The question of whether the District had acted 
arbitrarily or abused its discretion could not be determined in a prohibition 
action, but the court suggested it was possibly a matter of defense to be 
determined in the condemnation action. Another case, in which facts similar 
to the Atherton case were alleged, was reported, but the court said all the 
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issues raised were similar to those of the Atherton case and further dis-
cussion was unnecessary.26 
ATTEMPTS OF PUBLIC AGENCIES lO CONDEMN 
PROPERTY OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
Only one case has been located in which the attempt of a public agency 
to condemn the property of a school or college was unsuccessful. President 
and Fellows of Middlebury Colleg_e Vo Central Power Corporation of Vermont27 
was a suit brought by the College to enjoin the Corporation from taking part 
of its property for development of a water storage and .electric power projecto 
The property sought was devised to the College by Joseph Battell in trust 
forever as a park for the benefit of the students with the provision that the 
citizens of Vermont be allowed access to the park. The injunction was sought 
on the ~asis that it was a public park dedicated to the public uses under the 
terms of the Battell will. The court held that lands dedicated and employed 
to a public use could not be taken for another public use without legislative 
authority either expressed or impliedo It was not considered essential that 
the State hold the legal title to park lands which are devoted to a public 
useo The court was of the opinion that: 
In each case the distinction bet\l\reen public and private 
uses lies in the character of the use, and determination of 
the character of a given enterprise cannot be made upon 
consideration of legal principles alone; economic conditions 
and the needs of the people must have attention.28 
The corporation maintained that the Battell will created only limited rights 
26Laridi ·vo Supet.tior _ Court, .159 Ga.1.App. 2d 839, 324 P .2d 326 (1953). 
27 
·· 10.l Vt • .325, 143. A. 384 (1928) • 
. 
28143 Atlo at 388. 
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for the public as a condition subsequent, but the court was of the opinion 
that the intention of the testator was clearly to preserve wild lands and 
found that the land was dedicated to a public use. The fact that the Trus-
tees had the power to fix reasonable regulations regarding public access to 
the park was not considered the power to deny accesso The primary use of 
the property was found to be public and not subordinant to the private use 
by the Collegeo 
The other cases in which the property of schools and colleges has been 
taken by public agencies are presented in chronological order. 
Th~ earliest case located was Trustees of Belfast Academy v. Salmondo29 
In 1825, the selectmen of Belfast laid out a town way diagonally across a 
lot belonging to the Academy within a few feet of its building. In 1833, 
the Trustees put up a fence across the wayo The selectmen removed the fence 
and this resulted in the action of trespass being brought by the Academy, 
which resulted in a non-suit. According to the court, it was clear the land 
was private property subject to claims on the part of the publico 
Similar facts were involved in the case of Trinity College Vo Hartford30 
except that it was a petition for an injunction to prevent opening a street. 
The right of the public to take the college property was not discussed in 
the case, but assumed. 
Rominger v. Simmons31 began as ·a petition for location of a highway in 
Haw Creek Township of Bartholomew County. A remonstrance was filed by some 
29 11 Me. 109 (1833). 
3032 Conn. 452 (1865). 
3188 Indo 453 (1882)0 
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of the owners alleging that there was no public need for the highway and 
the damages awarded were inadequate. The Haw Creek School Township filed 
a separate remonstrance but did not press the appeal. The instructions of 
the trial court had told the jury that no part of the proposed highway 
could be located on premises owned, used and occupied by the School Township 
for common school purposes, because such property, being the property of the 
State, could not be ~ntered upon for the purpose of locating a highway 
thereon. The jury was told however, that they could locate the proposed 
highway if they found it to be of public utility regardless of the fact that 
part of the proposed line would be occupied by a schoolhouse. It had been 
conceded that if the highway were established, a portion of the school 
building would be in line of the highway~ but this fact alone, the jury 
was told, would not defeat the petition for location of the highway. The 
rights of the School District would not be in any way affected, and location 
of the highway would not authorize destruction of the schoolhouse. The jury 
was told that the effect of finding the road to be of public utility would 
be to locate the highway as proposed, with the schoolhouse intact occupying 
a part of the highway. On appeal the court found error in these instructions 
on the basis that it was not for the jury to fix the location of the road. 
It was not regarded an issuable question whether the road would occupy land 
owned by the School Township. Taking the instructions as a whole the jur-y 
could not have understood that they were not to determine the line of the 
road but only the question of public utility and damages. The court then 
discussed whether a public highway may be located on school property, and 
concluded that the appropriation would not extinguish the franchises of the 
School Township. The cost of the highway to the public would be a proper 
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question for the jury in determination of public utility, and this cost 
would include the expense caused by removal of the brick schoolhouse. The 
court found error in instructions saying the schoolhouse might occupy a 
portion of the highway, but added it was not erroneous to say that the 
schoolhouse in line with the highway should not alone defeat the petition. 
In re St. Paul and Northern Pacific~· Co. 32 was appealed from denial 
of a motion by the State to dismiss the petition. The motion was made on 
the ground that the Company could not appropriate the land of the University. 
The court found the lots in the Regents Addition of Minneapolis were not 
used or held for public purposes by the State and not contiguous to the 
University grounds, so therefore liable to appropriation in the same manner 
as private property. No cause was shown by the University why such lands 
might not be taken. 
Dicta in University of Minnesota v. Northern Pacific BY· Co. 33 
suggested that if the University had been found to have acquired title in the 
lots in question they would not have been subject to condemnation by the 
Company. The case was decided for the Company because the action of members 
of the executive committee of the Board of Regents had not been recognized 
by the Regents, nor had the property been put to any use by the University. 
Another case involving the laying out of a town way over a schoolhouse 
lot was Easthampton v. County Commissioners of Hampshire. 34 The action was 
brought as a petition for certiorari to quash the proceedings and the petition 
3234 Minn. 227, 25 N.W. 345 (1885). 
3336 Minn. 447, 31 N.W. 936 (1887). 
34154 Mass. 424, 28 N.E. 298 (1891). 
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was dismissedo Justice Holmes noted that ordinarily a highway or railroad 
could not be laid out_ longitudinally over a previously established highway 
or railroad according to general statutes or without special legislation, 
but he was of the opinion: 
ooo When we come to more difficult cases, we derive little aid 
from the varying statements of general principles under which 
authority will be implied to take land for a second public useo 
We must consider the relative importance and the necessities 
of the two uses generally, the extent of the harm to be done, 
accept any light that history may throw, and make up our minds 
under all the circumstances of the particular case as best we cano35 
Considering that large tracts are appropriated to school purposes, it was 
thought impossible to accept an unqualified rule that no part of school 
property could be taken for a way under any circumstances without express 
enactmento The Rominger case was cited as authority for the takingo The 
opinion reasoned that the converse case of an attempt to put a schoolhouse 
within the limits of a highway would not be so strong, as there would be no 
necessity for taking the property since the school had a much greater freedom 
of choice~ The record of the Governor and Council of 1702 was cited to show 
that such a case had been permitted, and the conclusion was that, according 
to this reasoning, the present case should also be permittedo Other examples 
cited of public property taken for other public uses involved a highway 
through a reservoir, a railroad already located through a cemetery, and a 
crossing of a large tract by a highway at the edgeo 
An action for damages was brought in Board of Education Vo Kanawha and 
Michigan _gyo Coo36 In 1892, the Railway Company erected an embankment across 
35 28 NoEo at 2980 
3644 Wo Vao 71, 295 SoEo 503 (1897)0 
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the schoolhouse lot for the bed of its road without legal permission. The 
Board alleged that the playground had been destroyed, the railroad created 
a nuisance, its access to a river and spring had been cut off, and that the 
lot was therefore worth nothing as school property. It had been used each 
year, however, since the embankment was built. The issues presented in the 
case related to the measure of damages and these will be discussed in 
Chapter VII. The court did point out that the school could build a fence, 
dig a well, or get adjoining land for its playground. 
The issue of damages was also of paramount importance in San Pedro, 
L.A. and~·.!::· _gy. Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City.3 7 The 
railroad condemned a strip 43\ feet wide off the south end of a 292 x 150 
foot lot. The trial court found that the property was entirely destroyed 
for school purposes and awarded damages for the entire property, including 
the four room, 63 x 90 foot building. The track was located 127 feet south 
of the building, and access to the building was unimpaired. The Company's 
motion for a new trial was overruled, and this ruling was reversed on appeal. 
The finding of the trial court that the property had been wholly destroyed 
was not supported by direct evidencej and error was found in the instructions 
that let the jury believe the Board might abandon the property under any 
conditions other than total destruction for school purposes. 
A judgment awarding damages to the School District for property taken 
by the State for use as a highway was affirmed in School District of Borough 
of Speers v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.38 In this case the highway 
3732 Utah 305, 90 Pac. 565 (1907). 
38383 Pa. 206, 117 A. 2d 702 (1955). 
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department was contesting the requirement that damages be paid to the 
District because the District WqS already an agent of the State. 
The United States acquired title in condemnation proceedings to 3.42 
acres of Ridgely West Vi.rginia High School property for a flood control 
project, and the case of United States v. Board of Education39 adjudicated 
the issue of the measure of damages. 
The measure of damages was also the only major issue in State v. Salt 
~ City Public Board of Education.40 The State Road Commission in 
construction of an interstate highway condemned Franklin School and possession 
was granted by a stipulation of counsel. The dissent in the case commented 
that the highway was conceded a more necessary public use although this was 
really not contested. 
Another highway condemnation action in which damages were at issue was 
Union Free School District v. State.41 In this case the state appropriated 
a strip along the frontage of the school property and two parcels in the 
northeast portion of theelementary school site. The court noted that the 
school did not use the entire site for school purposes and that the two 
parcels in the northeast corner were undeveloped. 
The state acted to condemn 7.4 acres for highway purposes through the 
campus of University High School in Waco in the case of State v. Waco 
Independent School District. 42 In this case, also, the issue before the 
39253 F. 2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958). 
4013 Utah 2d 56, 368 P. 2d 468 (1962). 
4135 Misc. 2d 373, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (N.Y.Ct. Claims 1962). 
42364 s.w. 2d 263 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
court was whether the school had a market value, and it, too, will be 
discussed further in Chapter Vllo 
SUMMARY 
Condemnation of property already devoted to a public use as a public 
park by a school district has been permitted in a recent case, but the 
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power of a school or college to take other public property has, in general, 
been limitedo The other cases of competing public uses in which a school 
or college has been successful in condemning property involved factual 
situations in which the public use by the other agency was marginal or the 
use of the property by the school did not interfere with the pre-existing 
public useo The courts have held consistently that in the absence of express 
legislative provisions, a school or college may not condemn property already 
devoted to another public use, and only two cases, both of which were 
decided in favor of the school district, have been located in which such 
provisions were construedo 
The efforts of other public agencies to take property of schools and 
colleges have apparently met with greater success, as only one case has 
been located in which the taking was denied, and in that case the use of 
the property was found to be public not so much for educational purposes 
as for general access to the property for park purposes as dedicated by the 
terms of a will. In two older cases the property of private colleges 
yielded to public use for streetso The property of public schools and colleges 
has generally been found to be subservient to public highways and railroads 
on the theory that the location of a school or college is less critical than 
that of a public transportaion arteryo In many of these cases the paramount 
issue has been the measure of damages, the more necessary use having been 
conceded or uncontested. 
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Cases in which the condemnation of property by schools has been 
challenged because in violation of .. zoning ordinances do not involve -the 
same issues as those in which the property sought is actually put to a 
public use, but the rights of two public agencies are put at issue. All 
the cases located hold that zoning ordinances of a municipality, even 
though they are enacted under statutory authority, will not prevent condem-
nation of property by public schools also operating according to legisla-
tive provisionso The references to location of schools in the zoning 
statutes have not been construed as grants of power to the municipalitieso 
The power of eminent domain granted by the legislature to schools in these 
cases has been found to be greater than the police power granted to 
municipalities. 
CHAPTER V 
DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC USE AND NECESSITY 
In Chapters III and IV, the issues involved in the commonly recognized 
principles that property condemned by schools and colleges must be for 
necessary public uses were investigatedo The purpose of this chapter is to 
document the judicial opinions in school and college eminent domain cases 
concerning the methods of determining questions of public use and necessityo 
It should be recognized at the outset that, as a result of the function 
of review, the judiciary could be considered the final arbiter of almost any 
questiono There are questions, however, which the courts have been reluctant 
to consider~ and to a relative extent, the determination of these questions 
can be said to be left primarily to legislative or administrative bodieso 
In the cases where the courts disqualify themselves from consideration of an 
issue a phrase such as 11 except in case of fraud~ abuse of discretion, or bad 
faith, 11 is usually addedo It should be noted also that in some jurisdictions 
the statutes have been more explicit than in others about the roles of the 
various agencies involved in condemnation proceedingso Sometimes it is not 
clear from the report of a case whether the comments regarding who should 
determine if a taking of property meets the requirement of the law are 
necessary to the decision or dictao It may be assumed, however, that the 
issue is raised by the parties when mentioned in the report, and the issue is 
often one that is critical to the outcome of the caseo 
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LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES 
The early case of Williams Vo School District No. 61 indicated that it 
was for the legislature to determine when and in what manner public necessity 
requires the exercise of eminent domain 1 and that courts would not interfere 
with reasonable exercise of that discretion. The use of the term 11 reasonable 11 
implies that the court reserves the right to review the "wisdom of the legis-
latureo11 In this case 9 the amount of property that could be taken was 
regarded as a matter resting with the conunissioners and the county courto 
The opinion in Appeal of Rees2 cited authorities to the effect that the 
control of the right of eminent domain rests with the legislature and that 
the degree of the public necessity for exercise of that right is exclusively 
for the legislature's ascertainmento The court also said, however, that the 
question of what is a public use is finally a judicial question. 
In Knapp v. State3 the court indicated that the legislative determination 
to take private property is conclusive, but the questions of whether the 
taking is for a public use and whether just compensation has been paid are 
judicial questionso 
A statute of the Texas Legislature authorizing the Governor to appoint 
a conunittee to purchase land adjacent to the state university and appropriating 
$1,350,000 was contested in Cochran Vo Cavanaugho4 By the terms of the Act, 
133 Vto 271 (1860)o 
212 Atlo 427 (Pao Supo Cto 1888) 0 
3 125 Minno 194, 145 NoWo 967 (1914)0 
4252 SoWo 284 (Texo App. 1923). 
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the acquisition board was authorized to institute condemnation proceedings 
in the name of the State of Texas for the use of the University. The court 
noted that the University Board of Regents had the power of eminent domain 
as wello In its decision favoring the taking of property, the court spoke 
concerning the legislative function: 
The State University is a public institution 
authorized by the Constitution of the State of Texas 
and supported by legislative appropriations from 
year to yearo It is necessary for its future growth 
and prosperity that it have ample grounds on which 
there can be erected buildings for its various activi-
tieso Whether or not there was sufficient land before 
this enactment for this purpose was a matter resting 
solely with the Legislatureo By this act the Legisla-
ture declared that a necessity existed for the 
acquisition of this additional land~ and the courts 
cannot review a legislative act in this respecto5 
In a case involving a school as one of two public uses, Cemetery 
Company Vo Warren School Township, 6 the court reasoned that it could not, 
under the guise of interpreting the law, grant a priority to one public use 
over another where the legislature had not seen fit to expressly grant such 
powero A United States Supreme Court decision involving an eminent domain 
proceeding by a railroad was distinguished and criticized by the court in 
the following terms: 
oo• L-E_/ven though the Supreme Court has not feared to 
venture into this field of apparent legislative policy 
with heavy-handed deftness it has reached anomalous and 
confusing results.7 
In this case, also,determination of the legal authority and right under 
5252 SoW. at 2860 
6236 Ind. 171, 139 N.E. 2d 538 (1957)0 
7139 N.E. 2d at 545. 
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which the power of eminent domain is exercised was recognized as a judicial 
function, but the court added, prqbably in deference to other Indiana cases 
L see the following section_/in which the discretion of administrative 
boards has been protected: 
This does not mean, however, that the courts may assume the 
administrative act of determining the necessity or reason-
ableness of the decision to appropriate and take the land • 
••• We do not think the court has the power to inquire into 
the wisdom or propriety of such judgment unless a question 
of fraud or bad faith is raised as where an attempt is made 
to show that the property taken will not be used for a 
public purpose, or the proceeding is a subterfuge to convey 
the property to a private use.8 
These five cases decided in five different states would seem to indi-
cate that there is a tendency for the questions of public use and necessity 
basic to exercising of the right of eminent domain to be determined by the 
legislature, at least in these jurisdictions. The issue is not always 
clearly stated in the reports, however, and it is probably safer to conclude 
that no clear line has been drawn regarding the determination of the issue 
of necessity by the legislature or by the courto 
THE FUNCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS 
The general principle that an agency of the state must depend upon 
legislative authorization in order to exercise the right of eminent domain 
has been discussed. This statement does not account for many of the details 
involved in an eminent domain action, and a number of cases have dealt with 
the problem of the proper function of the administrative board or agency 
seeking to condemn the property. 
8 139 N. E. 2d at 5460 
One of the errors assigned by the defendant in Kirkwood Vo School 
District Noa z9 was that the court should not have approved the report of 
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the commissioners appointed to appraise the property sought by the District 
since one of the three commissioners found no necessity for the takingo The 
court said that the statute empowered the School District to take and hold 
as much property as necessary for the location, construction, and convenient 
use of a schoolhouse 9 but not in excess of one acreo The court found that 
there was no error committed by the trial court because the matters of 
determining the location for a school and the necessity of taking property 
had been vested entirely in the school authorities and were not for the 
commissioners to determineo The court added that these were not matters for 
the jury to determine, but this statement would have to be regarded as dictao 
One of the grounds on which the taxpayers requested an injunction in 
Smith Vo City Board of Education of BirminghamlO was that the conquct of the 
Board in seeking to condemn property to construct an administrative office 
building was a gross abuse of discretion, arbitrary, and capriciouso The 
demurrer was sustained partly on the ground that it was not a function of the 
courts to locate, construct, and maintain school buildings and that~ when 
free from fraud, administrative and quasi-legislative functions of the Board 
could not be reviewedo 
In three school or college cases, the Indiana Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that a legislature could confer broad discretion 
945 Coloo 368, 101 Paco 343 (1909)0 
10272 Alao 227, 130 Soo 2d 29 (1961)0 
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concerning exercise of the right of eminent domain. In Braden v. McNuttll 
the ~rustee of Washington Tow~ship in Clinton County filed a petition to 
acquire land for a schoolhouse. A motion by the defendant to reject the 
petition was overruled and the Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, stating 
that the filing of the petition was sufficient evidence of the Trustee's 
decision that it was necessary to locate the school on the land he sought 
to acquire under the statute. An abuse of discretion might be prevented 
by the court, but the defendant had not offered any evidence to that effect. 
The statement by the court that 11 ••• great injury might ~esult if the 
questions respecting the locating of schoolhouses and of providing school 
facilities should be made matters for trial by jury •••• 11 12 must be regarded 
as dicta. 
The Braden case was cited in Richland School Township v. Overmyer, 13 a 
case in which a judgment for the defendant was reversed. The Township 
Trustee began proceedings to condemn one acre and the appraisers appointed 
reported its value as $325. The defendant filed exceptions on the basis 
that damages were too small. The District's demurrer to the exceptions was 
overruled. On application by the defendant the venue of the case was changed 
and a verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant. On appeal the 
petitioner assigned as error the overruling of his demurrer to exceptions and 
overruling a motion for new trial. The Supreme Court found that the 
allegation of the defendant that the damages were too small was sufficient 
11 114 Ind. 214, 16 N.E. 170 (1888). 
12 16 N.E. at 171. 
l3164 Ind. 382, 73 N.E. 811 (1905). 
to justify overruling the demurrer, but granted a new trial on the basis 
that the only legitimate question for the jury was the amount of damageso 
The court accepted the argument of counsel for the Trustee that the verdict 
could not be sustained because in condemnation proceedings the Trustee acts 
on his discretion and his action is not reviewable except by the County 
Superintendento This ruling was made in spite of an allegation by the 
defendant that the appropriation was not intended for school purposes but 
that the Trustee under the color of his office was acting from prejudice 
and personal interest, if not corruptlyo The court said that the State 
had delegated to the Township Trustee the right to exercise the power of 
eminent domain for the special purpose of construction of schoolhouseso 
There was no question that could be raised about public use as the taking 
was by a public official and the benefit shared to a greater or lesser 
degree by the whole publico No hearing on the propriety of taking was re-
quired, the court said, and the legislature could delegate the authority 
to decide the necessity for taking the property without review by a court 
or juryo The discretion conferred on the Trustee was broad, comprehensive, 
and absoluteo The question of whether the Trustee would personally benefit, 
or whether he was biased or prejudiced against the defendant was not 
regarded as a proper matter to go before the jury or in any sense pertinent 
to the real issue for trialo The court indicated that it was not deciding 
whether property could be taken by private or quasi-public agencieso 
The court stated in Wampler Vo Trustees of Indiana University14 that 
necessity or expediency is a legislative question but that the statute had 
14 241 Indo 499, 172 NoEo 2d 67j 90 AoLoRo 2d 204 (1961)0 
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vested discretion in the University and its judgment :could not.be questioned 
or·superceded by the·court~, except for fraud, capriciousness, or illegality. 
The·couX't did not :seem to go .as far·in this case as it did in the Overmyer 
c.ase, as it recognized that reasonable standards must be imposed where the 
legislature had delegated discretionary duties. The purpose of the condem-
.n.ation could be considered in order to determine if the. standards provided 
.in the .act were-reasonable. The defendant maintained that the-condemnation 
·was not necessary as the University was.seeking:more land than it needed 
arid that parking space for the dormitory could be provided on land already 
owned by the University. In answer to this contention, the court held that 
the question of necessity or-expediency was within the discretion of the 
legislature, not ·a proper -subject for _judicid review, and that the defend-
ant was prevented from showing that ·.a smaller. amount 9f land would suffice. 
There is dicta in _the case of Burlington City _Board of Education ·v. 
Allenl5 to .the effect·that the._advisability of taking property.is comm.j.tted 
to the discretion of the petitioner·With the exercise of which neither the 
defendant nor the court could interfere. The-major issue·in the·case,was 
whether the defendant had received adequate notice, and the court said that 
condemnatio1;1 was a politi~Jl and administrative measure of which the 
defendant was not .entitled to notice or even to be heard. This result was 
reached in part because of the-statutory provision designating ·the Clerk of 
the Superior Court as the officer to conduct.all proceedings until the 
-question of compensation was raised. The Clerk was not considered a judicial 
officer. 
15 
'.243 N.C. 520,91 S.E. ,2d 180 (1956). 
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Brown v. Doby16 was before the North Carolina Supreme Court twice, 
the first decision having been handed down on June 30, 1955, which was 
before the Allen case of February 3, 1956. In the first decision the 
problem of notice-was adjudicated. In the second case, decided on November 
7, 1956, after the .Allen case, the court simply stated that discretionary 
powers existed in the petitioner to select and take land not exceeding 30 
.acres for school purposes and that the respondent had no right to stay the 
taking. His rights were limited to the recovery of damages. 
The discretion of the Board was questioned in Board of Education of 
- -
City of Minot v. Park District, 17 an action involving the issue of two public 
uses. The judgment-for the Board was affirmed, the court noting that the 
evidence as to the amount of property needed was in conflict. According to 
one of the statutes, the legislature had fixed the maximum fo~ conunon 
schools at five acres, but the condemner in this case was designated a 
special district. Since no maximum was specified in the statutes for this 
type of district, the court said that the amount that could be taken was 
left to the discretion of the Board and not reviewable except in case of 
gross abuse or manifest fraud. In discussing the issue of which use involved 
the greater necessity, the court cited a federal decision which did not 
involve schools which held that if there is no express legislative provision, 
the relative importance of the two uses is to be determined by the court. 
l6242·N.C. 462, 87 S.E. 2d 921 (19!?5), 244 N.C. 746, 945 S.E. 2d 
895 (1956). 
1770 N.W. 2d 899 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
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A statute which provided that 11 if the application be by ••• a board 
the petitioner shall determine the necessity 11 l8 was cited in Phi Delta 
Theta v. Sachtjen.19 In response to the plaintiff's contention that a 
State agency could n~t be a board within the meaning of the act, the court 
found that the Board of Regents met the requirement of the statute. 
The plaintiff in Spann Vo Joint Boards of School Directors20 objected 
to the fact that the Board appropriated 15 acres through the heart of his 
farm cutting it into two parcels. He called the action of the Board 11 a 
grandiose scheme 11 that could have been served on acreage to the north and 
challenged the action of the board as arbitrary and capricious. The court 
held that the location and amount of property to be taken had been placed 
in the discretion of the Board by the statute--that it was an administrative 
matter, binding on the courts. Where the land had been cut in two, the 
court suggested, the element of damages may be involved. 
The amount of land necessary for a senior high school of 600 to 1500 
students was questioned in State ex rel. Tacoma School District v. Stojack.2 1 
The statute said that it was for the court to find that the real estate 
sought was necessary for the purposes of a schoolhouse site. In spite of 
this provision, the court said that the rule applicable to other public 
agencies should apply, which was that the action of a public agency having 
the right of eminent domain in selecting land for public use will generally 
18 . Wis. Stats. 32.07 (2). 
19260 Wis. 206, 50 N.W. 2d 469 (1951). 
2016 Beaver 18, exc.dis. 16 Beaver 122, affd. 381 Pa. 338, 113 A. 2d 
281 (1955) 0 
2153 Wash. 2d 55, 330 P. 2d 567, 71 A.L.R. 2d 1064 (1958). 
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not be controlled by the courts, except for abuse of discretion, violation 
of law, fraud, improper motives, or collusion. 
The question of the necessity for the .college taking property on which 
to construct a dormitory was raised in Board of Regents v. Palmer?22 
According to the court, the grant of power by the legislature carried with 
it the right to decide the essentially political questions of the necessity 
for its exercise as well as the expediency and propriety of doing so. The 
only question for the court was whether the contemplated use was a public 
use. 
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 
It has just been noted that in Missouri the question of necessity 
was regarded as a matter for the determination of the condemnor 1 but that 
the determination of whether the use was public was for the court. Conunents 
in cases from a number of other jurisdictions also indicate that the question 
of public use is a judicial question. 
Determination if the Use is Public. 
A New York case, Board of Education of School District No. l v. Harper23 
held, similarly to the Palmer case in Missouri, that the question of public 
use was to be determined by the court but that the legislature or the 
instrumentality it employed to exercise the right of eminent domain was the 
sole judge of necessity. 
22356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
23191 N.YoSo 273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918). 
A case involving the tax exemption of Yale University24 was noted by 
the court in Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert.25 The College in 
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attempting to support the legislative determination of public use, maintained 
that the Yale case established that principle. The Calvert case held, however~ 
that it was a judicial function to determine if the use would be administered 
as a public or private use in accordance with the facts of the case, and that 
it was for the court to determine whether the public had or could acquire a 
right to use the property takeno The dissent was based on the opinion that 
the court should resolve every reasonable intendment in favor of the legis-
lative declaration that the purpose of the act was public. The dissenting 
judge thought that since the charter of the College had been made a part of 
the application to condemn, no further allegation as to the public right was 
necessary on the part of the college. The dissenting opinion r~cognized 
that 11public use" was an elastic term varying with different ages and 
circumstances, and that, in the end, the courts should decide if the public 
benefit was great enough to warrant the exercise of the power in a given caseo 
The dicta in Kern County Union High School District Vo McDonald26 that 
the power to determine what uses are public is vested in the legislature was 
discussed in University of Southern California v. Robbins. 27 In the Robbins 
case the court agreed that the legislative declaration that uses are public 
24Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 Atl. 87, 43 L.R.A. 490 
(1899). 
2587 Conn. 421, 88 Atl. 633, 48 L.R.A. (NS) 485 (1913). 
26180 Cal. 7, 179 Pac. 180 (1919). 
27 1 Calo App. 2d 523, 37 P. 2d 163, cert. den. 295 U.S. 738, 55 S.Ct. 650 
(1934). 
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would be recognized, but expressed the opinion that the final determination 
of whether an individual case involved a public use must be determined by 
the judiciary •. A United States Supreme Court case involving eminent domain 
for irrigation purposes was cited as authority for the statement that what 
is a public use depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 
The Question of Necessity. 
The question of whether a necessity for taking property existed was a 
matter dependent upon the evidence and to be determined by the court according 
Sh d Ed . 28 to eppar Vo · l.SOno An Act of the General Assembly to amend the charter 
of the City of Edison included a section relating to condemnation of land for 
school purposes and the act included the phrase 11when in their judgment it 
may be necessary." The court said that this phrase in the Act did not have 
the effect of making the power dependent merely on the judgment of the city 
council instead of upon the facts of the case. The injunction sought was 
granted on appeal for other reasons. 
The court in Seba v. Independent School District No. ~29 stated that 
the condemnor•s decision regarding the necessity for taking property would 
not be disturbed in absence of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, but 
also noted that this had been held to be a judicial question. On the 
question of whether the taking was arbitrary and for spiteful reasons, the 
court found that the defendant had not introduced.sufficient evidence to 
make a showing that the Board did not need the property, or that the Board 
28161 Ga. 907, 132 S.E. 218 (1926). 
29208 Okl. 83, 253 P. 2d 559 (1953) •. 
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did not have the right to take it by eminent domain. 
In the jurisdictions where the court has the function of determining 
whether the property taken is necessary or for a public use or both, the 
issue has been raised as to whether these are legal questions for the judge 
to decide, or of a factual nature for submission to a jury • 
. · ~~ ··Questions for the Court. The opinion in Dean v. County Board of 
Education30 is somewhat contradictory on the question of whether the board 
or the court determines the necessity for taking the property. At one 
place the court says the necessity for acquiring by condemnation is a matter 
for determination of the Board of Education rather than by trial of fact. 
This statement was in answer to the defendant's argument that the Board had 
never introduced sufficient evidence to show that taking the property was 
necessary. The court said that the Board's statement of facts in its 
petition and the fact that it had prosecuted the case were sufficient indi-
cati.ons that the Board thought the land was necessary. The court also 
stated that the question of necessity was determined by the court as a legal 
question on the right of condemnation presented by the pleadings, and held 
that there was no error in the oral instructions that, 
The court has determined from the petition and the 
evidence in the case that the petitioner in this case 
has a legal right to condemn the property and has a 
right to have the value of the property assessed.31 
Ouachita Parish School Board v. Clark32 is authority for the determination 
30210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923). 
3197 So. at 7 44. 
32197 La. 131, 1 So. 2d 54 (1941). 
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of the question of necessity by the court. It was noted in the opinion that 
the defendant had not asked the court to try the issue of necessity before 
submission to the jury. The court thought that the fact that the judge 
rendered and signed a judgment showed he found necessity for the Board to 
acquire the property. 
A line of Illinois cases have held that determination of the.question 
of necessity is not to be submitted to the jury, but to be decided by the 
courto These cases also illustrate a tendency to shift from judicial to 
administrative determination that the property sought is necessaryo The 
earliest of these cases, Chicago Vo Lehman33 held that the question of 
whether the particular property sought to be appropriated was necessary for 
the public use was for the courts. The owner could challenge the right by 
denying that the property was necessary and that issue was regarded as 
preliminary to be decided by the court. The burden of the evidence was on 
the petitioner to show facts supporting his allegation of necessity. While 
the court recognized that the question would be left largely to the condemnor 9 
it noted that it was subject to review, and if the quantity sought was 
grossly in excess of the amount necessary, the right to take would be denied. 
The trial court was held to have erred in issuing judgment for the City 
because no evidence of necessity was shown by the record. 
The validity of an election to select a site was contested in Bierbaum 
Vo Smith.34 Selection of the site was held to be a condition precedent to 
the right to condemn. The court felt that while the question of the conditions 
33202 Ill. 468, 104 N.E. 829 (1914). 
34317 Ill. 147, 147 N.E. 796 (1925). 
under which the right of eminent domain could be exercised was purely 
legislative, it was for the judiciary to decide whether the statutory 
conditions existed in any case, and if not, to dismiss the petition. 
Dicta in the case of Chicago v. Jewish Comsumptives Relief Society35 
was to the effect that the court must determine prior to submission of the 
case to the jury if the right of condemnation existed. 
Citing the Lehman case, the court in County Board of School Trustees 
Vo Batchelder36 stated that the question of necessity for public use was 
for the courts and if none were found the land could not be taken. Other-
wise, according to the court: 
••• the property owner would be without the protection to 
which he is entitled if the determination of a corporation, 
private or municipal, to take his property conclusively 
settled the necessity of the taking, •• 
~ determination of the question of necessity is left 
largely to the corporation or municipality, and its 
determination will be rejected only for an abuse of the 
power.37 /-emphasis added. 7 
- -
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Here the Board was seeking to condemn 1.45 acres for a playground and other 
school purposes. The motion to dismiss by the defendant was based in part 
on his allegation that the taking was not necessary for a public use. 
Evidence submitted by the Trustees on necessity included the fact that the 
school had been leasing the tract since 1942 and that it had been continuously 
used as a playground and athletic field by the school since then. The school 
enrollment was larger by 80 students in 1953 than it had been in 1942. The 
35323 Illo 389, 154 N.E. 117 (1926). 
367 Ill. 2d 178, 130 N.E. 2d 175 (1955). 
37 130 N.E. 2d at 178. 
court held that upon the consideration of this evidence, the burden of 
showing necessity for taking the property was satisfied. 
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The court held that issues raised by traverse or denial concerning the 
right of the petitioner to condemn were preliminary questions to be deter-
mined by the court~without a jury.in Chicago v. Riley.38 This determination, 
the·court:said, would not be disturbed on appeal unless against the-weight 
of the ·evidence, and in this case there was a direct conflict in the evidence of 
petitioner and defendant. The case presented a complicated fact situation. 
On January 8, 1957, the Board made an offer to purchase the defendant's lot, 
on which stood a two-story frame building, for $6,500, and stipulated that 
unless the·offer was accepted in 10.days it would be assumed rejected. The 
defendant testified that she received this offer .and went to the Board office 
to tell an employee that she accepted, but that he informed her she should 
wait until hearing from the Board. The employee said he did not recall the 
interview, and there was no tangible evidence of acceptance. The defend-
ant did continue to collect the rentals on the property. On August·3, 1957, 
the buil.ding on the property was washed or blown from its foundation by a 
violent storm and the City demolished it due to the hazard it created. On 
October 21, 1957, the Board petitioned to condemn the property. Appraisers 
were appointed who reported the value of the property at $750. This was the 
only evidence on the question of value that had been submitted, so the court 
directed a verdict for that.amount. On February 3, 1958, the defendant filed 
a petition for dismissal on the grounds that her offer had been accepted, or 
·in.the alternative, that $6,500 be entered as the amount of compensation due. 
3816 Ill. 2d 257, 157 N.E. 2d 46 (1959). 
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The defendant had instituted suit to recover insurance for the damage caused 
by the storm, and the court was of the opinion that this fact, along·with the 
collection of rentals, furnished sufficient .reason to doubt the credibility 
of the defendant's evidence on acceptance of the Board's offer. The only 
issue tobe tried, concluded the court, .was that of just compensation, and 
the value of the property was to be determined as of the time of filing the 
petition to condemn. 
In Trustees v. Sherman Heights Corporation39 the Board of Education of 
the township passed a resolution stating that 11 it is necessary.and desirable" 
to acquire the eleven .acre tract of vacant·land in question. The resolution 
stated that the use·would be for playgrounds, recreation grounds, athletic 
fields, and enlargement of the Lemont Township high school site and other 
educational purposes. According to the Illinois procedure, the Township 
Trustees intitiated the petition to condemn. It was dismissed on the defend-
ant's motion, the trial court overruling all the denials of fact by the 
defendant except that on the question of necessity, ruling that the Trustees 
would have to introduce further evidence to establish their case. On appeal 
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the resolution 
of the Board stated a prima facie case of necessity. The question of 
necessity, added the court, is legislative and its determination is within 
the discretion of the corporate body authorized to exercise the·right of 
eminent domain. This discretion would be disturbed by the courts only when 
there was evidence of a violation of constitutional rights. The evidence 
presented by the Superintendent on the question of necessity was part of the 
3920 Ill. 2d 357, 169 N.E. 2d 800 {1960). 
record. It included the following facts: 
1. The recommendation of the North Central Association that a high 
school the size of Lemont should have a minimum site of 20 acres. 
2. The original building was constructed in 1925 with additions in 
1952 and 1957 and one then :1,n progress. 
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3. The 8\ acres occupied by the school were 99% covered by buildings 
and the terrain of the site was irregular. Additions were crowding the 
baseball diamond and football field, neither of which had spectator seats. 
4. Land to the north, south, and west was improved. 
5. Enrollments in 1954 totalled 248; in 1959, 418; and the projection 
to 1964 was 603. 
6. Classes were then being held in the gymnasium. 
This evidence is repeated here as a point of interest to school boards or 
administrators who may be contemplating condemnation. It illustrates that 
the court may regard factual information which may have a bearing on the 
question of a necessity as of considerable importance to the taking of 
property for school use. 
It is interesting to note that in the three Illinois cases that indicate 
the court should decide the question of necessity, the school was not success-
ful in its effort to condemn property, but that in the three cases emphasizing 
the role of the administrative board, these boards' right to condemn was 
upheld. 
Necessity Determined~ the Jury. The constitution and statutes in 
Michigan require that in eminent domain cases the question of necessity for 
taking the property should be determined by a jury. The constitutional 
provision reads: 
When private property is taken for the use or bene~it 
of the public, the necessity for using such property••• 
shall be ascertained by a jury •••• 40 
The statute quoted in Board of Education .2.f City of Detroit v. Moross41 
stated that whenever a site is designated and the district is unable to 
obtain the title for any purpose, the Board is authorized to apply to the 
circuit judge or circuit court commissioner or justice of the peace for a 
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jury to determine the questions of just cc;,m.pensation and necessity, provided 
that when the school district has selected or established a site, that action 
is prima facie evidence for the necessity thereof.42 The case was not de-
cided on the basis of this issue. 
In~ Board of Education of City of Grand Rapids43 held that the trial 
court's dismissal of the Board's petition should be vacated. On December 3, 
1928, the Board had passed a resolution stating that it was necessary to 
enlarge the site of Vocational and Technical High School by acquiring three 
parcels, that it had been unable to agree with the owners on the price, that 
it was a necessary improvement, and that it was necessary to take the property 
for the use and benefit of the public. The resolution instructed the city 
attorney to take proceedings to condemn the property. After the Board had 
submitted its evidence, the order dismissing the petition was issued for 
40Article 13, Section 2. 
41151 Mich. 625, 114 N.W. 75 (1907). 
42comp. Laws, 4729, Sec. 2. 
43 249 Mich. 550, 229 N.W. 470 (1930). 
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want of proper·proof of necessity. The evidence submitted by the Board 
included its preliminary plans, approval of the plans by the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, a cost estimate of $565,490 for the first 
section of the project, the fact that the first parcel had been purchased and 
that two were yet to be acquired, and that money was on hand for the first 
section of the building and the land needed for the second section. The 
trial court's action had been based on an absence of proof that the Board 
had adopted a resolution providing that the second addition would be built 
when funds were available. In vacating the order dismissing the petition, 
the Supreme Court held that a jury would have been justified in finding 
that the Board intended to raise additional money to complete the project 
and that under the provisions of the constitution, the jury was judge of 
law and fact on the issue of necessity which should have been submitted to 
them. 
The defendant in Union School District of Qity of Jackson v. Starr 
Conunonwealth for Boys44 objected to the taking of his property on the basis 
that it was also used for a public purpose, and the court here held that the 
question of necessity was for the jury. 
The decision in Board of Education of City of Grand Rapids v. 
Baczewski45 is authority for a limitation being pbced on the function of 
the jury. In this case, a decision for the Board of Education was reversed 
because the court found that there was nothing in the record to justify the 
condemnation of the defendant's property for a playground and that the Board 
44322 Mich. 165, 33 N.W. 2d 807 (1948). 
45340 Mich. 265, 65 N.w. 2d 810 (1954). 
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had shown there was no present necessity to use the property. The court 
took note of the fact that the provision in the ·constitution regarding jury 
determination of necessity for taking and using property was not generally 
found. Before it was inserted in the 1850 constitution, the court observed, 
the jury and conunissioners only assessed damages, and the prerogative·of 
taking was exercised by the legislature or those authorized by the legisla-
ture. The Board argued that the jury's determination was conclusive and 
that the constitution denied the court of any function of review, but the 
Supreme Court held that where the jury had proceeded on a wrong theory, and 
error had been a controlling influence in the result, the ·court had a right 
and a duty to reverse their decision. 
Abuse of Discretion. 
In at least two cases, the discretion of the legislature or the adminis-
trative board has been considered unreasonable by the court. 
In Fountain Park Company v. Hensler46 the act of the legislature dele-
gating the right of eminent .. domain to a Chautauqua Gompany was considered 
unreasonable on two grounds. The first ground was that the classification 
involved in the act was manifestly unjust, and the second ground was that 
the legislature could not reasonably have considered the use to. be public. 
The court recognized that usually questions regarding the expediency of 
taking private property for public use were exclusively for the legislature 
and that the question for the court was not .whether the use was public, but 
whether the legislature might reasonably consider the use to be public. 
46199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518 (1927). 
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Ultimately therefore, the question was considered one of judicial determina-
tion. In this case, the court determined that the use was not public. 
Winger v. Aires,47 a suit to enjoin the school district from condemna-
tion, was dismissed by the trial court but reversed on appeal. In 1947, the 
School Board of the Borough of Euphrata conducted a census and calculated 
that by the beginning of the 1952-53 term another building of three rooms for 
60 to 65 students would be needed and that by the next term, three more rooms 
would be required. On July 10, 1950, the Board tried to purchase the Winger 
farm of 55 acres but was unable to do so. In December of that year, a reso-
lution authorizing condemnation was passed under the statute which provided 
that the Board was vested with the necessary power and authority to acquire 
in the name of the District by condemnation any and all real estate, vacant 
or occupied, as the Board may deem necessary. The court found the zeal of 
the Board excessive and its knowledge of the law lacking. It said the record 
showed the Board moved precipitately and without adequate preparation. The 
reasons given by the court for this finding were that no plans had been drawn 
up for use of the 55 acres; no building specifications had been indicated; 
no architect had been retained; there had been no surveys of the property nor 
location on the tract of the structure; no estimate had been made of 
construction costs and there was no money in the treasury or no planning for 
a junior high school, football field, or additional rooms. A bond issue of 
$150,000 had been approved, and one of the directors had testified that he 
would vote to take 71 acres if he had known the owner held title to the 
additional tract which had not yet been recorded. The opinion also took note 
47371 Pa. 242, 89 A. 2d 521 (1952). 
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that an adjoining city had built on 12 acres a plant costing $850,000. The 
approval of the State Council of Education was not considered evidence for 
necessity of this property, as an official of the Council had testified they 
never denied approval because a tract was too large and that they would have 
approved a ten acre tract. A presumption that the school directors performed 
discretionary acts in the interest of the public welfare was mentioned, but 
evidence in this case was held to overcome the presumption and lead to the 
conclusion that the Board had abused its discretion. The court added that 
the decision was not intended to restrict the Board in meeting the needs of 
the district. In a general vein the court said: 
There is no authority under our form of government 
that is unlimited. The genius of our democracy springs 
from the bedrock foundation on which rests the proposi-
tion that office is held by no one whose orders, commands 
or directives are not subject to review. The power of 
eminent domain, next to that of conscription of manpower 
for war, is the most awesome grant of power under the law 
of the land.48 
In a concurring opinion, one of the judges thought that the evidence showed 
serious study and no abuse of discretion on the part of the Board, and he 
would have reversed the case only on the weakness of the petition. 
SUMMARY 
The case.s cited in this Chapter lead to the general conclusion that 
the determination in eminent domain proceedings involving schools and 
colleges of what is a public use is finally a judicial que:Stion to be 
decided by the court. 
The determination of the.question of necessity for exercise of the 
4889 A. 2d at 522. 
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right of eminent domain is often left to the discretion of the legislature 
or the administrative board to which the legislature has delegated the right. 
This conclusion is subject to a number of important exceptions, however~ In 
the jurisdictionsof Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan and Oklahoma, there 
i~ authority for the judicial determination of the question of necessity. 
D~cisions in Minnesota and Texas which emphasize the legislative determination 
of necessity involved State Universities. In these institutions the relation-
ship of the legislature might be considered more direct than the relationship 
to the public schools. The opinions in which the administrative determina-
tion of necessity has received approval have consistently reserved to the 
court the right to review the discretion of the condemnor. In only one case 
was the discretion of an administrative agency regarded as absolute,and the 
decision on this point could be considered eroded by a later decision in the 
same State. 
It should be noted that in all of the cases decided contrary to the 
right of an educational organization to take property by eminent domain, the 
opinions held that determination of questions of public use and necessity 
were judicial functions. Conflicting opinions in Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, 
and Pennsylvania may be explains.bile:!_ pa:ttJ.ycon.·-t.lilis; basis. 
The problem of determination of questions of public use and necessity 
may not have been adjudicated in a schbol or college eminent domain case in 
a number of States. A jurisdictional rule may have been established, 
however, in eminent domain actions brought by other parties. 
CHAPTER VI 
RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
AS A RESULT OF CONDEMNATION 
Assuming that a school or college may successfully complete condem-
ncjltion proceedings, a number of questions have been raised about the effect 
of the proceedings upon the rights of the parties. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present the case material on the issues of when the school or 
college secures rights and the nature of the rights secured as a result of 
condemnation proceedings. 
THE STAGE IN THE PROCEEDINGS WHEN RIGHTS ARE SECURED 
In a general sense it could be said that rights are acquired by a 
school or·college when legislation authorizing condemnation is passed. The 
issue of when the condemnor acquires property rights in the specific property 
sought has been raised in a few cases. It should be noted that statutes in 
many of the states specify that the title to property shall vest in the con-
demnor upon payment of the compensation award. Other statutes require an 
official act of the judiciary before rights are affected. These provisions 
have not been frequently adjudicated. They havebeen put at issue in cases 
in which the condemnor wishes to discontinue the proceedings, and the cases 
on discontinuance are considered in Chapter VIII. 
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A new trial was granted in Storer v. Hobbs 1 because the court found 
that the plaintiffs in the trespass action had not established their joint 
possession. The action was based on the complaint that the District had no 
right to enter or take possession except upon payment of compensation. 
Apparently the building construction was begun before payment, and the court 
stated ±h. its opinion that for the District to tender payment after entry 
would not establish a right to possession. 
The question of when the School District obtained title to the prop-
erty condemned was raised in School District of Ogden v. Smith. 2 In July, 
1913, the School District petitioned to condemn 8.14 acres and a jury trial 
resulted in a verdict of $2,500 as compensation. On July 26, the District 
paid the award to the Sheriff and notified Smith. On Septe,;nber 3, the 
Sheriff paid the award to the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk paid Smith on 
October 13. Presumably, the reason for this delay was that the itlourt ad-
journed after its July term until October 13 when a judgment was rendered 
vesting the title in the District. Subseq'uent to the payment by the District, 
Smith removed potatoes, apples, peaches, and corn from the property and col-
lected rents from four dwellings. Smith refused to give possession when it 
was demanded by the District. On December 9, 1913, the District brought the 
action for damages of $300. The statute provided that the District may 
request the Court or the Judge to fix a proper sum to be deposited as security, 
and after making the deposit the District had authority to take immediate 
possession. It was also provided that after the compensation was fixed by the 
1s2 Me. 144 (1862). 
2113 Ark. 430, 168 S.W. 1089 (1914). 
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jury, the District should have 60 days to pay to the owner or the Clerk of 
the Court the amount and the Court would then enter an order vesting the title 
in the District. 3 The judgment of the trial court for the defendant was 
reversed and remanded, the court holding that the purpose of the statute was 
to give the School District immediate possession on payment of the amount of 
compensation whether the order of the court vesting the title had been im-
mediately made or not. In the opinion of the court, if the District paid, it 
was entitled to possession the same as if it had made an outright purchase 
with a contract for immediate delivery. The owner was entitled to have com-
pensation from the time of the petition, and the jury had estimated the 
value at the time of filing the petition. Their award was held to include, 
the value of the land, appurtenances, and growing crops. While the title 
was not divested until the court order, the District was entitled to 
possession from the time it paid the award to the owner or the Clerk. The 
court added that if the owner continued in possession after the compensation 
was paid he would be regarded as a tenant by sufferance. 
The court in Topping v. North Carolina State Board of Education4 held 
that the title was not divested unless and until the condemnor obtained a 
final judgment in his favor and paid the condemnation award. The issue of 
when the title to the property vested in the District was raised as a result 
of a complicated factual situation. In 1957, the Superior Court of Hyde 
County issued a judgment authorizing and requiring the Board of Education to 
build a consolidated high school at a designated place. The State Board of 
3 193 Acts 238, secs. 4,5,6. 
4249 N.C. 291, 106 s~E. 2d 502 (1959). 
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education allocated $164,484 after approving plans including a 15 acre site. 
The Board acquired the fee simple title to three acres, but began condemna-
tion proceedings on February 17, 1958, for the remainder, The Board planned 
to build on the three acres previously acquired, and entered into a contract 
for construction of the building. The plaintiff in this case: sought to re-
strain the Board from entering into the contract, but it was signed while 
the case was on appeal,and the appeal was dismissed as academic. The action 
cited above was brought on April 10, 1958, to restrain the State Board from 
paying the amount allocated, and a restraining order was granted by Judge 
Moore on April 23. The basis for the restraining order was that the Board 
of Education had acted unlawfully in entering into a contract without first 
obtaining the site and the State Board could not allot funds for an 
inadequate site. There was no appeal from the restraining order which also 
provided that if the Board acquired legal rights to the entire site it may 
move to dissolve the injunction. The Chairman of the Board of Education 
and the County Superintendent signed a requisition for $19,184 of the State 
allotment. This amount was honored by the State Board of Education on 
May 19, 1958, and a contempt judgment was issued on June 27, 1958. On 
September 17, 1958, the Conunissioners reported their apprgisal1~6fd:iaey:pr9p"'''.' · 
erty sought by the Board at $5,218.50 to the two defendants, and the 
following day the Clerk of the Court signed an order that the Board be let 
into the possession after the award had been paid. The owners filed 
exceptions, and on October 22, 1958, had a hearing pefore the Clerk and took 
an appeal from that hearing. On November 15, 1958, the Board moved to 
dissolve the restraining order, and the order was dissolved by Judge Paul 
on November 21 on the b~sis that the conditions ,prescribed by Judge Moore 
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had been met. The owners filed exceptions to this dissolution. The 
question taken to the Supreme Court, therefore, was whether the Board had 
complied with the conditions of Judge Moore's order of April 23, or what 
was the status 'of the title on November 21. The order of Judge Moore had 
restrained the State Board from making any payment 11 until final hearing of 
this cause or until title to the full site of 15 acres shall have been 
acquired in fee simple. 11 The court found the condemnation proceeding was 
still pending on the exceptions directed at the right to condemn and the 
adequacy of damages. The court recognized that the statute5 explicitly 
entitled the Board to possession 11notwithstanding the pendency of the 
appeal, and until final judgment rendered on said appeal ••• 11 The court 
did note that the condemner may not take a voluntary non-suit over the 
landowner's objection after obtaining temporary possession, but reasoned 
that the non-suit was prevented because the owner may still assert a claim 
for damages. Judge Paul's order granting the motion to dissolve the 
restraining order was vacated as the court found that the Board had not yet 
secured the title in a way that met the requirem~nt of Judge Moore's earlier 
order, even though it had gained possession. 
In three cases in which school buildings were constructed by mistake, 
the schools were found to have obtained an interest in the land before con-
demnation proceedings were begun. The major issue raised by the defendant 
( 
in Buchwalte~ v. School District No. 42 6 was the adequacy of notice, but 
the case could be regarded as authority for the proposition that a school 
5 G.s. 40, Sec. 19. 
665 Kan. 603, 70 Pac. 605 (1902). 
149 
district may secure interest in property by construction of a building 
even without title to the land. In this case, the building was constructed 
on government land prior t~>the plaintiff's ·Settlement of the property. On 
November 14, 1855, the plaintiff made full payment and obtained a receiver's 
receipt. On July 28, 1886, the District proceeded to condemn the property, 
and on December 28, 1886, the·plaintiff obtained a U.S. patent to the land. 
The plaintiff objected to the proceedings partly on the basis that the District 
was seeking .to condemn government land, but the court dismissed the conten-
tion.with the statement that the plaintiff held the equitable title. The 
court commented that the title passed to the District upon taking of the 
property but this could be regarded as dicta. Even though the proceedings 
were begun in 1886, the court cited a 1901 statute which provided that a 
District which built on land without the equitable title may apply ·for 
appraisal, and when the sum was paid, the title should vest in the District.7 
In Davis v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County8 it was held that 
the power granted to the School District included the right to condemn every 
interest incident to having a perfect and complete title to the land taken. 
The District was found to have power to condemn an easement where the 
destruction of the easement was essential to utilization of the land for 
school purposes. This condemnation proceeding was begun to condemn the right 
of the defendant to use an alley 20 feet wide on which the Board had construct-
ed a building. 
Due to .a mistake regarding boundary lines, the .Board constructed a 
7 1901 G.S. Sec. 6131. 
8166 Md. ·118, 170 Atl. 590 (1934). 
gymnasium extending onto an adjoining owner's land and later qrought pro-
ceedings to condemn it. The court held in Ouachita Parish School Board v. 
Clark9 that the proceedings were begun after appropriation. In answer to 
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the defendant's plea that he be reimbursed for improvements made before the 
proceedings were begun, it was held that he had already been divested of 
his property 11 by the authority of law 11 as provided.in the statute. 
The Effect of Pre-Existing Rights. 
The plaintiff in Russell v. Trustees of Purdue UniversitylO attempted 
to quiet his title against the condemnation proceeding by the University by 
relying on the conunon law rule that a tenant's action may not be hostile 
to the title acknowledged in a lease. In this case, the University had 
leased the real estate in question for agricultural purposes cm April 15, 
1927, for five years to commence March 1, 1928. On September 22, 1927, the 
University began an action to condemn the fee simple estate for doiri:nitory 
purposes. The condemnation proceeding was appealed and resulted in affirmance 
of the judgment for the University on November 1, 1929.11 On March 1, 1928, 
however, the University had taken possession of the property under the terms 
of the lease, and while in such occupation of the premises and without the 
knowledge of the plaintiff, on September 18, 1929, paid the appraiser's 
award in the condemnation action to the Clerk of the Court. The University's 
demurrer was sustained, and a judgment in its favor affirmed, the court 
9197 La. 131, 1 So. 2d 54 (1941). 
l093 Ind. App. 242, 178 N.E. 180 (1931). 
11Russell v. Trustees of Purdue University, 201 Ind. 367, 168 N.E. 529 
(1929). 
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holding that the University had not waived its rights to condemn by paying 
the lease money and entering on Ma:i:ch 1, 1928. A waiver was defined ,as an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the court found no allega-
tion that the University intended to waive its rights to condemn or that the 
plaintiff was misled. A tenant while in possession would be estopped to deny 
the landlord's title as it existed at the time of the lease, but the court 
was of the opinion that the tenant may show that the right of the landlord 
had expired or that the tenant had acquired the landlord's title. The 
University's claim was asserted under a judicial decree passing title by 
operation of law, the court said. According to this view, payment of the 
appraiser's award was not denial of the title accepted in the lease, but 
affirmance of it. Payment of the award, it was held, extinguished the land-
lord's title and vested it in the University, and the relationship of 
landlord-tenant ceased,; n:C:i-ppssessoryyright::remaining in the landlord. The 
question of how the appraiser~ award accounted for these interests was not 
presented in the case. 
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS ACQUIRED 
The nature of the estate or interest a school or college acquires as 
a result of exercise of the right of eminent domain has been litigated for 
a number of reasons. Several of the cases which deal with this issue have 
not involved schools or colleges as parties, but they are included in the 
study because the issues are pertinent. For the purposes of this study, 
the cases will be classified as those in which the school or college 
acquired the fee simple absolute title to the property in question and as 
those in which a limited estate was secured. In either situation, it 
should. be ·noted, the natu.re of the estate acquired may be determined by 
express provisions of a statute or by judicial interpretation. 
Jurisdictions in Which~ Fee Simple Estate~ Been Secured. 
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One of the early comments on the nature of the ti~le acquired by a 
school district can be found in Norton ~ighth School District v. Copeland:12 
The School District brought the action in tort for breaking .and entering and 
removing a stone wall. The action resulted in a directed verdict for the 
defendant and the District's exceptions were overruled. The court held that 
the owner should have had the opportunity to appear before the·selectmen in 
a condemnation proceeding. One of the grounds of defense urged by the defend-
ant was that if the .action could be maintained by the District it had 
taken only an easement and therefore he had committed no trespass. The 
,court observed that the tenure of the District was peculiar but that it was 
imma-terial how it was denominated .in law, as the District would have gained 
a right to exclusive possession if the condemnation proceedings had been 
found regular. Due to the fact that the proceedings were not upheld, this 
statement must'.be regarded as dicta. 
Ritter v. County Board of Education of Edmonson County13 involved the 
question·of whether the Board had abandoned an old site to .which the former 
trustees of a common school district had a title which contained a reverter 
clause. The court found that there was no abandonment in the Board's action 
of temporarily choosing a new site and beginning .construction, then going 
122 Gray.414 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1854). 
13150 Ky. 849, 151 s~w. 5, rehearing 151 Ky. 578, 152 s.w. 564 (1912). 
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back to the old site on a ~ajority petition of the District. The schoolhouse 
on the old site was still in use. In the modified opinion, the court directed 
the Board to secure the fee simple title to the site by condemnation proceed-
ings if it was unable to agree with the owners on the price. 
The nature of an estate acquired by condemnation in 1889 was put at 
issu.e by an action of the Board for specific performance of a contract made 
on March ~:,·,].927~, to sell the property. In Binder v. County :Board of Educa-
tion for Jefferson Countyl4 the demurrer on the basis that the Board had 
obtained only an easement or that the clause in the deed 11for school purposes" 
created a reversion was overruled and a judgment for the Board affirmed. 
As a result of the action in 1889, the court appointed connnissioners to 
execute a deed to the Trustees of Common School District No. 36 in the County. 
The deed recited that the parties of the first and second part through: the 
commissioners did nhereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey to the parties 
of the third part their successors in office forever for school purposes" 
the described one-half acre. The defendant conceded that the title of the 
County Board was the same as that formerly held by the Trustees. The 
statutel5 under which the Trustees had condemned the property provided that 
the Trustees may condemn property, if they could not purchase it, as in the 
case of railroad and turnpikercornpanies, that the court should issue a writ 
causing the deed by the Commissioners to be made to the Trustees and their 
successors, and that thereupon the title should vest in the Trustees and 
their successors in office. The court held that this statute did not require 
14224 Ky. 143, 5 S.W. 2d 903 (1928). 
15 . 
1888 G.S., Sec. 6, p. 1166 (Bullitt and Freeland). 
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that the title taken by the District be the same as the title taken by 
railroad companies. It was noted that the statute provided that the Trustees 
might dispose of a site as well as acquire one. The deed to be executed by 
the Commissioners was to have the same language as that employed to create in 
a corporation a fee simple title, and the court observed that the Commissioners 
had no authority to limit the fee even if it had been their intention to do 
so. The conunissioners had no authority to convey any less title than the 
condemnation proceedings provided for. The language in the statu~e "for 
school purposes" did not create a reverter in the absence of express statu-
tory provision to that effect. 
A similar result was reached in Hopewell School District v. Bush.16 
A judgment for the defendant was reversed, the court holding that the 
interest in the property to be taken in this proceeding was expressly stated 
to be the fee, and no lesser estate would satisfy the purpose of a site tor 
a school building. The court noted that the price paid was the full market 
value for all purposes. The wording in the statute "for school purposes" 
was considered a limitation on the right to exercise the power of eminent 
domain, but not a limitation on the interest or estate to be taken. The 
reversal was based on the errof of the trial court in not ordering the 
entire interest in the property condemned. 
In 1942, the District of Columbia ~egan a proceeding to condemn property 
and deposited the amount of the condemnation award with the court. Because 
of the war emergency the District was prevented from constructing a school 
building. The defendant refused to deliver possession to the District and 
l6179 Ark. 316, 15 S.W. 2d 985 (1929). 
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the action in ejectment resulted. The defendant's answer set up the defense 
that the title had reverted due to non-use by the District for school 
purposes. The decision in O'Hara v. District of Columbial7 was a summary 
judgment for the District which was affirmed. The court held that there 
was no reversion as the statutes provided 11 for the condemnation of said 
land or said right of way and the ascertainment of its value" and that the 
District may acquire "title to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or 
such less estate or interest therein as is specified in the declaration 
shall vest in the District of Columbia. 11 18 The court recognized that it 
was construing the allegation liberally in order to find that the District 
was seeking to condemn a fee simple and that it would have been better for 
the District to declare that it was seeking an estate in fee simple and 
state why such estate was necessary. The court also noted that the jury 
had been instructed to appraise th.e property at its full market value, and 
this fact supported the condemnation of the entire estate. 
The Jersey City Board of Education was made a third party defendant 
in Valentine v. Lamont,19 an ejectment action by the successor in interest 
of the condemnee a:gainst the grantee of the condemnor. The action was 
dismissed by the trial court and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal by 
the Law Division, the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
The Board had condemned the property on July 19, 1922, and paid an award 
1779 U.S. app. D.C. 302, 147 F. 2d 146 (1944), cert. den. 325 U.S. 855, 
65 S. Ct. 1183, 89 L. Ed. 1975 (1945). 
181940 D.c. Code 16-601, 605. 
l920 N.J. 454, 90 A. 2d 143, Affd. 25 N.J. 342, 96 A. 2d, 417, affd. 13 
N.J. 569, 100 A. 2d 668, cert. den. 347 U.S. 966, 74 s. Ct. 776 (1953). 
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of $13,600 for it. On May 27, 1928, Emma Maslin, who had owned the property, 
died intestate, and her only heir was Mary Stinard, who died intestate on 
January 22, 1934. The heirs of Mary Stin~rd were a son, Percy, whose where-
abouts were unknown, a granddaughter, Anna Valentine, and a grandson, 
Rutherford Stinard. On September 6, 1945, the Board of Education passed a 
resolution that the property was no longer needed and offered it for public 
sale at a minimum price of $5,900. On March 21, 1946, the Board ratified 
a sale on March 14, 1946, to Lester and Marian Lamont. On April 9, 1946, 
a deed conveying the property to the Laments was executed. On January 14, 
1952, the suit by the plaintiff, Anna Valentine, was filed. The opinion of 
the court pointed out that the title and right of possession of the Board 
had not been disputed for 24 years in spite of the fact that the property 
had not been used for school purposes. It had been occupied by tenants who 
paid monthly rental. The court recognized that the taking of the right, 
title, and interest of the owners should not be greater than necessary to 
effectuate the public use, and noted that, according to New Jersey precedents, 
the land of an abutting owner, both at common law and under the statute, was 
merely charged with an easement for right of way and the fee to land in the 
middle of a road remained with the owner. Another New Jersey case involving 
operation of a public market in a public street was noted in which a servi-
tude over and above an easement had been found. In that case, the court had 
thought it was 11 an exaggeration of the essence of private ownership and a 
mulcting of the public purse 11 20to pay an individual for lands and then when 
the character of the use of the property changed to pay him or his heirs anewo 
20100 A. 2d at 672. 
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The court concluded that the ·precedents did not establish a lack of power 
·to take a fee simple absolute title where necessary to accomplish the under-
lying public purpose and cited authority for taking a fee simple estate for 
railroad, military reservation, public market .and housing authority purposes. 
The question then became one of whether the·legislature had authorized taking 
of the fee simple. The ,court was of the opinion that if the statute author-
ized taking a fee it could not be held invalid because a lesser interest 
would accomplish the legislative purpose. The.court was of the opinion 
that the legislature intended for schools to take a fee simple title. 
Where, as here, the land is being acquired for the purpose 
of schools it is extraordinarily difficult to see how any-
thing less than a fee simple absolute title was intended by 
. the statute.21 
The reasons .given ·for this position were that the use of the Board involved 
exclusive possession, and the right of possession mi-ght have last~d forever. 
The requirement by the statute for payment.of full market value carried with 
.it .a presumption of full payment for an estate in fee. The court-felt it 
would also be inequitable to compensate the condemnee on the basis of a 
determinable-title ,and deprive him of the use, right of possession, and 
interest in the property subject only to a theoretical contingency that the 
public use might be abandoned. This, the court .suggested, would make a fraud 
of the constitutional provision for payment of just compensation. The court 
also held that the Board was a body corporate with power to sell or dispose 
of land or buildings no longer needed without regard to whether they had been 
purchased or condemned. The·money received from the sale, however, could be 
devoted only to school purposes. The court noted a statement in a street 
21Ibid. 
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railway case that 11 it appears to be the settled law that a fee simple abso-
lute cannot be acquired by condemnation 11 22 was contrary to its ~olding and 
held that the statement which was obiter dicta in the earlier case was ex-
pressly overruled. The opinion of the Law Division had pointed out that 
there were no sacramental words to create a fee simple estate, but that the 
job of the court was to ascertain the intent of the legislature. In the 
statute which provided that the Board could "purchase, lease, receive, hold, 
and sell property ••• and take and condemn land and other property for school 
purposes, 1123 the Law Division found authority for a fee simple absolute on 
the basis that 11for scho.ol purpo13es 11 was not to limit the estate but to 
show the public use. The Binder and Hopewell cases mentioned earlier were 
cited as authority. Lazarus v. Morris24 which held that the property 
reverted when no longer used for school purposes was distinguished on the 
b1:1sis of.the statutory provisions which were different in Pennsylvania. 
The opinion of the Appellate Division emphasized the fa.ct that the Consti-
tution or statute did not require a limited estate, and that it was not 
necessary that authority to take a fee simple be stated in express terms in 
the statute. It was also noted that the owner had not claimed that less than 
full value had been received at the time of condemnation, and the court was 
of the opinion that compensation was made, pa.id, and received on the basis 
of a full estate. 
673. 
22summerill v. Hunt, 25 N.J .Misc. 498, 55A.2d ~33 ( 1947), cited at 100 A.2d 
r .. , 
.' -, 
'2'3:i·) (> ~1 -~ :;._ ,?", : ,s - :::: l /, l• • (I ., ,;, 
.· ,R.S. 18:6~24 N.J.S.A. 
·.,., ... ·, . . ., • •.··.·. ·.1. ' 1 .. \ 24·: ·' ·'.· .:: c ; :·,.:." :1 ,:·· :· ' ,' ., 
212 Pa. St. 128, 61 Atl. 815 (1905)~ 
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North Dakota statutes on which the Board relied in Board of Education 
of City of Minot v. Park District25 provided that when taken for public 
buildings or grounds or for permanent buildings, a fee simple estate was 
condemned but that the estate taken was an easement when for any other use. 
The court noted that the statute did not make any provision for reversion, 
but it is not clear if the issue of the nature of the estate was contested 
in this case. 
Jurisdictions in Which Schools and Colleges Take Only~ Limited Estate~ 
Condemnation. 
Contrary to the cases cited in the preceding section, the courts in some 
:jurisdictions have held that a school o~ college acqui~es only the right to 
use property for school purposes by condemnation, and when ab?ndoned for those 
purposes, the rights condemned revert to the condemnee or his successors in 
interest. In these cases, also, the decisipn may depend on either an explicit 
statutory provision or upon Judicial interpretation. 
Dicta in the case of Williams v. School District No. !26 pointed out 
that the proceedings did not profess to take a fee but speculated that if 
they did, they would probably be ine~fectual to accomplish that result. 
A statute which provided that when a schoolhouse ":ceased to be on a lot 
for two years, the lot may revert to the original owner was the basis for 
the action in Jordan v. Haskell. 27 After proceedings concerning the loca-
tion of a schoolhouse lot there was a delay of at least two years between 
25 70 N.w. 2d 899 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
2633 Vt, 271 (1860). 
27 63 M e. 189 (1874). 
the·selection of the lot and construction of a schoolhouse. The .court 
pointed out that in this case, the.schoolhouse had not ceased to be used, 
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in fact, it had not begun to be used as it had never been constructed. The 
owner had a year to apply for a jury and the appeal might involve more than 
two years. A district would take an ·element of risk if it proceeded without 
clear title to the lot. It was therefore held that the lot did not .revert 
because of non-use for school purposes, and the·sustaining of the demurrer 
to the bill for injunction to prevent:erection of the school on the lot 
· was affirmed. 
Banks v. School Directors of District No. !28 is not exactly in point 
.regarding the nature of the estate condemned, but it was held in the case 
that the District in condemning a tract in the center of an enclosed pasture 
did not acquire·a right.of way of access to the tract only by condemning the 
tract. The·petition for condemnation sought .a tract 12.7 rods square in the 
,center·of a·pasture which was part of the defendant's 374 acre farm. The 
School District did not ask for a right of way to the tract but claimed the 
law would give it. The verdict by the jury resulted in a grant of $75 for 
the·land, $100 damage to the remainder and SO cents to the tenant. The 
defendant's cross petition had asked damages for the ·whole tract. In revers-
ing .a verdict for the plaintiff, the court held that the rules under which 
a way by necessity arises and is presumed to have been granted could not be 
applied to this case. The judgment of the trial court was found erroneous 
in the attempt to give the District a right not acquired. 
28194 Ill. 247, ~2 N.E. 604 (1901). 
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The question of what title the Trustees took in Illinois was raised in 
Kelly v. Bowman,29 a suit to determine the ownership of land and buildings. 
In August of 1906, the Trustees of the Township had filed a condemnation 
suit, and a jury fixed the value of the property at $355.25, which the 
Trustees paid to Henry L. Tinunons. A schoolhouse was constructed on the 
property. On January 19, 1952, the Trustees sold all interest in the two 
acres and the buildings to Bowman, and Bowman contracted to sell his 
interest to Hise. There was no question but what the premises had been 
abandoned for school purposes. The plaintiff in the case was successor in 
interest of Tinunons and the Trustees were joined as a party defendant. 
According to the statutes then in force30 the court found that there was no 
legislative intention that the Trustees acquire a fee simple title. The 
court thought that it was clear that the legislature intended that the 
Trustees in the exercise of eminent domain obtain the school site for school 
purposes only. The court did hold that the reversionary interest did not 
include the improvements and that the title to the improvements was separate 
from the title to the site. The opinion of the trial court which had granted 
the plaintiff the land and the defendant the buildings was affirmed. Neither 
of the cases cited as authority for this holding was an eminent domain action, 
and the court distinguished the Trustees argument that drainage districts 
acquired a fee simple title on the basis that statutory provisions had not 
granted such authority to school districts. The ownership of the buildings 
was decided on the basis of two Illinois cases, one involving a conveyance 
29 104 F. Supp. 973 (E~ Dist. Ill. 1952). 
30111. R.S. 1905, Ch. 122, Sec. 151, 152, Ch. 47, sec. 10. 
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with option to repurchase when abandoned and the other a grant with express 
provision for reversion. 
The authority of the Kelly case would seem to have been eroded to some 
extent by Waukegan Vo Stanczak.31 In this case, however, the condemnation 
proceedings were brought by a ·special char1ter city which had a co-extensive 
school district. Her~ the court stated that the State, may take any interest 
if for a public purpose and just compensation is made. It could be a fee 
simple absolute if the legislature so determined and lacking the express 
definition by the legislature, the court suggested that the absolute needs 
of the public purpose should control the decision on the nature of the estate. 
The court found authority for a fee simple absolute in this case in the 
charter provisions. 
The School District was not a party to the proceedings ;i.n Lazarus v. 
Morris,32 but the issues in that case were raised again in Mulligan Vo 
School.District of Hanover Township.33 The factual situation involved in 
the two cases was the same. In 1871 the School District, by exercise of the 
right of eminent domain, gained title and took possession of real estate 
belonging to George Deal. The Deal heirs conveyed all their right, title and 
interest in the property taken by the School District to Thomas Lazarus. In 
1896, the School District abandoned the premises and offered them for sale. 
They were purchased by Morris for $1,000, and the District officials executed 
a deed purporting to convey the fee containing a cQvenant of general warranty. 
316 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E. 751 (1955). 
32 212 Pa. St. 128, 61 Atl. 815 (1905). 
33241 Pa.· 204, 88 Atl. 362 (1913). 
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Morris was in possession of the property.until 1905when the heirs of 
Lazarus brought an action in ejectment. In that case, the defendants' 
exceptions to the referee's report were dismissed and the dismissal affirmed. 
The court held that appropriation did not give a.fee simple in the absence 
o( express statutory language. The title had been acquired by the District 
under a statute which had provided that when unable to procure a site by 
agreement, it would be lawful for the District to enter upon and occupy 
sufficient ground for the purpose. This statute, the court held, covered 
only the use and occupancy of the property. It was noted that in some cases 
the right acquired by the school was called an easement, but the court was 
of the opinion that whatever the kind of right, it terminated when the 
School District ceased to use the property for the purposes for which it had 
been appropriated and the title reverted. The Mulligan case was an action 
by the heirs of Morris .against the District to recover on breach of. general 
warranty. Here the court stated that the School District was a creature 
of statute, a mere agent of the State, a corporation of lower grade and less 
power than a city and had only such powers as given by statute. It found no 
act which expressly granted or impliedly granted or attempted to grant the 
right to convey in fee property which had been acquired by eminent domain er 
to enter into a covenant of general warranty. The court was of the opinion 
that the plaintiff's decedent must have been aware of this fact. The plain-
tiff was found unable to produce Board minutes showing any authority to enter 
into the covenant of general warranty. The court thought that while this 
conclusion was hard on the estate of the plaintiff, it was clear beyond.any 
doubt. 
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The L?zarus case was cited in the concurring opinion of a more recent 
Pennsylvania case, Winger v. Ayres,34 as authority for the dicta that the 
Board was without power to sell a portion of the condemned property that it 
did not need, as it would revert should the Board attempt to do so. 
In School District of Donegal Township v. Crosby35 the court held that 
where a School District had been in possession of property for 55 years, and 
there was no evidence of how the property had been obtained, it would be 
proper to imply that it had been granted to the District and that the District 
held a fee simple title. This case is no authority for the nature of estate 
taken by condemnation, but in the opinion, an act of the Pennsylvania legis-
lature of 1911 was mentioned which provided that a School District may condemn 
a fee simple estate.36 
The question of whether the District had abandoned the property was 
raised in Long v. Monongahela City School District.37 In 1880 and 1883, 
the School District had condemned the land of John Kennedy,· Jr., to whom the 
plaintiff claimed succession of title. The plaintiff in his action for 
ejectment claimed that the District had abandoned the property for school 
purposes prior to 1955. In 1955, the District took action under a statute 
granting the power to acquire the fee where a previous lesser interest had 
been secured. The court pointed out that the original taking was a base or 
conditional fee 9r easement, citing the Lazarus,case, but added that no 
34371 Pa. 242, 89 A. 2d 521.(1952). 
35178 Pa. Super. 30, 112 A. 2d 645 (1955). 
36P.L. 309, Set. 606, 607. 
37 ( 395 Pa. 618, 151 A. 2d 461 1959). 
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property could be considered abandoned in the absence of a resolution of the 
Board to do so. The issue had been raised by a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, and the court found that the plaintiff had not sufficiently averred 
a cause of action in that he had not cited a resolution of the Board to 
vacate and abandon the premises. The court found that the case was moot 
because by admitting the fact that the District had acted to condemn the fee, 
even though he maintained that the action had no legal effect, the plaintiff 
was found to have admitted by his pleadings that the District had acquired a 
fee. 
Carter v. Davis38 was an action to quiet title under a warrant deed 
executed by the School District. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed 
on appeal. In 1921, the lots in question were condemned for agricultural 
and farming purposes in connection with the agriculture department of the 
school.· The only use made of the property was as a garden in 1922, and a 
few flowers had been planted in 1924. Otherwise the lot was idle and weedy. 
On September 16, 1924, the District conveyed the property to the plaintiff 
in order to acquire bther property. The check for $350 in payment by the 
plaintiff was held by the District as there was some doubt regarding the 
title. The general rule ment.ioned by the court was that unless the statute 
authorized the cendemnor to take a fee, only an easement or.qualified or 
terminable fee would be taken and upon cessation of the use for which the 
· property had been condemned, the title would revert. The Lazarus case was 
dit'ed to support the statem~nt that authority to take a fee must be expressly 
given or necessarily implied and an absolute or unconditional price must be 
38141 Okl. 172, 284 Pac. 3 (1929). 
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paid. The statute on which the plaintiff attempted to rely had been repealed, 
and the court held it was not in force in 1921. The controlling statute39 
provided that a School Bqard or Board of Education had power to condemn in 
the manner as provided for railroad companies for building sites and other 
public purposes. It was recognized that cases may arise in the absence of a 
statutory provision where it clearly would appear from the proceedings that 
a fee was condemned, but under the facts cited here, it was not found neces-
sary for the School District to acquire a fee simple to accomplish the 
purpose for which the lots were taken. The plaintiff could not rely on 
statutesauthorizing an independent school district to sell and convey real 
estate, as the District could not sell or convey any interest it did not have. 
From the report of the case, it is not clear that Thomison v. Hillcrest 
Athletic·Ass0ciation40 was an appellate decision, but it would be regarded as 
authority for the proposition that a school district condemns only a limited 
estate in Delaware. In 1903, the Hillcrest Sch0ol District acquired title 
to the pr0perty in question from the Brandywine Realty Company by condemna-
tion proceedings. The property was abandoned for school purposes in 1933. 
On March 15, 1938, Thomison bought a tract including the Hillcrest School 
property from·the realty company. On March 17, 1938, the defendant purchased 
the scho0l pr0perty from Weatherl0w who traced his title t0 the Hillcrest 
School District by a deed from the State Board of Educati0n, dated N0vember 
17, 1933. The defendant argued that the provisions of the statute that 
required freeholders to allow at least cash value in condemnation proceedings 
39 1921 c.o.s. Sec. 6321. 
4o39 Del. 590, SA. 2d 236 (1939). 
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and that upon payment of damages, the land taken 11 shall become and be the 
property of the said school district for the purpose aforesaid 11 41 authorized 
the taking of a fee, both expressly and by implication. The court held, 
however, that the provision for cash value was not determinative of the 
quantum of interest taken, pointing out that the constitution and statute 
both required just compensation. The defendant cited the Hopewell case42 
as authority for interpretation of the statute as showing a public use 
rather than describing the estate. The court thought that 11 for school 
purposes" was entirely different than 11 for the purpose aforesaid. 11 It was 
not necessary to require that the property be taken for public use the 
court said, as the statute was concerned solely with the condemnation of 
private property for school purposes. There was no indication that the 
legislature intended that land for school purposes required a fee simple 
estate, and the unlimited estate would not be implied. In explaining its 
position, the court stated that: 
•o• A reversioner in an eminent domain proceeding has no 
general power to accelerate his right of reversion and it 
is a mere dormant right dependent upon the action of that 
party for whose benefit the property was condemned43 
Ohio cases are in conflict on the issue of the nature of the estate 
secured by a school board as a result of condemnation. Pifer v. Board of 
Education of Rochester .!P_., 44 a court of appeals decision, held that the 
41 21 Del. Laws, Ch. 67, Sec. 17. 
42 179 Ark. 316, 15 S.W. 2d 985. 
435 A. 2d at 239. 
4425 Ohio App. 469, 159 N.E. 99 (1927). 
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estate taken for a school was an absolute fee simple estate, but a later 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, McMechan v. Board of Education of 
Richland .'.!'.E.045 held that under the statute in force at the time of condemna-
tion only a limited estate was taken. The Pifer case was not mentioned in 
the Supreme Court opinion. The condemnation in the Pifer case occurred in 
1919 and three or four years later, the school at the location was abandoned. 
The Board proceeded to sell the property. An action was brought to quiet 
the title against the Board, and the decree for the plaintiff was dismissed 
on appealo The question before the court was whether the Board had obtained 
a fee simple absolute title with a right to dispose of the property. The 
o~inion noted that eminent domain was a sovereign right granted by constitu-
tional provision and legislative enactment.,to be strictly construed, being 
in derogation of common law rights. The Board was found to have proceeded 
under a statute which provided that it follow the same proceedings as for 
appropriation of property by a municipal corporation. The proviso that on 
payment of the amount assessed an absolute estate in fee simple should be 
vested unless a lesser estate was a~ked was held to apply to the Board. The 
fact that.the Board asked for the property "for school purposes 11 would not 
limit the estate, as the Board could not acquire property for any other 
purpose by condemnation. Its pleadings would have been defective had the 
purpose not been stated. When the fee simple had been taken, no right of 
reversion existed, and the property could be disposed of for either public 
or private uses. 
The property involved in the McMechan case had been obtained by 
45157 Ohio St. 241, 105 N.E. 2d 270 (1952). 
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appropriation proceedings in the Probate Court on February 7, 1861. The 
record of the court did not disclose any reversionary interest. The decree 
to quiet the title for the Board was reversed by the Supreme Court. The 
question stated in the opinion was whether the Board obtained a fee simple 
title by appropriation. The statutes had provided that the Board may 
11 appropriate for schoolhouse purposes 11 46 according to the procedure outlined 
in the act entitled An Act To Provide For Compensation To the Owners of 
Private Property Appropriated to The Use of Corporations 47 which said that 
the corporation must state the rights it sought and that the court would 
render judgment that the corporation should hold the property for the 
purposes for which it was appropriated. The opinion noted that the record 
of appropriation had used terminology 11 to the use· of" and found that the 
statutes in no place provided for the appropriation of an estate in fee 
simple and that if authorized it would have to be by implication. Cases 
involving canal and railroad condemnation which said that no greater estate 
or interest may be taken than necessary for the public use were cited, as 
well as a case involving a dedication of school lands in a town plat, which 
held that on ~bandonment of the schools, the interest reverted. In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Taft stated that he thought the party seeking equitable 
relief should, as a condition of the relief sought, refund to the Board the 
money paid to the predecessors in title. He noted that when the property 
had been taken, the School Board was required to pay full compensation for 
perpetual use, but that it would no longer have either the use of the property 
4651 Ohio Laws 429, 433, Sec. 11, 57 Ohio Laws 9. 
47 50 Ohio Laws 201, 204, Sec. 11. 
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or the money as a result of the decision. Chief Justice Weygandt dissented, 
being of the opinion that the lower court had been correct in COJlstruing the 
allegation of the Board in its condemnation action that the property was 
needed "for schoolhouse purposes" as a necessary jurisdictional fact the 
Board had to allege, and not as a limitation on the authority of the Board 
of Education to take an unlimited estate. 
Texas cases are also in conflict on the nature of the estate taken by 
condemnation proceedings of a school. In Dickey's Estate v. Houston Independ-
ent School District48 the highest court held that a judgment passing fee 
simple title was in error. A special act creating the school district 
conferred the power ·to appropriate property for the purpose of securing 
grounds for public school buildings in the manner provided for appropriation 
· by ·railro.ad corporations or by any other manner or any other proceedings 
authorized by the general laws of the State for condemnation.49 In the 
statute setting out the prQcedure for ·railroad companies,50 .the court held 
that, except where othe·rwise expressly_ provided by law, the right acquired 
by eminent domain was not to be construed to include a fee simple estate in 
lands. The· court stated that the District could rely on other statutes on 
eminent domain only for the manner or proceeding to be followed as the other 
statutes were for special classes of districts. The court .also found errors 
in the instructions of the trial court regarding the market value of the 
·property. The judgment .awarding the property to the District .and a 
48300 s.w. 250 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1927). 
49spl. Acts, 38th Leg., p. 323. 
501925 R.S., Art. 3270. 
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compensation award of $35,250 to the defendant was reversed and remandedo 
In a later case involving the same school district, Houston Independent 
School District Vo Reader{l the appellate court held that there was no 
inhibition in the Constitution against condemnation of a fee simple and that 
the clear implication of Section 17, Article 1 of the Constitution was that 
a fee simple may be takeno The court said the legislature had the right to 
grant authority to condemn a fee simple and cited the same statute as was 
cited in the Dickey case regarding creation of the special district. The 
court found that the legislature had authorized the District to take a fee 
as asked in its petition. The Dickey case was not mentioned in the opinion 
here. The court stated that if authority were not to be found in the act 
creating the District, then it could be expressly found in another statute.52 
The issue was raised in this case on a cross assignment of error after an 
appeal by the District from a jury verdict. The decision of the trial court 
was affirmed, but it should be noted that this case was not decided by the 
Texas Supreme Court. 
In County School Trustees of Up'shur County v. Free53 the Trustees 
sought a fee simple title to the surface estate only, subject to the oil and 
gas mineral estate. The court reversed the judgment dismissing the condemna-
tion action, holding that the Trustees were not required to condemn both 
surface and mineral estates. The defendant claimed that the fee simple title 
meant the absolute and indefeasible ownership of everything from the top of 
51 38 S.W. 2d 610 (Texo App. 1931). 
52 Acts 4lst Leg., Ch. 168, P• 370 • 
.53 ( ) 154 SoW. 2d 935 Tex. App. 1941 • 
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the ground to the center of the earth. The court replied that the statute 
did not use the word 11 land 11 but 11 fee1 simple title to real property,11 and 
that the minerals may be severed and when done so, involved separate and 
distinct estates. As a result of this decision, the owners of the mineral 
estate were found not to be necessary and indispensable parties. 
SUMMARY 
Payment of the compensation award was a critical factor in determination 
of the stage of the condemnation proceedings at which the school or college 
secures rights which was mentioned in three cases. Where school buildings 
had been constructed before formal steps to acquire property were taken, 
the right of the school authorities to subsequently condemn the property 
without making compensation for the improvements has consistently been 
upheld. Acquisition of a leasehold interest ha~ been held not to prevent 
condemnation by the.tenant in a university case. 
The case authority is in conflict not only between jurisdictions, but 
also within some of the States, regarding the nature of the estate secure~ 
by public schools as a result of condemnation proceedings. Statutes provide 
for condemnation of a fee simple absolute interest in some States. In the 
absence of an express statutory provision, the courts of some jurisdictions 
have been reluctant to grant more than a conditional estate, probably 
because of the influence of the litigation concerning condemnation for rail-
road purposes. The rationale advanced for finding that an unlimited estate 
is taken has been that the payment of just compensation requires assessment 
as if the property will be held for school purposes for an indeterminate 
length of time, but even considering this argument, some courts have not been 
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convinced that a school should require an unlimited interest in the property. 
Statutory provision for condemnation of property "for school purposes'' has 
been interpreted to .limit the estate and, on the contrary, to provide only 
that the property taken must be used for a public purpose. 
Some of the cases have simply litigated the issue of whether the property 
had been abandoned by the school authorities, and in each case the continuing 
interest of the school district was upheld. 
CHAPTER VII 
COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN SCHOOL OR 
COLLEGE EMINENT DOMAIN CASES 
In Chapter II, the constitutional requirement that when private 
property is taken for public use just compensation must be paid was dis-
cussed, and a number of cases in which the provision was construed were 
presented. The purpose of this Chapter is to consider the issues raised 
concerning .the ·determination and assessment of compensation and damages 
in school or college eminent domain cases. Standards adopted by the courts 
for determination of what constitutes fair or just compensation are examined 
fir.st. In the second section of the Chapter, questions raised regarding the 
·evidence on the value of property are considered. 
RULES FOR THE MEASURE OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES 
A distinction between compensation and damages is not always clear in 
the. case reports. Here the term "compensation" will be used to refer to 
.payment for the property taken, and "damages" will refer to injury to the 
defendant or to adjoining property as a result of the condemnation. 
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Compensation On the Basis of Market Value. 
The defendant in Burger v. State Female Normal Schoo11 objected to the 
refusal of the court to offer instructions he had submitted which would have 
stated that the commissioners in determining the value of the land were not 
to confine themselves to the present uses but to consider ~s an element of 
compensation the special adaptability of the land to the use for which it 
was to be tqken. The opinion did not mention the instruction actually given 
by the trial judge, but the court held that the attention of the jury was 
unduly directed to the necessities of the condemnor in the instructions 
offered by the defendant. The object was not to ascertain the value to 
the school for its purposes, but fair market value. The court said that the 
extent, variety, and importance of uses to which the property may be put and 
the number of persons who may want it is what gives property its value. It 
would have been proper to consider the uses of the land for all purposes, 
which would have included the use for which it was sought ,by the schoola 
In Mohler Vo Board .2f Regents of University of Nebraska2 the defendant 
charged that error had been committed in limiting his recovery to the cash 
value of the property at the time of the taking. He thought that he should 
be entitled to prove damages of $250 for expenses of moving and loss of work 
timeo The court pointed out that the instructions had stated that market 
value was what the defendant could get in money under a voluntary sale and 
purchase of his property. The fact that it was his home or that he would 
suffer inconvenience in moving would make no difference. The court suggested 
114 Va. 491, 77 S.E. 489 (1913). 
2102 Neb. 12, 165 N.W. 954 (1917). 
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that the measure of damages for condemnation of a railroad right of way was 
the value of the land taken and the damages to the remainder, and that this 
rule was in the mind of the legislature in providing that a school should 
follow the procedure as outlined in the statute regarding railroads. 
The defendant argued·1 in Wood v. Syracuse School District3 that the 
instructions had been confusing to the jury in the use of "market," "fair," 
or "reasonable" as terms by which the :am·outlt of compensation should be 
measured. The court held that market value was only one of several elements 
the jury could consider and noted that the constitutional requirement of 
full compensation made no mention of market value. The statute under which 
the school condemned the land provided only·that the owner was to be paid 
the 11value 11 of his property. 
The instructions given in Dickey's Estate v. Houston Independent School 
District4 were found to be in error because the court suggested that among 
the uses to be made of the property any development that might be expected in 
the irranediate future, but not speculative or possible contingencies, could 
be taken into account in the determination of the amount of .compensation. 
The court pointed out that by the terms of the statute, the trial judge was 
required to submit explanations and definitions in legal terms as necessary 
to enable the jury to properly p_ass upon and render a verdict, but if 
explanations were not necessary, none should be given. The measure of com-
pensation on the basis of market value would comply with the statute, and 
the remainder of the instruction in which the jury was told not to consider 
3 108 Kan. 1, 193 Pac. 1049 (1920). 
4300 s.w. 250 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1927). 
evidence as to speculative values was considered confusing and misleading. 
Instructions in School District of Kansas City v. Phoenix~ and 
Improvement Co.S that the jury was to fix damages and the actual cash 
market value of the land actually taken were held by the coul;'t to .. be 
correct. 
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In another Missouri case, Consolidated School District No. 1 v. O•Malley,6 
the defendant objected to instructions which included the terms "clear 
market value," 11 actua:l cash market value,ir and "actual cash value" on the 
basis that these·were prejudicial to his interests. The court held that 
one of the ins·tructions had defined "market value" as the measure of damages, 
and. words used in other instructions could not have been prejudicial. 
The instructions in North Kansas Cit~ School District of Clay County v, 
Peterson-Renner Inc.7 st,ted that private property could not be taken for 
public use without just qompensation 'tnd the School District on appeal argued 
that it was error to inclµde this statement in the instructions, The court 
noted an earlier Missouri case which had said that language abstract, 
··.~ 
immaterial, .and unnecessary to the precise issue, should not be included in 
the instructions, but thought that it was not reversible error unless it 
resulted in prejudice to the interest of the party or was misleading to. the 
jury. The case-was remanded, and the court .advised the parties to considel;' 
this cave'at .. at the new trial. The point here was that the jury was only to 
assess damages and not to consider the issue of whether the District could 
take·the property. 
5297 Mo. 332, 249 s~w. 51 (1923). 
6343 Mo. 1J87, 125 S.W. 2d 818 (1938). 
7 . 
369 S.W. 2d 159 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
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The Effect of Benefits to the Condemnee. The District appealed from 
an award in Haggard v. Independent School District of Algona. 8 One of the 
issues raised on the appeal was that the advantages of locating a school on 
the property ought also to be considered in the assessment of damageso The 
court simply stated that benefits were not to be taken into accounto 
In a later Iowa case, Gregory v. Kirkman Consolidated Independent 
School District9 the court approved instructions which said the amount of 
damages was the difference between the reasonable market value of the 130 
acres before the condemnation and the reasonable market value of the remainder 
immediately after the condemnation without any consideration pf the benefits 
that might accrue to the owner. The court noted that the evidence did not 
support any other theory as to damage. The owner had invited the instruc-
tion, therefore, by his evidence, and was in no position to complain on 
appeal as he had not requested any instructions on this point at the trialo 
In People v. Pommerening10 the opinion of the court stated that it had 
been error to admit testimony that a golf e0Jir·sre1.wcot.ildii>'e1.:1e:":fi'.it 'the :1and.;.dif 
the owner that was not taken, but the error was cured by an instruction which 
stated that the claimed benefit was not to be considered in fixing the amount 
of compensation. The court found the award of the jury within the range of 
the evidence and affirmed the judgment of the trial court for the Board of 
Regents. 
8113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
9193 Iowa 579, 187 N.W. 553 (1922). 
l0250 Mich. 391, 230 N.W. 194 (1930). 
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The Time at which Value of~ Property is Determined and Interest on 
'the Award. Instructions to the jury in Rinke v. Union Special School District 
No. _1111 stated that the measure of compensation was to be the fair cash 
market value of the land at the time of taking. The market value was to be 
determined by the amount the land would reasonably be worth on the market 
for a cash price allowing a reasonable time within which to effect a sale. 
The court pointed out that a long line of decisions had held that just 
compensation was the actual market value at the time of institution of the 
proceedings. Since compensation was to be paid in money, there was no error 
ip telling the jury that the value could be determined allowing a reasonable 
time for sale, but the court did not give any reason as to why payment in 
money would remedy the instructions. 
The question of interest as a part of the compensation that is required 
of the condemnor is closely related to the problem of the time of determina-
tion of the value of the property to be taken. The District claimed that the 
judgment allowing interest in Houston Independent School District v. Reader12 
was in error because the owner had made no prayer for interest in his 
pleadings. The court held that in a condemnation proceeding, the owner was 
not required to plead that interest be granted and his prayer for general 
relief would entitle him to it from the date of actual appropriation. 
While the District had deposited the award into the Court, the owner could 
not withdraw it without waiving further rights and the deposit was not a 
tender but a prerequisite to possession. Therefore, the interest would run 
ll174 Ark. 59, 294 S.W. 410 (1927). 
123s S.W. 2d 610 (Tex. App. 1931). 
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from the time of appropriation until the owner received the award according 
to this opinion. 
In School District of Clayton v. Kelsey13 the owner objected to the 
refusal to give an instruction which would permit the jury to consider the 
value 'of what the owner said amounted to a 10 day option given to the 
District under the statute. The statute provided that the District might 
"within 10 days from the return of such assessment, elect to abandon ••• :1114 
In the opinion of. the court, there had been no evidence presented on the 
value of a 10 day option, and the court also was of the opinion that the 
value was to be fixed as of the day the property was appropriated, which 
would not occur until the damages had been fixed by the jury and paid into 
court. 
Condemnation p,roceedings were begun on June 10, 1957, in the case of 
Red Springs City Board of Education v. McMillanl5 and the judgment on the 
$1,450 awarded by the jury said that it should bear interest at six percent 
from June 10, 1957. The court held that the judgment must conform to the 
verdict and that the trial judge was without authority to add the interest. 
Interest should run only from the time of rendition of the judgment. In a 
concurring opinion, one of the justices pointed out the conflict in authority 
on the right to recover interest on a judgment in condemnation proceedings, 
some of the cases holding that interest ran on.a judgment from a date of its 
rendition, others from the date.of taking the property by the condemnor. In 
13355 Mo. 478, 196 S. W. 2d 860 ( 1946) • 
l41939 R.S. Sec. 1506. 
l5250 N.C. 485, 108 S. E. 2d 895 (1959). 
this opinion, the North Carolina Constitution required interest on the 
judgment in order for the owner to receive just compensation. 
The Question of Damages to Property Not Taken. 
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Where the school or college has not taken the .entire amount of property 
owned by the defendant in condemnation procee.dings, the.question of whether 
the District is obligated to pay for damage that may occur to the remainder 
has .been raised. 
The District sought to condemn 2 1/2 lots separated from the defendant's 
residence· by an alley in Haggard v. Independent School District of Algona~16 
The District appealed from an. award of $350, basing its appeal on an excep-
tion to the testimony of witnesses regarding annoyance or inconvenience 
resulting from establishment of a schoolhouse which would have the effect of 
depreciating property~ The appeal was also based on an objection to instruc-
tions which said the jury could consider the condition in which the·premises 
were left after the appropriation and every inconvenience naturally resulting 
by which the market value of the property would be unfavorably affected. 
The jury was also told it could take into consideration the natural and 
probable effect of the use for which the property was condemned, as well as 
how the taking would inconvenience the owner in the use of the remainder of 
his property or how it would lessen its value. The trial court's holding 
that damage was not limited to the value of the land taken but might include 
damage to the entire premises was approved. There was no conflict'found.in 
the evidence as to whether the premises were OW'ned and used together and 
16113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
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while this question would ordinarily be for the jury, it was not reversible 
error to assume the fact that they were used together and to instruct the 
jury accordingly. Three possible views regarding consequential injury were 
mentioned: 
1. That the owner should receive the value of the land and damage to 
the remainder only, with no compensation for .the same kind of in-
convenience suffered by adjoining property owners whose land was 
not taken. 
2. That the owner should receive compensation not only for the land 
but also for any injury caused by the use of it for public purposes. 
3. That the landowner, while not generallyYe'nt.l:ti~dtto::copip!en.siabtt>n 
for inconvenience, is entitled to recover for depreciation of the 
value of the entire tract arising from the proximity of a public 
improvement, and which would not have resulted but for the taking. 
The first view:would satisfy the constitutional requirement, the court said, 
but the statutes had been construed to entitle the owner in the railroad 
cases to damages beyond the mere compensation for being deprived of his land. 
The court thought tt would not be practical to adopt the third view.as it 
was impossible to tell how much inconvenience the owner.suffered due to the 
proximity of a public improvement. It was not entirely clear how the second 
view differed from the third, but the court seemed to favor the second view 
and modified the judgment, finding error in rendering the Judgment against 
the District for the amount of the owner's damages as.assessed 'by the jury. 
The opinion was not clear about e;xactly where the trial court had erred. 
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The Board sought to take 12.9 of the 300 acres owned by the defendant 
in Bell's Committee v. Board of Education of Harrodsburg.17 The defendant, 
on appeal, argued that there had been an error in the instructions. The 
statute provided that the Board should follow the proceedings in accordance 
with provisions governing condemnation by railroads, and the court found 
that the instructions given had been upheld in railroad cases. The measure 
of the damage to the remainder was the difference between the market value 
of the entire tract innnediately before the taking and the market value of 
the remainder after the taking, excluding from both estimates any enhance-
ment of the remainder by reason of the purpose for which the condemned 
quantity had been taken. The court also observed that when testimony was 
contradictory, the jury was to reconcile the difference, and the court 
would not set aside the verdict unless the jury had been influenced by 
passion or prejudice. 
The owner argued in Peoplev. Brooksl8 that he should have been award-
ed damages for impairment of the value of the portion of the lot that was not 
taken by the University. The question was not settled on appeal, however, 
as the court said the question had been left to the jury under proper 
instructions, and there was no evidence in the recerd about how the lump sum 
awarded by the jury had been determined. 
One of the grounds for reversal in Dean v. County Board of Education19 
was that the trial court had erred in refusing the charge requested by the 
17 192 Ky. 700, 234 S.W. 311 (1921). 
18224 Mich. 45, 194 N.W, 602 (1923). 
19210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923). 
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owner that he was entitled to the value of the land as situated and not 
merely as a separate piece. According to the facts of this case, the 
remainder of the property obtained water from a well located on the lot the 
Board sought to condemn. The court was of the opinion that the two lots 
were legally related, each enhancing the value of the other. 
Mayfield v. Board of Education of City of Salina20 was a suit by 
owners of property adjoining that sought by the Board to enjoin condemnation 
on the basis that they would be annoyed by noise and trespassers and their 
property depreciated in value. They sought injunctive relief on the basis 
that they had no remedy at law since the statute did not provide for damages 
and the Board was immune from suit. The adjoining owners also alleged that 
their property was taken and thet they were denied eqt1al protection. of the 
laws. The sustaining of a demurrer was affirmed because there was no right 
to compensation in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions 
requiring payment of damages for consequential injury. These owners, the 
court noted, differed only in degree from the next removed neighbors covering 
an indefinite area. The court commented that even in States where 
consequential damages were allowed by constitutional provision there was no 
damage except forphysical interference. 
A cross petition by the wife of the owner of the property in the case 
of Schuler v. Wilson21 was based on .an allegation that the land owned by 
the wife which adjoined the property condemned was also damaged. The jury 
did not allow damages for the wife I s adjoining property and the court found 
20 118 Kan~ 138, 233 Pac. 1024 (1925). 
21322 Ill. soj, 153 N.E. 737, 48 A.L.R. 1027 (1926). 
there was no error in this procedure. There was no physical interference 
with herproperty or no disturbance of any right.· None of her property 
had been taken and the mere use of the adjoining property for a playground 
even though it caused deprecia_tion of her property would net justify an 
action ~t law for damages er assessment for compensatien in an·eminent 
domain proceeding .•.. 
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Compensation When Property ef a Scheel~ College is Condemned for~ Public 
Use. 
It was peirited out . in Chapter IV that very few appe.ilate,, cases have 
been located in which a schoel or cellege has cbndemned public property. 
Only one case, In~ Oronoce School District,22 has been located in which 
the issue of damages when a school attempts to condemn property already 
devoted to a public use was raised. In this case, the issues on daxnages 
were treated no differently than in the situation where private property is 
taken. The court held that damages may be assessed in gross by the jury and 
divided between the town and the heirs of those who originally laid out the 
park in the town· p~at. No errer in the evidence en the value of the property, 
which varied from $650 to $6,00©, was 'found and the verdict w:as supported by 
the evidence. Twe justices who dissented thought that instructions which 
· told the jury they may consider the fact that tesidents of the school district 
were alse citizens of the towri'ship and that whatever the district residents 
had to pay, they weuld also have to pay as citizens, were ert"ene'Ous. In their 
opinion, it was clearly prejudicial ta tell the jury that consideration could 
22 170 Minn. 49, 212 N.W. 8 (1927). 
be given to who would benefit most by use of the land for park purposes, 
the people who lived in the village or those who lived outside it. 
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There have been a number of cases in which the measure of damages when 
property of a school or college is taken has been put at issue. 
A benefit set-off was allowed in the case of Trinity College v. 
Hartford.23 The case began as a petition for in:junction by the College to 
prevent opening of a highway through the College property. Gross damages 
of $3,500 had been set, and it was estimated the College would benefit to 
the extent of $3,000, so the judgment was for $500. The comment of the 
court that where the landowner has a claim for damage and has received local 
and special benefits equal to the damage, the value of the benefits shall be 
set off against the dcµnage and he shall be allowed nothing,must be regarded 
as dicta. 
The court in Board of Education v. Kanawha and Michigan!• Co. 24 was of 
the opinion that the same rule regarding damages should be applied as in the 
case of condemnation of private property, The fact that the property was 
already put to a public use did not enhance the damage because the Board 
could condemn a replacement. Just compensation would allow for what was 
taken and 4amages to the residue beyond the benefits from the work to be 
constructed, The school should receive the difference between the value of 
the property for school purposes before the damage and the market value for 
any purpose after the damage, In this case, the railroad had erected an 
embankment across a school lot for the bed of a railroad without legal 
~;332 Conn. 452 ( 1865), 
2444 W, Va. 71, 29 S.E. 503 (1897). 
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permission. The school said the land was worth nothing as school property, 
but had used it annually for school purposes since the taking. The court 
ruled that if the property was still to be used for school purposes, the 
damage would be the difference in value of the property after the taking of 
a part by the railroad. The court intimated that the cost of building a 
fence, digging a well, or getting adjoining land might be considered as 
elements of damage. 
The instructions on the measure of damages given by the trial court 
in San Pedro, 1·~· .§!. .§.·1·~· Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City25 
were not printed in the record of the appeal, but the opinion stated that 
they were correct. The action of the trial court in allowing the Board to 
prove.the value of the schoolhouse apart from the land was also approved 
on the basis that no other method of arriving at the val~e ·of the property 
was practical in a case where the property had no market"'v:alue. The evi-
. dence presented was not considered sufficient, however, to justify the 
finding of the Jury that the property of the District had been wholly 
destroyed for school purposes by construction of railroad tracks on one end 
of the property. The overruling of a motion for new trial was reversed. 
The School District brought the action for damages under the State 
highway law in School District. of Borough of Speers v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. 26 The judgment confirming the award of the viewers to the 
School ,Di.strict was affirmed. The appeal by the State was based on the 
position that the State had a duty to compensate only for private property 
2532 Utah 305, 90 Pac. 565 (1907). 
26383 Pa. 206, 117 Atl. 2d 702 (1955). 
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condemned. As the School District was an agent of the State, the State 
argued, it may receive compensatl:on only by grace and not by right. The 
State also attempted to rely on the argument that the constitutional prohi-
bition against taking property without just compensation applied only to 
privately owned property. The court noted that the school code provided 
that lands may be acquired by the School District in fee simple in holding 
that the District was the owner of the property and that the highway act 
did not specify that compensation would be made only to private owners. The 
court stated: 
We cannot believe, for example, that school buildings costing 
many thousands of dollars can be destroyed for highway purposes 
and yet the legislature not have intended that the loss be paid 
to the District.27 
A judgment against the United States for $97,500 for condemnation of 
3. 42 acres of high school property and a temporary easement over .• 57 acres 
taken for a flood control project was affirmed in United States v. Board of 
Education of the County of Mineral~8 Prior to the taking by the United 
States, the high school site included eight acres, and the court found that 
abundant evidence bad been submitted that the program could not be carried 
on satisfactorily with less than this amount. The case was submitted to 
the jury on instructions that the award be the value of the property taken, 
plus damages to the residue, less any benefits to the residue from the 
project. If the jury were to find that the property taken had no:·market 
value, they were to consider the cost of acquiring adjacent property in 
substitution. The issue raised by the United States on appeal was that only 
27 117 Atl. at 704. 
28253 F. 2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958). 
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the market value of the property taken should be considered~ The court 
thought that where the highest and best use', of the property was for municipal 
or government purposes for .which no market value existed, some.other method 
of arriving. at just compensation must be adopt-.ed. 
It would be ab.surd to hold that the Board I s iecovery should 
be limited to the value as vacant lots of the land so taken 
and that no severance damages should be.allowed for damages 
to the residue merely because the residue had no market 
value for school purposes and its market value far other 
purposes was not affected.29 
Anather federal case halding that the United States had the canstitutional 
power to condemn lands to substitute for those inundated by a reservoir was 
cited as authority that the best means of making compensatian in such cases 
was by substitutian. The instructions approved by the court were ta the 
effect that if the jury should find the property taken had na market value 
at the time af the taking, a replacement cost or substitution cost would be 
appropriate for them to consider. The Boprd would be entitled to have the 
lands taken substituted' by replacement with lands with the same proximity 
if reasonably possible, if the Boprd was required to continue to provide the 
same facilities for the' program .as at the time of the taking. U the jury 
should decide that the Board was not required to continue the pragram,they 
should consider how much loss would' be suffered by the Board by reasan af 
the taking •. Any benefits ta the Board as a result of the constructian of .a 
flood wall should be cansidered. If the Board were nat obligated or 
required to continue the,program as at the time af taking the· property but 
only deemed it advisable, it would be incumbent upon· the B~ard ta use the 
remaining existing facilities even though re-scheduling might be inconvenient. 
29253 F. 2d at 763. 
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The jury could consider the uses to which the Board was putting all its 
lands and award just compensation for damages the Board would sustain in 
restoring itself to a full utilitarian and equivalent use before the time 
of the takingo The government was required to pay just compensation but no 
more than necessary to indemnify the Board of Education for its loss. 
In .§!lli. v. Salt ~ City Public Board of Education30 the State's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis that Franklin School which was 
condemned for construction of Interstate Highway 15 had no market value and 
therefore the State was not obligated to compensate for the taking was denied. 
On a petition for interlocutory appeal, the denial of the motion was affirmed. 
Possession of the property had been granted by stipulation of counsel and the 
question of compensation reserved for trial. In its answer the Board asked 
$550,000 as the market value but was later allowed to amend its answer to ask 
$709,000 on a replacement cost theory rather than market value. The court 
found no distinction in the method for taking public or private property and 
stated that the condemnor was required to take all essential st;eps in either 
case. The State's argument that the legislature would not require taking 
public money from one pocket and putting it into another, would be considered 
valid only if the resources of the State were in a unified fund. Tax funds 
collected in the School District were not put into the General State Fund, 
the court noted, but were for a particular purpose of operating the public 
schools. Taking the property without compensation would disrupt the balanced 
plan for financing schools, and as a practical matter would create an obstacle 
for the Board in the management of its program. The fact that the highway 
J013 Utah 2d 56, 368 P. 2d 468 (1962). 
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was part of the federal project had some bearing on the case. The court 
referred to the fact that 90% of the cost of the highway would be borne,by' 
the federal government, and said that while this fact had no bearing on legal 
issues and would not be admissable as evidence, it pointed up the inequity 
of imposing the cost of the right of way on the School Board. Two justices 
dissented, ba~ing their views on statutory construction that the statute 
did not .:specifically provide for payment in the case of taking of public 
property. An Illinois school annexation case was cited as authority for the 
proposition that the Board of Education owns nothing save by the grace of 
the State. The dissenters thought that the practical argument substituted 
a philosophical point of view for binding legal authority, calling it an 
11 objectivity complex, divorced from juridical justification." In their 
·, 
view, the federal participation had no place in the decision. 
The substitution theory as a basis for assessing the compensation due 
to the District was not allowed in Union Free School District v. State'.31 
In this case, the State appropriated for highway purposes a strip along the 
frontage and two parcels in the northeast portion of the elementary school 
. ' 
site. The District cited the federal West Virginia case as authority that 
its damages should be a sum equivalent to the market value of another 
suitable tract, but the court observed that the school did not use the 
entire site for school purposes here. Contemplation of future use could 
not offset the fact of non-use. In this case, it was found that the school 
could continue the same activities after the taking as before the taking. 
For the substitution theory to be applicable, the District use before the 
3135 Misc. 2d 373, 230 N.YoS. 2d 416 (N.Y. Ct. Claims 1962). 
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taking would have to be so compl;te that partial taking would render the 
whole useless and the court w.ould have tQ find that there was no other 
method to determine the plaintiff's pecuniary loss. The court thought that 
the District, by admitting an alternative to the substitution method in 
computing $368,300 as the direct and consequential damage to the land and 
building and another figure, $190,000, as the amount necessary to purchase 
an adjoining tract, conceded the validity of the usual before-and ... after 
method of assessing damages. 
State v. Waco Independent School District3.f was:1an action by the State 
to condemn 7.4 acres of a high school site in Waco for highway purposes. 
The acreage included two buildings, and the remainder of the high school 
campus included a $250,000 gymnasium and three shop buildings. At the 
trial, the District amended its pleadings to allege that the measure of 
damages should be the cost to the School District of providing substitute 
replacement facilities. The State's exception to this amendment was over-
ruled. The State con~ended that the proper measure for damages was the 
difference between the value of the entire campus of 25 acres before the 
condemnation and the value of the remainder after the taking •. According 
to the State, the value of the condemned property should be market value 
with damages to the remainder. In the opinion of the court, it made no 
difference if the property had a market value or not, as the value of what 
the school had or lost was not the inquiry. Instead, the costs of restor-
ing the facility t.o a utility for school purposes equal to what. it was 
prior to the taking was to be considered. The trial court had said that 
32 364 s.w. 2d 263 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
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the property remaining after the taking had value only to the extent it 
was a starting point from which to re-build the high school cam.pus that 
was absolutely necessary to the Waco School District. This value would 
be dependent upon the cost of acquiring or constructing reasonable sub-
stitute facilities. In explaining that the measure of damages was the 
.. aJl)lount reasonably necessary to restore the remaining 18.35 acres of land 
and facilities to. the same or ,:._easonably equal utility, the court corranented 
as follows: 
There is a fundamental distinction between the obligation 
resting on the agency condemning public property, and that of 
condemning private property. This distinction lies in the 
obligation thereby imposed on the condemnee. For example, a 
private party owes no duty to the public to continue its 
operation either at its original location or elsewhere. It 
can move, it can stay, or it can liquidate as it alone sees 
fit. Not so with a school system charged with a legal 
obligation ·to the public. A school system suffering the ioss 
of one of its schools by condemnation must replace that school 
when the facility is necessary to the education of its child-
ren as shown by the undisputed evidence in this case. This 
is the legally imposed duty of the School District, and it has 
no other choice.33 
The State objected to the instru:tions that had been submitted on the basis 
that they were multifarious. The court found the instructions to· the advan-
tage of the State because in this case there were no eeparate elements of 
dam.ages, and it was proper for the land and improvements to be submitted 
together. The State was protected against double.assessment by the instruc-
tions regarding the restoration of the 18.35 .acres remaining. The instruc'.'" 
tions as submitted by the trial court were as follows: 
What do you find from a.preponderance of the evidence 
was the reasonablecost, on November 7, 1961, of land, if 
any, and facilities, if any, reasonably necessary to replace 
33 . . 364 s.w. 2d at 268. 
the 7.40 acres of land and facilities taken by the State with 
land, if any is required, and facilities .of the same or 
reasonably equal utility for high school purposes as that to 
which the 7.40 acres and facilities were reasonably utilized 
immediately prior to the taking in question, and reasonably · ,, 
necessary, if any are reasonably necessary, to restore the 
remaining 18.35 acres of land and facilities to the same or· 
reasonably equal utility for high school purposes as that to 
which the 18.35 acres of land and facilities were reasonably 
utilized immediately prior to the taking in question.34 
Comments on the Waco case in Law Reviews were generally favorable. 
The advantages to the public of the substitution theory were pointed out 
by one of the comments in that the facility destroyed had no doubt 
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deteriorated to some extent, but if it was considered unnecessary to replace 
the facility, only nominal damages would be awarded. The writer seemed to 
recognize that the probability of the jury finding replacement unnecessary 
in any school case was slight: 
It seems reasonable to conclude that in almost no other 
situation dpes the necessity of immediate reconstruction exist 
as strongly as when school facilities have been taken from use.35 
Three conditions were noted by Conant36 which require the application 
of the substitution theory as in the Waco case. These conditions were, first, 
that the property have no market value, second, that replacement of the 
facility be found necessary, and third, that there be a lega,l duty to replace 
the facility. In this comment another advantage of the substitution theory 
was noted: 
The principal case appears to follow the weight of 
authority in applying the reasonable substitute measure 
of damages, as between two public bodies. Likewise in 
34 364 s.w. 2d at 264. 
3549 Iowa L. Rev. 193, 197. 
36 15 Baylor L. Rev. 84. 
view of the importance of school facilities and the close 
legal question which would be ptesented should a school 
district assert the doctrine of paramount purpose in bar 
of a condemnation for highway use, the substitution 
method would seem most equitable of remedies in such a 
situation.37 
EVIDENCE IN ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES 
In addition to the necessity for some measure of value for determi-
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nation of what constitutes just compensation, it is necessary to determine 
what evidence is valid in the attempt to arrive at the amount of compensation 
or damages that must be paid. Obviously, not all of the rules of evidence 
would have been mentioned in the school and college cases, but issues on 
what types of evidence should be admitted and for what purposes have been 
raised in a number of cases. 
The Nature of Evidence of Value. 
Recognizing that appropriation proceedings are special in nature, not 
necessarily adversary, the court in Kraemer v. Board of Education of 
Cincinnati38 stated that there was no set rule as to the burden of proof, 
but found error in the trial court's assigning of the burden of proof to the 
owner regarding the value of the property to be taken. The owner was not 
required to prove the value of the property by the preponderance of the 
evidence. The jury were warned that they should not average the testimony 
of witnesses r1 nor· divide· the values placed on the property by the number of 
witnesses. The opinion was also critical of the trial court's confinement of 
37 15 Baylor L. Rev. at 89. 
388 App. 428 (Ohio App. 1917). 
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the testimony to per acre value, ruling that the owner shoµld be permitted 
to suggest value on any plan most desirable. The court found error in 
sustaining an objection to testimony regarding the front foot value of the 
land in favor of a per acre value. Error was also found in instructions 
which limited the view of the jury to the premises only. The view of the 
premises was for the purpose of seeing the real estate to be condemned, not 
for the purpose of fixing its value, but to enable the jury to better 
consider the evidence because the value of the property depended on its loca-
tion. The court thought the owner would be deprived of his statutory rights 
if he were not permitted to call the attention of the jury to the abutting 
property. 
According to the statute involved in Dean v. County Board of Education39 
evidence of value is opinion evidence that is not conclusive on the court 
or the jury trying the fact even when the evidence is without conflict. In 
this case, estimates of the value of the property sought by the Board varied 
from $800 to $2,000. While the court found no error in the'examination and 
cross-examination of the owner on the value of the property, the court did 
find that the owner, haring been invoked on re-direct examination to reveal 
that he had told the commissioners the land was worth $1,500, should have 
been allowed to give the jury the basis of that opinion. This evidence was 
not confined to the question of the credibility of the owner's testimony, but 
was allowed to apply to the value of the land. 
39 210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923). 
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Conflicting .2.!: Irrelevant Evidence. Mohler v. Board of Regents of 
University ·of Nebraska40 was a proceeding to condemn a portion of a 50 foot 
square lot in Lincoln on which a seven roan cottage was located. The 
appraisers valued the p~operty at $2,200, and the jury found its value to 
be $2,250. The question of the adequacy of the damages was raised on 
appeal. The court noted that the evidence had been conflicting and that 
the estimates had varied fran $1,800 to $3,500. For some reason, the court 
commented that the witnesses best qualified to know made the lower estimates. 
The opi~ion mentioned the fact that the property was in an .area where the 
streets were unpaved, that a railroad yard was located several blocksno:ttih 
of the property, and that property in the area had declined invalueo The 
owner also sought to overturn the verdict on the basis that incompetent and 
irrelevant evidence had been admitted, but the court found that he had not 
made any objection or motion to strike at trial and while sane of his objec-
tions should have been sustained, they were not considered prejudicial. The 
verdict was affirmed. 
The verdict in Ouachita Parish School Board v. Clark41 was amended 
------~ ------ ------~
because the court found that testimony did not support the jury finding of 
a value of $200 per acre for the property taken by the Board as a result of 
construction of a gym on the owner's land due to a misunderstanding regarding 
the boundary. While a jury was author,ized to rely on its own valuation and 
its verdict was entitled to respect, the court felt that it had disregarded 
the testimony. The owner had placed a value of $200 per acre on the property, 
40102 Neb. 12, 165 N.W. 954 (1917). 
41 197 La. 131, 1 So. 2d 54 (1941). 
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but the court found this was an.arbitrary figure as no reasons for the figure 
had been given. The experts who testified for the BQa:rd said the land was 
worth $20 per acre since located near the school, but otherwise would be 
worth $10 per acre. The deedsr.'si.Jbmit.ted by the Board as evidence had shown 
that property in the vicinity had sold for fran $5 to $12.50 per acreo The 
owner was to be ·awarded the market value of the property without regard to 
the improvements that had been made by the Board, and the court fixed the 
award at $50 per acre, and assigned costs of $300 to the owner.· On re-hearing 
the owner pointed out that the costs exceeded the amount he was awarded. The 
matter was settled by the Board's motion to pay the costs in both the District 
Court and the appeal. 
The refusal of a new trial on the ground that damages awarded were in-
adequate was affirmed ln School District of Clayton v. Kelsey42 even though 
there was a wide margin in the testimony on value. The court would not 
disturb the verdict when the award was supported by substantial evidence. 
In Waukegan v. Stanczak43 the verdict of the jury of $35,000 was affirmed. 
The City's evidence. had shown a value of $22,800 to $30,400 and the owner's 
evidence had shown a value of $60,000 to $75,000. Since the jury had viewed 
the premises, and the verdict was within the range.of the evidence,it was 
affirmed. 
A judgment on the verdict of $15,000 was affirmed in County Board of 
School Trustees af DuPage County v. Boram,44 one of the issues being that 
42355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W. 2d 860 (1946). 
436 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E.· 2d 751 (1955). 
44 · c· ·> 26 Ill. 2d. 167, 168 N.E. 2d 275 1962 o 
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the verdict was not within the range of the testimony. The Board was seeking 
to acquire 5.16 acres to which Boram had titl~ on and before April 10, 1960. 
Luehring, a real estate broker, claimed to have purchased the property from 
Boram on April 10 for $30,000 with one dollar down and a ,note for the remain-
der due within two years without interest. Witnesses for the Board placed 
a value on the property of $3,000 per acre or $15,000, and witnesses for the 
owners said the property was worth $34,000 and $6,250 per acre. The owners 
maintained that since the acreage was 5.16 and the low valuation was $3,000 
per acre, the verdict of $15,000 was not within the range of the evidence. 
The court explained that while the evidence had established the actual 
acreage as 5.16, the property had been referred to in the trial as a five 
acre tract, even by the defendants I own counsel. The total amount specified 
by the jury was held to have precedence over a per acre valuation. Because 
the jury was supposedly in the best position to appraise the capabilities of 
expert opinion witnesses, the verdict was not contrary to the evidence. The 
owners also insisted that the verdict was a result of passion and prejudice 
caused by improper remarks of counsel for the Board. The court pointed out 
that the objection to remarks regarding the opinion of members of the Board 
that the value of the property was no more than $3,000 per acre had been 
sustained, and that at no time did counsel for the Board state his own opinion 
or put his. reputation upon the supposed opinion of Board members. 
Testimony. The appraisers modified their valuation of the property 
and Peckham v. North Providence School District45 was an action for debt 
by the owner in an attempt to recover on the basis of the first award. On 
457 R.I. 545 (1863). 
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March 26, 1863, the appraisers, the owner, and the .District clerk went to 
the site saught for a school. The owner infarmed the clerk that he would 
not allow him an his ground and accarding ta the repart af the case, the 
awner used "~pprabrious language" in,. referenpe ta the men .from the. clerk's 
section af the town. As a result, the awnerwas heard alone by the 
appraisers, and they reparted the value af the preperty at $500. · When the 
District complained to the appraisers that it had net been heard, the 
papers were recalled and an .appraisal meeting held at the schoolhause where 
the awardwas reduced ta $333. The court denied the owner the l,"ight ta 
recaver on the first award, calling his conduct inexcusable. The Board had 
a right to be heard, but was prevented by the owner's conduct, so he was 
found to have no right to complain. 
A judgment awarding the owner $17,000 was reversed in Chicaga v. 
Lehman46 partially because the trial court had refused to allow the owner 
to cross-examine the City's value witnesses on the cost of develaping the 
lots for their best use. The coutt discussed the use of the term "expert" 
and in this case, thought the use of the term was a mi~nomer. The witnesses 
had net acquired the ability to deduce correct inferences from hypothetically 
stated facts, or from facts praved invalving scientific or technical knowledge. 
Instead, they had acquired practical experience in real estate business; but 
even then, had na special knowledge of the locality in.question. It was 
significant to the court that the faur witnesses all went to the property, 
knew of na sale in the neighborhoad, but each arrived at a tota.1 value af 
$15,000. The City maintained that it was not admissible ta examine witnesses 
46262 111. 468, 104 N.E. 829 (1914)0 
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regarding a purely imaginary scheme, but the court found that these witnesses 
had fixed their estimate of value on the basis of the possible uses of the 
property and that to test the value of their opinion, it would be admissible 
to question them about the possible income that might be derived from the 
property. 
The question of whether one of the appraisers should be allowed to 
testify at the trial was raised in Gregory v. Kirkman Consolidated Independent 
School District. 47 The court agreed that the jury was not entitled to consider 
the award made by the appraisers as it was not an issue in the case. Two of 
the appraisers had testified at the trial, but the court guarded any re'ference 
to the amount of the award made by the appraisers and promptly sustained any 
objections that were offered. The evidence of the value of the property 
ranged from $10 to $20 per acre, and two of the District's witnesses had testi-
fied that the taking would cause no damage to the remaining property. The 
verdict for $1,260 for four acres of the owner's 130 acre improved farm was 
affirmed. The District submitted with its motions to set aside the verdict 
and grant a new trial, affidavits of the jurors that they had erred. The 
court recognized from reading the affidavits that the jury misunderstood or 
ignored the instructions or considered a measure of damage on which there had 
been no evidence, but it was held that the jury could not impeach its own 
verdict by showing a mistake in calculation or error in judgment, and the 
verdict stood. 
47 193 Iowa 579, 187 N.W. 553 (1922). 
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Testimony by a conunissioner in School District of Kansas City v. 
Phoenix Land and Improvement Co.48 was a basis for reversing the case. The 
court said that the fact McElroy was a conunissioner should not have been 
permitted to go to the jury as the cause stood at the time it was submitted 
to the jury as though no conunissioners were appointed. At the same time, 
the court indicated that if the conunissioners were not examined, the trial 
court would have no way of knowing the theory on which they had proceeded. 
At the trial the commissioners were named and the fact was stated that their 
valuation of the property was $41,950. Because this evidence was prejudicial 
and in disregard of the law in prior cases, a new trial was granted. 
No error was found in refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury 
that they should be guided by their own judgment as well as all the evidence 
in State v. Moriarity.49 A previous case was cited in which a similar 
instruction was held improper because the jurors were not limited to evalua-
tion of the testimony, but invited to draw without limitation on whatever 
information, knowledge, or experience they had. The court found that the 
jury had been fully instructed on the subject in another instruction, and 
cautionary instructions were regarded as resting in the discretion of the 
court. Refusal of the trial judge to permit the jury to view the site was 
also discretionary, and he had been of the opinion that testimony of 
witnesses and photographs were sufficient. 
48297 Mo. 332, 249 S.W. 51 (1923). 
49361 S.W. 2d 133 (Mo. App. 1962). 
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Elements That May Be Considered. 
The following cases illustrate some of the elements or conditions that 
have been considered as evidence of the value of property schools and colleges 
have sought to condemn. 
The Most Advantageous Use. Four lots for a high school building were 
appropriated in Soisson v. School District of City of Connellsville.SO The 
judgment on the verdict awarding $6, 784.11 was affirmed by the court without 
discussion. No error was found in the instructions which told the jury that 
if they believed the land was available for subdivision and the market value 
would be increased thereby, they had a right to consider such as an element 
of the value of the property. The District's motion to strike testimony of 
a witness that he valued the property at $10,000 and that if he wanted it 
for a residence he would give that amount was overruled by the court. The 
owner was also refused permission to show a price that had been bid for the 
property in 1912. The condemnation proceedings began May 9, 1916. 
The District suggested that error had been conunitted in admitting 
evidence of valuable gravel deposits on the property it sought in Woodv. 
Syracuse School District.51 The court held, however, that in order to 
determine the market value of the property, it would be appropriate to 
consider any legitimate use that could be made of the land, including that 
most advantageous to the owner. 
50262 Pa. 80, 104 Atl. 892 (1918). 
51108 Kan. 1, 193 Pac. 1049 (1920). 
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State v. Moriarity52 was an action by the Board of Regents to acquire 
8 1/2 acres for Central Missouri State College. Commissioners assessed the 
damages at $14,000 which was paid by the State and both parties filed excep-
tions. The jury arrived at a figure of $2©,0©0 for the property. On appeal 
by the State, the instruction: telling the jury to consider only the highest 
al}d best use for theproperty as shown by the owner was challenged. The 
position of the State was that £a.fr market value should not be defined as 
what could have been obtained from parties who wanted to·buy the property 
on December 21, 1960,who would give the full value for its highest and best 
use. The State was also of opinion that evidence of suitability for sub-
division was speculative. The judgment was affirmed, however, on the basis 
that the highest and best use instruction ·as:·used withtn:i.ai:lyotherwher,~or:rect 
deftnition::of fair market value was not reversibly erroneous. The court 
pointed out that the highest and best use was not th~ only measure of value 
but one element. Unless other elements of value had been excluded, the 
instructions would not. be considered erroneous. The jury had not been limited 
to only evidence presented by the owner. 
The District sought to condemn a strip of about ten:.-acres on the north 
end of a 160 acre farm owned by the defendant in Vierling v. Independent 
School District~· 120.53 On an appeal fran the apprabers report of 
$15,000 a jury awarded the owner $16,500 for his property, and this judgment 
was affirmed. The owner objected to the fact that his cross examination of 
the Superintendent regarding the DistJ:"ict 's con temp lated use of .the property 
52 361 S.W. 2d 133 (Mo. App. 1962). 
53129 N.W. 2d 338 (Minn. Sup. Ct~ 1964). 
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had been restricted. The owner's case was presented on·the theory that the 
highest and best use for the property would be residential deveiopment, and 
he made no claim that the remaining 150 acres would be adversely affected. 
The court found that the rule permitting evidence of the contemplated use 
where the effect would be to depreciate the value of the remainder did not 
apply in this case. The right of the District to condemn the property for 
an athletic field was not relevant to the question of damages. The owner 
also maintained that error had been COID!llitted in rejection or disparagment 
of the testimony of his value witnesses. Since the highest and best use 
was the basis for recovery on which the owner had proceeded, the court felt 
that the rule permitting testimony of persons living near the tract as to 
its value was not applicable and would prejudice the owner. 
Offers and Problems.of.Collusion, Two types of offers shou(!:.d be 
distinguished; those by the school or college seeking the ptoperty, and 
those submitted as evidence of the value of the property by the owner. As 
discussed further in Chapter VIII, it is necessary in most states for the 
condemner to make an effort to purchase the property before he begins condem-
nation proceedings, and the offer made in this effort has, on occasion, been 
questioned regarding its validity as evidence of value. 
The offer made by the Board was considered in Dean v. County Board of 
Education54 and in Waukegan v. Stanczak.55 The Board in the Dean case 
offered .$300 to the owner for the land it later condemned. The :evidence 
presented in the case valued the land at between $800 and $2,000. The court 
54210 Ala.· 256, 97 So. 741 (1923). 
556 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E. 751 (1955). 
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found that it had been error to use the offer of the Board as evidence of 
the value of the land. In the Waukegan case the Board had offered.more 
than the jury eventually awarded. In holding that there was no error in 
exclusion as evidence of the Board's offer to purchase the property for 
$40,000, the court pointed out that the condemnor•s offer was a requisite 
to showing that a price could not be agreed upon, and that often the offer 
was a premium price in order to secure quick action. 
One of the grounds on which Chicago v. Lehman56 was reversed was that 
the trial court had erred in refusing to permit the owner's witnesses, two 
of whom lived in the neighborhood and two of whom had offices on the same 
street, to show offers that had been made for their property. From the 
record the court ascertained that these witnesses would have valued the 
property at from $23,000 to $25,000 compared to the $17,000 offered by the 
jury. The court observed that actual sales of property were the best evidence, 
but in the absence of such evidence, bona fide offers to purchase for cash 
were some evidence. When there were no sales in the vicinity, this evidence 
would be of some value. It was noted that courts differed in the admissibility 
of such evidence and in some courts, the sales of similar property at about 
the time of condemnation could not be· proved. This court was of the opinion 
that there ought to be great liberality in admitting evidence and preferred 
the rule that bona fide offers by persons able to buy were admissible. The 
court also held that the refusal to admit as proof of the value of the 
property the amount awarded in a previous condemnation of 14 adjoining lots 
was not error. Evidence would be compet:¢nt to show value only when it 
56262 Ill. 468, 104 N.E. 829 (1914). 
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involved an open market negotiation. 
The question of whether an executory cont~act was admissible as evidence 
of value was raised in School District of Clayton v. Kelsey~7 At a meeting 
of the School Board on April 19, 1944, the Superintendent was authoriz,ed to 
offer $15,000 for the property sought by the Board. The contract the owner 
offered as evidence of value was dated March 7, 1945,between the owner and 
Adelyn Freund for the sale of a lot across the street from the property 
involved in the condemnation action at $200 per front foot. The contract had 
been signed for the owner by her agent, and $500 was deposited provided the 
deal was closed by June 7, 1945,or the deposit would be forfeited or would 
go to the agent as a commission. The contract also contained a notation 
that the seller would receive half of the earnest.money. Evidence submitted 
by the District valued the property at $85 per front foot and the verdict on 
which the judgment was based was for $114.23 per front foot. While nothing 
had been offered to show that this contract was made in bad faith, the court 
held that to admit it as evidence would open the door to fraud. 
The court in Denson v. Alabama Polytechnical Institute58 found no 
indication of fraud in the fact that the grandmother of the appellant, who 
held a life estate, and two uncles, who also had an interest in the property 
had agreed with the Institute on a valuation of the property. The grand-
daughter suggested that this agreement involved collusion that worked to 
her disadvantage. The opinion of the court was based on the fact that the 
life tenant's interest was not adverse to that of the contingent remaindermen. 
57355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W. 2d 860 (1946). 
58220 Ala. 433, 126 So. 133 ( 1930). 
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The sum that had been agreed upon was the same as the amount of the jury 
verdict, and by some means, the court concluded that it was "in fact in 
excess of the actual value" of the property. 
The owner in Pike County Board .2! Education v. 12!:!!59 objected to the 
commissioners who had been appointed to appraise his property, but with-
out success. The statute provided that the court appoint three impartial 
housekeepers of the county who were owners of land. 60 The owner showed 
that one of the commissioners was a brother-in-law of a clerk in the County 
Superintendent's office, one was the father-in-law of the attorney repre-
senting the Board, and one was the father-in-law of the son of the Assist-
ant .Superintendent of Schools. While the court was of the opinion that 
it would be better practice not to use persons with such marital relation-
ships, there was no showing of bias or prejudice that would cause them to 
place an unfair value on the land or not be classified as 11impartial 
housekeepers." 
.~ Value .2! Other Property. It was suggested in School District .21 
Kansas City v. Phoenix~.!£!! Improvement Co. 61 that testimony regarding 
the value of land three miles distant from the property sought by the 
District should on re-trial be excluded. The court did not say that it 
was error to have permitted this testimony, but pointed out that in its 
exercise of discretion, the trial court should confine the investigation 
to property sold in the near vicinity and at a recent date. 
The fact that two tracts were separated by 2~ miles of distance would 
59279 S.W. 2d 245 (Ky. App. 1955). 
60 6 K.R.S. 41 .020 
61297 Mo. 332, 249 s.w. 51 (1923). 
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not render them dissimilar in the opinion of the court in Waukegan v. 
Stanczak.62 The tracts compared were both in the city, one in the northern 
part and one in the southern part. Both tracts were zoned residential; 
both were vacant and both usable for business, but best suited for subdivi-
sion. Both the tracts fronted on Lewis Avenue and were of comparable size, 
one being20 acres and the other 15.2 acres. Both tracts were bounded by 
buildings on one side and vacant on the other side. The owner complained 
that the tract to which his property was compared was subject to flooding, 
below grade, and contained a ravine. The court re-named the ravine, calling 
it a ditch, and pointed out that the defendant's property had a watercourse 
in one corner which contained 21/2 feet of water. On.the other hand, the 
court held that there was no error in exclusion of evidence of the value 
of another tract which was 44/100 of an acre and had been·sold for a clubhouse. 
This tract, the court thought, was not similar in size or potential use. 
Crawford v. Murphy63 was an original proceeding to prohibit the circuit 
judge from trying a condemnation action with a jury other than one composed 
of freeholders of the City of Newport. The School District sought to condemn 
property within the City under a statute which provided that 1:'Trial of such 
actions shall be by a jury summoned under order of court and rionsisting of 
twelve freeholders of such city or county. 11 64 The owner maintained that 
this provision called for a special jury of city freeholders. His rationale 
was that city gurors were more cognizant of property values :i.n the city. In 
626 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E. 2d 751 (1955). 
63296 S.W. 2d 738 (Ky. App. 1956}. 
64K.R.S. 416.120. 
denying the order of prohibition, the court mentioned the fact that the 
statute referred to either city or county freeholders as proper, and did 
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not refer to the location of the property. There would be no reason w'hy the 
owner would not receive a fair t.rial, as the verdict must be based on evi-
di:mce and not on pre-existing concepts of city or county valuations. 
The court in Vierling v. Independent School District No. 72065 approved 
the sustaining of an ibjection to a question of the owner's counsel directep 
to the District's witnesses which was designed to test their knowledge of the 
value of improved lots in the City. Since the land involved in the condemna-
tion proceeding was neither platted nor improved, there was no prejudice to 
the interest of the owner in the sustaining of the objection. Another 
question which was barred related to the effect of terms on the selling 
price, and here, again, the court found no prejudice in barring the.question. 
Improvements. The cases in which the improvements to the property have 
been considered elements in determination of the amount to bepa:i,d to the 
condemnee may be put into two categories. In the first are those in which 
the improvements had been made by the owner, and in the second, are those 
in which the improvements were made by the condemner. 
On the appeal in Board of Education v. Hackman66 the owner claimed that 
the Commissioners had overlooked the value of the crops growing·in the lando 
The court held that since the report did not show the fact that there were 
growing crops, this objection would fail. 
After the proceedings to condemn had been started by the District, the 
65129 N.w. 2d 338 (Mirirl~ .. Sup. Ct. 1964). 
6648 Mo. 243 ( 1871) • 
· 212 
owner in Petersburg School District v. Petersori67 had.the tract platted. 
· On appeal he objected that the instructions to the jury had told them to 
. . 
fix the value of the property as of the date the proceedings beg:an, but to 
disregard anything that had been done thereafter. According to the statute, 
no improvements subsequent to the date· of service of process were to be 
included in the damages. Th'e owner claimed that this prevented the jµry 
from considering the value of the property because of its locatipn, but the 
court m~ntioned that specific instructions on that point prevented any error. 
Linesch v. Bo.ard of Education of St. Bernard68 was reversed because the 
court found it was error to exclude the testimony of contractors and builders 
who had examined the improvements independently of the land. Their testimony 
was stricken on motion of the Board. !he court refar1red!:to 0 'an.CBhd.di-nrille2:'.that 
the owner had the right to show the value of the land separate from the value 
of the buildings, adding that this was the method used for assessment of 
property. A case in which the original construction cost of a btii,lding no 
longer adapted to purposes for which it was built would mislead the jury 
was distinguished. 
The judgment condemning three acres and awarding the owner $1,600 was 
affirmed.in Cunningham v 0 Shelby County Beard of Educatian.69 In the 
instruction an the measure of damages, the court had directed. the jury to 
include the probable cost of fencing, if any. The owner insisted that it 
had been shown without contradiction that some fencing would be necessary 
. 
6714 N.E. 344, 103 N.W. 756 (1905). 
6813··. 
. . App, 
69:202 Ky. 
161 (Ohio App. 1920) • 
763, 261 s.w. 266 (1924). 
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and that it was error to submit the issue of the necessity of fencing to 
the jury. The court was of the opinion that the judgment was amply sufficient 
to compensate the owner for every item of damage and though the instruction 
may have been in error, it was not considere~ prejudicial or s~fficient to 
authorize a reversal. 
Instructions to the jury .that they shoµld assess the value of property 
ti3-ken for a schoolhouse exclusive of the land devoted to the highway were 
held proper in Hilton v. Cramer.70 The statute in this case required that 
land taken as a schoolhouse site be situated upon a section line or upon a 
regularly laid out highway. The court found that the land taken did not 
include the 33 feet which was half of the highway and that "upon" as used in 
the statute meant "near to 11 or "along the side of. 11 
Evidence admitted in State v. Moriarity71 that a house situated on the 
original tract of the owner, but not taken by the Board of Regents, was con-
nected to a sewer was approved. The court. said that a factor in determina-
tion of what constituted fair market value was whether the property was 
served by a sewer or one was located close by. 
In North Kansas City School District of Clay County v. Peterson-Renner, 
Inc.72 the School District sought title to 34 acres in the southeast corner 
of a 140 acre tract. Conunissioners awarded damages of $94,966 and all 
parties filed exceptionso A jury trial resulted in a verdict of $131,200, 
plus interest, to total $133,615.51. The District appealed,assigning as·.error 
>. ~ .. ;:;. i.: 
70 50 s.D. 274, 209 N. w. 543 ( 1926). 
71361 S.W. 2d 133 (Mo. App. 1962). 
72369 S.W. 2d 159 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
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the instructions which had said that the owner had a right to use the 
sewer plant and that such right may be considered in determination of fair 
market value because just compensation is based on what the owner loses and 
not what the condemnor gains. The court held that it was proper to tell the 
jury the availability of sewers should be considered in determination of the 
value of the land as the highest and best use for the property, in this case, 
was for housing. The fact that the owner had paid $93,200 for sewer rights 
gave the jury the impression that they should add that figure to the value 
they found the property to have otherwise. This objection had not been 
pleaded by the District, however. The District's objection was based,on 
the fact that the contract purporting to give the owner the right to use the 
sewer was void as contrary to public policy. The court agreed with the 
District's contention and found the contract void on the basis that the city 
may not contract away its governmental functions. On this basis, the case 
was reversed and remanded. 
Five cases have been located, all of them prior to 1908, in which the 
issue of improvements made by the condemnor was raised. In the earliest of 
these, Harris v. Marblehead, 73 a claim for betterments made during pendency 
of the controversy was disallowed. Otherwise, the court suggested, the 
owner could be compelled to buy the schoolhouse which had been constructed. 
The judgment was for the devisee pn a writ of entry. 
Williams v. School District No. 674 was an appeal on certiorari from 
a decision of the commissioners that the owner receive $75.00 and the District 
7310 Gray 40 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1857). 
7433 Vt. 271 (1860). 
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build a fence. The owner comp'Plined that the compensation did not include the 
value of the fencing the District was required to make, but the court dismissed 
the objection with the observation that if the ~er had been required to do 
the fencing, it would be an additional loss to him. 
The only opinion by the United S,tates Supreme Court which has been 
located dealing with school and college eminent domain issaesS.involved:::the 
problem of improvements made hy the District. Accarding to the facts stated 
in Searl v. School District Na. ~~5 on April 16, 1881, a receiver's receipt 
was issued by the United States Land Office ta Cooper. On May 18, 1881, 
Cooper received a United States patent to the tract in Colorado which included 
the land in question. On November 20, 1882, Cooper conveyed the patent title 
to Searl, a resident of Kansas. Ownership af the property was also claimed 
by Watson and Schlessinger who occupied, possessed and improved the premises 
under a squatter's title with knowledge of the U.S. Patent. On July 1, 1881, 
the School Board purchased the lots from Watson and Schlessinger for $3,500. 
On January 30, 1882, the Board completed a building worth $40,000 on the lots. 
The School District employed caunsel who reported in favor af the squatter's 
title, and the Board subscribed to funds of an organizatian whose purpose was 
to defeat the patent title. Searl began an action of ejectment an March 24, 
1884, but on June 7, 1884, the District obtained an injunctian restraining 
trial of the ejectment action. On June 9, 1884, the District began condemna-
tiom1proceedings in the Lake County Court. On application of Searl, the case 
was removed ta the United States Circuit Court for a.:Jury trial. There the 
court instructed the jury that the value of the praperty had been stipulated 
at $3,000 and the instructions of Searl which would have awarded him the 
75 133 U.S. 553, 10 S. Ct. 374, 33 L. Ed. 740 (1890). 
216 
stipulated value of the buildings at $40,000 were refused. The case went 
to the Supreme Court on error from the Circuit Court. The owner 1 s appeal 
was based on a common law rule that structures erected by a trespasser with 
full knowledge of the condition of title were given to the legal owner. 
Pointing out that this was not an action of ~jectment or trespass, but a 
proceeding in exercise of the right of eminent domain, the court said that: 
••• It is the duty of the State, in the conduct of the inquest 
by which the compensation is ascertained, to see that it is 
just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken, but 
to the public which is to pay for it • 
••• courts of equity, in accord with the principles of the civil 
law, when their aid is sought by the real owner, compel him to 
make allowance for permanent improvements made bona fide by a 
party lawfully in possession under a defective title.76 
The court observed that Searl knew when he acquired the title that the land 
was in public use. While color of title ~as a matter of law, good faith in 
the party claiming thereunder was regarded as a matter of fact. The only 
legitimate inference that could be drawn from the facts was that the District 
acted in good faith. Although the District had been mistaken, 11 the intention 
guided the entry and fixed its character," the court said, and the District 
could not be held to have trespassed so that the building erected in good 
faith became part of the land as to entitle the owner to recover its value. 
The third time that Aldridge v. ~ of Education of City of Still-
water77 was before the Oklahoma court, the issue was whether the value of the 
improvements should have been considered by the jury and their value awarded 
76 133 U.S. at 561, 562. 
77 15 Okl. 354, 82 Pac. 827 (1905). 
218 
unlawful, and that the law was simply a rule of conduct th~t should keep pace 
with changing conditions of the times, the court held that the owner could 
not recover for the building which cost the District thousands of dollars and 
was not erected for the betterment of the real estate, but for a puhlic use. 
The Searl cas• was cited as authority for the holding. Claims of the public 
should not be overlooked, the court thought, in guarding the rights of citi-
zens. All the citizen could ask for was fair and reasonable payment for 
damages sustained. The court suggested that the owner should be awarded the 
value of the property at the time it was condemned, but if the land had 
increased in value from the time of unlawful entry, the owner should recover 
the advanced price and the value of the use of the land during the wrongful 
occupancy. The comm.on law rule that buildings erected on land by a trespasser 
became part of the real estate had been modified, and this case was considered 
within the exception to the rule. Since there was no law under which the 
condemnation could be had at the time the building was erected, the owner said 
this was not the same situation as wrongful appropriation. While the law had 
been declared invalid, the court pointed out that the legislature had declared 
that school authorities had the power to condemn. Even if there t-1er'ei.n0:1 law, 
there was a subsequent law which gave the right and the owner would receive 
just compensation when paid for all his damages. The ejectment action did not 
adjudicate the ownership of the buildings, but only settled the right to 
~ . • ,(J 
possession. The action to condemn was a new condition and the right to condemn 
was not questioned, so the issue before the court was considered the same as 
if the ejectment suit had never commenced. In this case, the court scolded the 
counsel for the School Board for filing no brief and putting the entire burden 
of the research on the court. The court suggested that, where the court had 
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every reason to believe he was able to brief the case,and, without good cause 
failed to do so, counsel may find his case dismissed. 
McClarren v. Jefferson School Township81 was an action to condemn the 
interest of the wife of a party whose property had earlier been taken by 
eminent domain. In the first action, begun in September, 1904, the wife 
was not a party as the township did not know she claimed any interest. After 
the proceedings, the Township built a school worth $600 with the full notice 
and knowledge of the wife. When the Township learned of her interest, it 
brought an action on March 20, 1905. The wife alleged that the improvements 
had become her property and that she should have damages for them on the 
basis of the common law rule that structures erected by tortfeasors become 
part of the land. The court held that this rule did not apply and distin-
guished a railroad case in which it had been held that the owner was entitled 
to the value of a depot constructed without any right to enter the property. 
The rule suggested was that failure to bring action until public interests 
have intervened, would prevent successful prosecution. 
Tax Assessment. In Haggard v. Independent School District of Algona82 
it was held that there was no prejudice to the owner's cause from exclusion 
of his valuation given to the assessor. The court recognized that while 
the assessor's valuation may not be shown as evidence of value of the property, 
the owner may admit what he had told the assessor. 
The court in Dean v. County~ of Education83 held that it was error 
81169 Ind. 140, 82 N.E. 73 (1907). 
82 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
83210 Ala. 256, 97 Soo 741 (1923). 
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to refuse an instruction requested by the owner that tax assessment sheets 
introduced as evidence had no legal tentlency to prove the value of the 
property. There was no error, however, in the examination and cross-examination 
of the owner about his evaluation of the property for tax purposes. 
The Value of a Life Estate. Because there was no evidence in the record 
as to the age of a life tenant, the judgment for the District in School 
District of Columbia v. Jones84 was reversed and remanded with directions that 
the case be re-opened on this single point. The life tenant had conveyed her 
estate to one of the defendants and the estate was commuted at a value of 
$1,687.95. There was nothing in the record to indicate that consent had been 
given to this valuation of the estate and no admission of the age of the life 
tenant. 
SUMMARY 
The constitutional requirement that private property may not be taken 
for public use without just compensation requires the development of standards 
for the measure of compensation. Market value has been traditionally accepted 
as a basic measure in school and college cases, and these cases are probably 
not unique in this respect. The facts of each case present problems of deter-
mining what may be taken into account by the jury in particular situations in 
its attempt to arrive at market value. 
It seems clear that any benefit that might accrue to the owner from 
having a school located near his property has not been taken into account. 
There is some uncertainty in the school and college cases about the time at 
84229 Mo. 510, 129 S.W. 705 (1910). 
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which the value of the property is determined, but it will usually be at the 
time proceedings are begun by the condemnor or the time of the jury verdict. 
Interest may be included in a condemnation award, and the school and college 
cases are not clear on the question of when it begins to run. 
\ 
Where only a part of an owner's property has been taken, the measure of 
damages has been held to be the difference between the market value of the 
entire tract before the taking and the market value of the remainder after 
the taking. A school or college would not ordinarily be liable to damages 
for consequential injury because of taking property by condemnation, either 
to the owner or to adjoining owners. 
In some of the cases where property of a school or college has been 
taken for another public use, the measure of damages has been regarded as the 
same as when private property is taken. Especially has this been true when 
the school or college is private or when the property taken has not been in 
use for school purposes. 
Recent cases have developed the substitution cost theory as a means of 
compensating an agency whose property has no market value. The right of the 
school to compensation as a public agency has consistently been upheld. The 
necessity of the school holding and using the property for school purposes 
has been an important element in consideration of the amount of compensation 
it should receive. 
Evidence of the value of the property condemned by schools and col}eges 
has been conflicting in most of the cases where it has been at issue, and the 
rulings on evidence have seemed to depend to some extent on the facts of each 
case. The verdict of the jury has been allowed to stand unless it is clearly 
contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
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The most advantageous use of the property has been regarded as an element 
that may be considered in arriving at the value of property sought by 
condemnation, but, in general, the courts have attempted to prevent specu-
lative values from entering into the verdicts. Offers made in good faith 
by parties who were able to purchase have been considered evidence of value, 
but where there has been the slightest suggestion of collusion, the courts 
have been careful to prevent admission of an offer as evidence of value. 
The offer made by the Board as a prerequisite to condemnation has not been 
considered good evidence of the value of the property. The value of other 
property similar to or in the area of that sought by the school or college 
may be considered valid evidence, but this determination usually depends 
on the facts of the case. Improvements made by the owner may be evidence 
of the value of the property ~epending on the conditions under which they 
were made. Improvements made by the condemnor bef~re securing full title 
have been consistently held not to enhance the amount of the condemnation 
award, even when made by mistake or under a defective title. This situation 
has been clearly distinguished from the cormnon law rule that improvements 
by a trespasser become the property of the owner. The valuation of property 
for taxation purposes has not been considered evidence of the market value 
of property sought by schools and colleges. 
CHAPTER VIII 
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SCHOOL AND 
COLLEGE CONDEMNATION CASES 
This chapter is designed to present a wide variety of issues that have 
been raised in the school and college condemnation cases. The use of the 
term "procedural" in the title of the chapter is not intended to mean that 
the issues discussed here can be neatly separated from those presented in 
previous chapters. In a sense, this chapter reports the issues that have 
been considered by the writer to be sufficiently unrelated to the issues in 
the preceding chapters. While many of the issues discussed here could have 
been considered in connection with issues previously discussed, it has 
seemed that dealing with them in a separate chapter would be less confusing . 
The order in which the issues are presented here is somewhat similar to the 
order in which the issues would be raised in a condemnation proceeding, 
beginning with issues regarding parties and pleadings, then considering a 
number of conditions precedent to exercise of the right of eminent domain, 
and concluding with other issues such as discontinuance or costs and fees. 
The court in Willan v. Hensley School Township stated that: 
We may suggest in passing that we have considered spme 
questions presented by appellants which appear to us to be 
quite frivolous and in reality merited no consideration.l 
1175 Ind. 486, 93 N.E. 657 at 660 (1911). 
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This expression may seem in many respects applicable to other cases reported 
in this section. On the other hand, if, as suggested in earlier chapters, 
rights in property are among those considered most important, both condemnor 
and condemnee are entitled to extensive judicial protection of those rights. 
ISSUES REGARDING PARTIES SUING AND BEING SUED 
One of the limitations of this study was that the cases involve a school 
or college as a party to condemnation proceedings. Even within this limita-
tion there are questions regarding the right to sue or be sued. 
A Line of Illinois Cases. 
The issue of what agency is authorized to prosecute an eminent domain 
action was raised in a series of Illinois cases dating from 1901 to 1949. 
Banks v. School Directors of District 12 has been cited as authority 
that in Illinois the Township Trustees are proper and necessary petitioners 
in a condemnation proceeding, but from the case report it is not clear that 
the revers a l wa s due to the fact that the School Directors brought the 
petition. The court apparently would have reversed the verdict for the 
Directors on the basis that they had no right of way to gain access to the 
t ract condemned in the middle of the owner's pasture. It was not clear if 
the discussion in the report was a result of the issue having been raised 
by the owner or of the court taking judicial notice. In either case, the 
opinion mentioned thai by statute, the Trustees were invested with the 
title, care and custody of school property and that the School Directors 
2194 Ill. 247, 62 N.E. 604 (1901). 
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had responsibility for control and support of the school. The Directors 
could decide when property was unsuitable, inconvenient, or unnecessary and 
decide upon a price to be paid for property or when unable to agree upon a 
price for it, to proceed to have compensation determined in the manner 
provided by law for exercise of the right of eminent domain. 
The authority of the Trustees to condemn property for school purposes 
was challenged in Trustees v. McMahon. 3 The Banks case was cited to the 
effect that the Trustees were proper parties. The Board of Education having 
requested the Trustees to institute condemnation proceedings, the action was 
properly prosecuted. Interests of the owner were protected as his property 
could not be taken until compensation was made, and it was immaterial to him 
whether the funds came directly from the Board or through the Trustees. 
The issue of whether the Trustees or the Board of Education were 
authorized to petition for condemnation was raised again in Schuler v. 
Wilson4 because the statute had been revised since the Banks case. The court 
explained again that by statute in 1857, the Trustees were invested with title, 
custody and care of the schoolhouses and sites, that supervision and control 
of the school was vested in Directors of each District, and that this plan 
had been preserved through revisions made in 1872, 1879, and 1909. The court 
found no substantial change even though the owner pointed out that the 1909 
statute expressly provided that a Board of Education should have the right 
to take land for a schoolhouse site "with or without the owner's consent, by 
condemnation or otherwise. 11 5 It was mentioned that the McMahon case had 
3265 Ill. 83, 106 N.E. 486 (1914). 
4322 Ill. 503, 153 N.E. 737, 48 A.L.R. 1027 (1926). 
51909 Laws, Sec. 127, cited at 153 N.E. 739. 
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already construed the 1909 act and that the Banks case and Thompson v. 
Trustees6 had construed the act of 1889. The thi:iri.pson case, however, did 
not concern the precise issue of whether the Board of School Directors or 
the Trustees were the proper parties, but only that the Trustees had power 
to take property without an election to select a site. 
In a decision rendered the same day as the Schuler decision, Chicago 
v. Jewish Consumptives Relief Society7 held that the City was a proper party 
to bring a condemnation action for land needed for school purposes. The 
petition in the case was filed by the Board of Education of the City, naming 
the City as petitioner in trust for the use of the schools. The owner 
challenged the right of the Board of Education to bring the suit on the bas is 
that it had no legal existence. If the City were held to be the petitioner, 
he maintained, the action was void because it was instituted without action 
of the City Council. The court noted that when the statute was amended, the 
concurrence of the City Council was left out and from this fact concluded 
that it was the intent of the legislature to give the Board of Education 
authority to act without action of the City Council. S'ince the title was in 
the City as Trustee, the action must be brought in the name of the City. 
In Board of Education of Cicero~Stickney Township High School v. 
Chicago8 the proceedings brought by the Board of Education were dismissed and 
the dismissal affirmed. On March 30, 1944, the Board of Education petitioned 
for condemnation of a tract of 36.75 acres in Berwyn which was owned by the 
6218 Ill. 540, 75 N.E. 1048 (1905). 
7323 Ill. 389, 154 N.E • . 117 (1926). 
8402 Ill. 291, 83 N.E. 2d · 714 (1949). 
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City of Chicago and used as a nursery to supply its parks and grounds with 
shrubs. On April 8, 1948, the Board filed an amended petition seeking the 
same relief, but naming the Trustees of tha Schools of the Township as 
additional defendants on the basis that they had declined to institute 
proceedings as requested by the Board. The Trustees answered the petition, 
alleging that they had declined to be the sole petitioners but had agreed 
to join with the Board as co-plaintiff, and that in 1944 the Board had insti-
tuted proceedings without the knowledge of the Trustees and had made no 
request to have the property condemned • . A motion to compel the Trustees to 
answer interrogatories and admit facts showed the Trustees had deemed it 
inadvisable to be the sole petitioner where they were asked to adopt and 
ratify all the acts of the Board of Education, but they had no objection to 
acquisi tion of the land. On July 13, 1948, a motion to dismiss was granted 
and final judgment entered because the Board was considered an improper 
party plaintiff, and because they could not condemn property already put to 
a public use. The record of the case on appeal does not discuss the public 
use issue. Citing the Banks, McMahon, and Schuler cases, the court was of 
the opinion that these decisions had been strengthened by legislation in 
1945. The 1945 revision of the statute$, which no longer contained the term 
11 Board of Education, " but, instead, referred to the "corporate authority" of 
the educati onal institution or school district, was held to govern the 
amended petition. The court explained that an amended petition was not an 
amendment to the petition. An entire new cause of action wa s begun when the 
original petition was abandoned, and the amended petition was then considered 
as an original petition. Since the circumstances and conditions under which 
the Trustee had declined to act had not been discussed at the triai, this 
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point was given no consideration on appeal. Nor was the answer of the 
Trustees considered a part of the record for consideration of the motion to 
dismiss, as the Board had elected to stand on its petition. The refusal 
of the Trustees to bring the action did not automatically give the Board the 
power to maintain the action as there was no provision to thatceffett :'.in ·· 
the statute. The dismissal did not raise the issue of the Trustees discretion. 
The court observed that even if it had been mandatory that the Trustees bring 
the action on request of the Board, their refusal would not itself empower 
others to perform their duties. The Board had named the Trustees as a party 
defendant on the basis of a statutory provision that any necessary plaintiff 
declining to join may be made a defendant. The court held that this was 
applicable only where joint plaintiffs were necessary parties. This provision 
was regarded as procedural only and not authority to allow an improper party 
to start a suit by making a sole necessary plaintiff a party defendant. The 
dissent in the case was based on the opinion that the only function of the 
Trustees was to receive and disburse tax funds, and that the Board was the 
"corporate authority" referred to in the 1945 act. Otherwise, the dissenter 
said, the efficient operation of the schools would be prevented due to a 
contrary stand by the Trustees 11who merely held the bare, naked legal title." 
The Condemning Agency For~ State College Or University. 
One of the defenses in University of Minnesota v. Northern Pacific 
Railway Co.9 was that the railroad could not take the property as it had 
already been put to a public use by the University. In June, 1882, a 
936 Minn. 447, 31 N.W. 936 (1887). 
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professor of agriculture had recommended that authority be granted to the 
executive corranittee of the Board of Regents to purchase lots adjoining the 
horticulture grounds for a farm house and outbuildings. His recorranendation 
was referred to the Executive Committee and two members of the Corranittee 
negotiated for and purchased seven lots in the City of St. Anthony for 
$4;900 and obtained a deed running to one of them. The title remained in 
him when the condemnation proceedings were begun by the railroad on January 
21, 1884. No record of action in the minutes of the Board of Regents to 
acquire the property was shown, nor had there been any occupation of the 
property by the University for any purpose :. . In affirm,ing the judgment for 
the Railroad, the court held that the action of the two members of the 
Executive Corranittee did not constitute a purchase by the University. Even 
assuming that the Regents, by their silence, had ratified the action of the 
Committee members, the ratification could extend no further than the parties 
had proceeded, and some action of the Regents to acquire the title would have 
been necessary. The fact that the State was made a party would not, in itself, 
be grounds for an injunction to stay the condemnation proceedings. 
A motion to dismiss was granted in Territory of New Mexico v. CrarylO 
on the basis that the petition to condemn property should have been brought 
in the name of the Regents of the University and not in the name of the 
Territory. On appeal, however, the judgment dismissing the action was 
reversed. The basis for the holding was that the Territory sought the legal 
title to hold for the use and benefit of the University. The statutell 
l015 N.M. 213, 103 Pac. 986 (1909). 
111897 Comp. Laws, Sec. 3693. 
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provided that when the Board of Regents found it necessary that title to 
real estate for the use of the University be acquired, the Board may acquire 
title in the name of the Territory. According to the court, an express trust 
was created, and under this statute the Territory could maintain a suit as 
Trustee without joining the University or the Regents. 
The defendant in People v. Brooksl2 contended that the act authorizing 
the State to condemn private property for public use did not include the 
Board of Regents because the title to the property would vest in the State. 
Because the constitution gave corporations the right of eminent domain in 
their own name, he said, only the Regents could hold title in their corporate 
capacity. This argument was denied because it was immaterial whether the 
title was held by the Regents or by the State. The mere holding of the title 
by the State could not interfere with the constitutional powers of the Board 
of Regents to exclusively control and manage the property. The court found 
no constitutional objection to requiring that the University prosecute an 
eminent domain action in the name of the State, pointing out that money was 
furnished by the State and t it le was taken and held by the State by consent 
of the Regents for the use and benefit of the University. 
In another Michigan case, People v. Pommerening~3 the defendant insisted 
that the Board of Control of Athletics w~s a corporate entity existing wholly 
apart from the Regents. The Board of Control was set up by statutel4 as a 
non-profit corporation and a creature of the Board of Regents for the declared 
12224 Mich. 45, 194 N.W. 602 (1923). 
l3250 Mich. 391, 230 N.W. 194 (1930). 
141921 Pub. Acts No. 84. 
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purpose of physical betterment of University students, particularly through 
the conduct of athletics. The court found the Board of Control an operating 
agency of the Regents in the management of designated activities, at all 
times under full control of the Regents. In this case, as in the Brooks case, 
the proceeding was instituted by the State for the use of the Board of Regents. 
In Board of Regents v. Palmerl5 it was argued that the act vested the 
right to prosecute an eminent domain action in the patticular institution but 
not in the Board of Regents. According to the statute,16 the court found that 
the legislative branch had the right to authorize condemnation, and in this 
instance,had conferred the power on any State educational institution acting 
through its governing body. The institutions mentioned in the act were con-
trolled by the Board of Regents, who were authorized to sue and be sued. 
Interests of Other Parties. 
The facts in Norton Eighth School District v. Copelandl7 led to a 
consideration of the relationship between the District, the owner,and a 
third party to whom the appraiser's award was paid. In November, 1852, 
the District appointed a committee to purchase a lot and build a new school. 
The committee selected the Copeland lot, but the owner refused to sell. In 
April, 1853, the committee and five other legal voters appraised the damages 
for the Copeland lot, and a town meeting subsequently approved their action. 
The appraiser's award was tendered to Copeland, but he refused it. Copeland 
15356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
16 1945 Mo. Laws, P• 1717, Mo. R.S.A. 10839.2. 
172 Gray 414 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1854). 
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entered the property and removed a stone wall, and the District brought an 
action of tort against him. After the action was begun, another person 
named Copeland accepted the award of the appraisers. The major issue dis-
cussed in the case was the failure of the District to give notice to Copeland 
that his property had been condemned. The District attempted to justify its 
right to bring an action in tort by the fact that the appraiser's award had 
been accepted and, therefore, rights in the property had been waived and the 
defendant was estopped to deny the District's title. The court found, however, 
that there was no privity between the Copeland who took the money and the 
Copeland who owned the property, so there was no authority to waive any rights. 
Facts somewhat similar to those in the Copeland case were involved in 
Board of Education of City of Holland v. VanDerVeen. 18 On May 13, 1911, 
the Board passed a resolution selecting the property owned by Engbertus 
VanDerVeen as a site for a school and authorizing a Connnittee to negotiate 
with him. On May 18, the Committee reported to the Board that they had been 
unable to arrive at any agreement, and the Committee was authorized to 
condemn the property. On May 20, the petition to condemn was filed and sum-
mons executed. On May 23, a deed was filed conveying part of the interest of 
Engbertus VanDerVeen to his son, John VanDerVeen. The deed was dated May 15, 
and acknowledged by VanDerVeen 1 s attorney. Testimony revealed, however, that 
the actual execution of the deed had been on May 23. The court held that it 
was not necessary for the Board to treat with John VanDerVeen or make him a 
party as his interest was acquired after proceedings wer'ec,b.eg9n~"::.: 1'he0 ·p£ot.~edings 
·as ·to~Engbertus VanDer.Veen w.ere ·regular, :. a·s· he::was ·the-: sole 9wner :at "the .time 
proceedin~ were....£i led. 
·,:, ·r . ·1 , ., ·1 \ 
(J ., .. ,, 
18169 Mich. ~70~ 135 N.W. 241 (1912). 
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The City was improperly joined as a party defendant in Byfield v. City 
of Newton19 but the court did not specify the reason why the City was not a 
proper party. The petition was for a writ of certiorari to quash eminent 
domain proceedings by the Board of Aldermen. The taking was for a school-
house, a municipal purpose for which, under Massachusetts statutes, the 
power of eminent domain could be exercised by the Board of Aldermen. 
One of the defendants in Denson v. Alabama Polytechnical Institute20 
objected to the condemnation proceedings on the basis that all the parties 
in interest were not and could not be represented due to the terms of the 
will creating remaindermen in fee who were not yet born. The real estate 
sought by the Institute was owned by a Dr. Thach at the time of his death, 
and devised to his widow for a life estate and at her death, to two married 
daughters. According to the terms of the will, at either daughter's death 
the property was to go in equal shares to the female children of the 
daughters and to the three named sons of Dr. Thach if they should marry 
with their parents' consent. The appeal was prosecuted by one of the grand-
daughters of the testator through her guardian. The contention that all 
parties in interest were not represented was rejected by the court. The life 
tenant, a contingent remainderman, and one of the class of indefinite 
remaindermen were all represented, according to the court. 
In a condemnation action to acquire the fee simple title to the surface 
estate only, County School Trustees of Upshur County 
19247 Mass. 46, 141 N.E. 658. 
20220 Ala. 433, 126 So. 133 (1930). 
21154 s.w. 2d 935 (Tex. App. 1941). 
v. Free 21 the owner __ , 
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tried to defeat the proceedings by contending that the owners of the mineral 
estate were necessary and indispensable parties. · The court held that their 
rights were in no way affected and that the owners of the mineral estate had 
no need of the surface strips for development of oil rights. 
The dismissal of a condemnation action was affirmed in Trustees of 
Schools v. Clippinger. 22 Title to the lot the Trustees sought as a play-
ground adjacent to a junior high school in Glen Ellyn had been acquired 
by Myers as sole devisee in 1939. Myers sold the property to the Board in 
1945, granting immediate possession and agreeing to convey title within six 
months. A year later the Board removed buildings on the lot and had it graded 
and filled. The deed was not delivered, as the will by which Myers had 
obtained an interest had not been probated. On January 20, 1948, the Trustees 
began the action to condemn the property, and the will was probated four 
months later. The court held that Myers was the only party in interest, and 
that the Trustees had not acquired a right to condemn the property due to an 
owner being incapable of consent, unknown or non-resident. Other parties had 
no rights except to contest the will, and Myers could contract his interest 
on the death of the devisee. While others may have been proper parties, they 
were not necessary or indispensable parties. 
In Pike County Board of Education v. For~_23 it was held that the 
Columbian Fuel Corporation which held a lease on part of the property sought 
by the Board was not a necessary party, as its easements were not incompatible 
with the use of the land for school purposes. 
22404 Ill. 202, 88 N.E. 2d 451 (1949). 
23 279 S.W. 2d 245 (Ky. App. 1955). 
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The issues litigated in Butler Fair anq Agricultu~al Association v. 
School District of the City of Butler24 concerned the relationship of 
several parties. The facts of the case were relatively complex. The 
statute25 provided that if, on account of liens against the premises, because 
the owners could not be found, the owners refused to accept, or 11 if for any 
other reason," the District could not pay the sum awarded, it could be pa id 
into court and the owners look to said fund for all damages. In August, 1955, 
nine districts, comprising a juncture, purchased from the owners a 67 acre 
tract on which was located ~O buildings. The Districts proceeded to condemn 
the leasehold interest of the Association. A Board of Viewers appraised the 
leasehold interest at $160,000. A final judgment for that amount was rendered 
with the stipulation that the Association have the right to remove the buildings. 
On April 30, the Districts certified to the Association that provision had been 
made in the 1956-57 budget for funds to make payment of the award, and on that 
same date one named Chambers loaned $60,000 to the Association. The Association 
assigned all right, title, and interest in the judgment to Chambers as 
collateral. On May 14, 1956, Chambers entered judgment against the Association, 
and the District was notified of the assignment on May 17. On June 13, stock-
holders of the Association's predecessor began an equity action alleging 
fraudulent sale of its assets 11 years earlier. The equity action was against 
the Associati on and the Schoel District. On June 29, 1956, the District 
requested permission to pay the judgment into court,which was refused on 
September 28, and the District filed exceptions. On December 5, the District 
24389 Pa. 304, 132 A. 2d 214 (1957). 
25 P.L. 30 Art. VIII, Sec. 726, 24 P.S. 7-726. 
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petitioned for interpleader of Chambers and the equity suit plaintiffs. On 
January 11, 1957, Chambers petitioned for a writ 11 in the nature of a mandamus 11 
directing the District to pay the Association judgment. On January 21, the 
petition for interpleader was refused and the District appealed. On January 
22, the Association 1 s preliminary objection to the equity suit was sustained 
and the plaintiffs appealed. On January 23, the denial of the District 1 s 
request to pay into court was reversed and the Association appealed. On 
February 13, Chamber 1 s petition for mandamus was dismissed and he appealed. 
The trial court was held to have erred in its order that the District be 
allowed to pay the award into court. The court reasoned that the whereabouts 
of all claimants was known and they did not refuse to accept payment. The 
equity suit was not a lien against the property, and the District 1 s reason 
that multiple liability may result was unfounded. Any other construction, the 
court thought, would allow payment into court under all circumstances. 
Chambers was the real party in interest as the Association had made a complete 
assignment to him. If he had to present his claim against the fund in court, 
he would have no remedy, as the exclusive remedy provided by the statute was 
against the District, and Chambers could not have enforced judgment while 
the equity proceeding was pending. On the appeal by the District from denial 
of its petition to interplead, the court held that interpleader must be by a 
defendant and a result of a demand by which the defendant was exposed to 
multiple liability. While the District was a defendant in the equity suit, 
there was no danger of multiple liability as the claim was against the fund 
when paid, and the claim of Chambers against the District was not adverse to 
that of the Association. 
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Three owners of property adjoining that sought by the Board in Herren 
v. Board of Education of City of Marietta26 intervened seeking an injunction 
to prevent the condemnation. They alleged that trreparable harm to their 
property would be caused by construction of a football field or s~adium. The 
court found that there were no grounds for relief as none of the property of 
the intervenors was taken and the nuisance of which they complained was mere 
speculation. The court made it clear that it was not deciding if the adjoining 
owners could properly intervene. 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS 
In the adversary system of jurisprudence, issues are raised by the plead-
ings of the parties. Because an eminent domain action is recognized as a 
special proceeding, some consideration of the propriety of the pleadings of 
both condemnor and condemnee is in order. 
Essential Allegation~. 
The sufficiency of the petition of the condemnor has been challenged 
for several reasons. In some states, the statute specifies in detail what the 
condemnor must allege. 
The Purpose For the Taking. One of the grounds of the appeal from a 
judgment of condemnation in Willan v. Hensley School Township27 was that the 
petition did not allege thatthe Township intended in good faith to construct 
a schoolhouse on the land or that it had taken steps to buitd a schoolhouse 
26 219 Ga. 431, 134 s.E. 2d 6 (1963). 
27 175 Ind. 486, 93 N.E. 657 (1911). 
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or that it had authority to incur the indebtedness required. The court held, 
with very little comment, that it was not necessary for the Township tbiaJlege 
these facts in its petition. 
The Board in School Board of City of Harrisonburg v. Alexander28 
applied to the court for condemnation 11 for its purposes" of a lot containing 
lo 74 acres. The owner I s demurrer to the petition was sustained and on appeal 
the action of the trial court was affirmed. The court on appeal did hold, 
however, that the petition was not required to be more specific regarding the 
purpose of the condemnation than it had been in this case. 
The order of taking passed by the Board of Aldermen and upheld in 
Byfield v. City of Bewton29 stated that the property was needed 11 for munici-
pal purposes." The court held that the order, although not meeting the 
precise requirement of the statute30 that the purpose for which the property 
was to be taken must be stated,was not a nullity as it was lacking only in 
specification of the particular municipal usecG The necessity for strict 
compliance with eminent domain statutes was mentioned, and authority cited 
that the order must show on its face the specific purpose. The court recog-
nized that the natural meaning of the requirement that the order of taking 
should state the purpose was that some definite use must be declar~d as the 
intent and design of the body exercising the power of eminent domain. A 
general, undefined, or comprehensive statement would not satisfy the terms 
of the statute. The court cited a case in which an order bf·assessment which 
28 126 Va. 407, 101 S.E. 349 (1919). 
29 247 Mass. 46, 141 N.E. 658 (1923). 
30 .. Mass. G.L. Ch. 79, Sec. 1. 
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was defective for not showing the amount to be expended for a public improve-
ment was held not void, but amendable. The right to amend was not even 
suggested in the Byfield case, and in spite of the dicta mentioned above, the 
order was held valid. The court explained that the petitioner knew all the 
facts and that it was clear the property was to be used for school purposes. 
Since certiorari was addressed to the discretion of the court, it must appear 
that manifest injustice had been done and that there was no delay in bringing 
the action. The opinion explained that a party could not, having,knowl!,!dge:' of 
salient .:.facts, see great expenditures made and then attempt to quash proceedings 
as lacking in legal formality. According to the facts stated in the case, the 
order for taking was passed by the Aldermen on November 6, 1922, and recorded 
on November 16. On November 24, the petitioner received notice of the 
proceedings, and on March 1, 1923, construction began. The writ of certiorari 
was sought on April 24, 1923. 
The defendant did not contest the issue of the sufficiency of the petition 
in Board of Education of Kanawha County v. Campbell's Creek gy. Co.,31 but the 
court discussed the question nevertheless. There seemed to be some confusion 
about whether a petition to condemn must describe the amount of funds to be 
used and show steps taken to issue revenue bonds as provided by statute. The 
court held that authority was conferred on the Board to condemn property for 
playgrounds and athletfc fields in statutes other than by those setting up a 
system of financing athletic facilities through self-liquidating revenue bonds. 
On the question of whether the Board must allege a public use superior to that 
of the railroad, the court found that the Board had closely followed the statute. 
31138 W. Va. 473, 76 W.E. 2d 271 (1953). 
The allegations were sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and the 
defendant must show facts relied on to defeat the proceeding. 
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An Allegat~on That The Property Is Necessary. In Territory of New 
Mexico v. Crary32 the court called attention to the fact that the petition 
would be subject to demurrer for failing to allege that the acquisition of 
the land was de:emed necessary by the Board of Regents. Apparently, sufficiency 
of the petition had not been challenged by the owner. The judgment dismissing 
the proceedings was reversed by the appeal. 
The owner based his appeal partly on the contention that the trial court 
had erred in denial of his motion to dismiss the proceedings because the 
petition was insufficient in lacking the jurisdictional allegation regarding 
the necessity for taking the property in Waukegan v. Stanczak. 33 The court 
recognized that the power to take private property was limited to cases of 
necessity and that the petition must contain allegation to that effect. When 
allegations were denied, it was the petitioner's burden to establish the facto 
In this case, the word "necessity" was not used, but the petition did contain 
an allegation that the School District "requires" the property and the court 
regarded this as synonymous with "necessity.," The court added that the 
petitioner did not need to allege facts showing the need for the propertyo 
A demurrer to the petition in Sheppard v. DeKalb County Board of 
Education34 was made on the basis that the Board had not alleged its determi-
nation of necessity to condemn the property for a specific use. From the 
32 15 N.M. 213, 103 Pac. 986 (1909). 
336 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E. 2d 751 (1955). 
34220 Ga. 219, 138 s.E. 2d 271 (1964). 
241 
opinion of the court, it is not clear if the Board was required to raise the 
issue of necessity by pleading, but the court held that the Board's resolution 
was not so vague as to provide insufficient notice to the awner. The resolu-
tion said that the Board must secure the property for the purpose of constructing 
school buildings and providing necessary educational facilities, and that the 
Board had determined that a necessity existed for acquisition pf the property 
for educational purposes. 
Amendment of the Pleadings. In McClarren v, Jefferson School Township35 
the court held that it was not error ·to permit amendment of the c:omplaint 
after the report of the appraisers had been made. The purpose of the amend-
ment was only to make the description of the real estate in the petition 
~onform to the description in the appraisal report. 
The question of whether the amendment to the complaint could be amended 
on the day of the trial was raised in Kern County Union High School District 
ld 36 Vo McDona • The amendment was sought by the District because one of the 
defendants had filed a separate answer which asked damages for a remaining 
20 foot strip of the tract. If these damages were awarded, the District 
would be required to pay for 100 feet of frontage and get 80 feet. The 
amendment was to ask for the entire 100 foot frontage of the property, instead 
of the 80 feet originally sought. The defendants argued that this amen;dment 
involved a new cause of action, but the court supported the amendment on the 
basis that there was no surprise or detriment to the owner. 
35169 Ind. 140, 82 N.E. 73 (1907). 
36180 Cal. 7, 179 Pac. 180 (1919). 
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The original application filed in the Probate Court in Lipscomb v. 
Bessemer Boi!rd of Education37 averred that the petitioner had adopted a 
resolution declaring that the acquisition of lots in the City of Bessemer 
was in the public interest and necessary for a public use for the site of a 
new school building or for a schoor playground or other public purpose or a 
public school purpose. A motion by the owner to dismiss the proceeding was 
overruled, but his demurrer to the application was sustained. The Board 
appealed to the Circuit Court where it received a judgment in favor of the 
condemnation. Before the trial in the Circuit Court, the application was 
amended to delete reference to the resolution of the Board and to the "other 
public purpose. 11 On appeal from the judgment, the owner maintained that the 
Board was attempting to condemn his property for public purposes other than 
public school purposes and that if, by amendment,the proceedings were 
changed to condemnation only for scho0l purposes, then a departure had 
occurred. In answer to this contention, the court found that the trial in 
the Circuit Court was de novo (as if it originated there). An application 
for condemnation filed in the Probate Court was subject to proper amendment 
on appeal and would not be a new action so long as it referred to the same 
transaction, property, and parties as the original application. Under a 
liberal system of amendment favored by the court, the only limitations were 
that there could be no change of parties nor any new cause of action. The 
court did not discuss the meaning of 11 cause of action, 11 but it was clear 
that it did not consider the cause of action changed in this case. The 
application, both before and after the amendment, s0ught the property for 
37 258 Ala. 47, 61 So. 2d 112 (1952). 
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a use autharized by the statute, and the amendment anly cured a defect of 
the application to delete the part calling for a use not within the statute. 
Sustaining of a demurrer was reversed in Woodland School District v. 
Woodland Cemetery Association38 because the trial court had abused its· 
discretion in refusing leave to amend. The District had not alleged that a 
school use was more necessary than use af the property as a cemetery. Its 
petition was subject to demurrer, but the court held that the District should 
have been afforded the right to amend its petitian·in order to present the 
issue of which was the more necessary use. 
· Amendment of the original petition was approved by the court in County 
Board of School Trustees of DuPage Caunty v. Boram~9 The petition had failed 
to allege the authority of the Board to take the praperty and the purpose for 
which the property was .ta be taken. The c:ourt pointed out that the statute 
provided for amendments when necessary to a fair trial and final determination 
of questions invalved. 
The Answer to a Petition for Condemnation. 
The owner in Richland School Township v. Overmyer40 filed exceptions to 
the appraiser's repart granting him an.award of $325. The Township demurred 
to the exceptions, but the court held that the allegation by the owner that 
the damages were tao small was sufficient to justify overruling the demurrer. 
38 174 Calo App. 2d 243, 344 P. 2d 326 (1959). 
39 . · ( ) 26 Ill. 2d 167, 186 N.E. 2d 275 1962. 
40 164 Ind. 382, 73 N.E. 811 (1905). 
The proper procedure for the Board of Aldermen in Byfield v. City of 
Newton41 would have been to file a return instead of an answer, according 
to the opinion of the court. The return or formal report, or official 
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statement of the action performed, the court said, should have been signed 
by the Board of Aldermen and not by their attorney. In the answer of the 
Board, the court found information which it called a return and found this 
information conclusive as to all matters of fact, not open to contradiction 
by the owner as the owner had gone to trial on the merits of the case. 
It was held in Houston Independent School District v. Reader42 that 
the owner's prayer for general relief would entitle him to interest, the 
court noting that in condemnation proceedings the defendant was not required 
to file a pleading. 
Dicta in Caruthersville School District v. Latshaw43 stated that 
pleadings were not required by a defendant in condemnation proceedings, 
but were necessary to raise issues other than the question of damages. 
The defendant filed objections to the condemnation proceedings in 
Cemetery Company v. Warren School Township.44 The court found that the 
statute under which the 'Tiownship proceeded was deficient in procedure in 
that it did not provide for filing objections to the proceedings. The 
objections were authorized by the general eminent domain act for the reason 
that the landowner was entitled to contest the proceedings at some stage. 
41247 Mass. 46, 141 N.E. 658 (1923). 
42 · 38 s.w. 2d 610 (Tex. App. 1931). 
43360 Mo. 1211, 233 S.W. 2d 6 (1950). 
44236 Ind. 171, 139 N.E. 2d 538 (1957). 
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The Township argued that the owner should use a suit in equity, but the 
court said the weight of authority was that injunctive. relief was available 
against wrongful exercise of eminent domain only where there were no 
provisions for an answer or objections in the act. 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE RIGHT TO CONDEMN 
Statutes in-most of the states specify that certain conditions must 
exist before the right of eminent domain can be exercised, and some issues 
h~ve been raised as a result of common law procedures. 
Selection of Site. 'f 
Discussion of the cases in which the issue of site selection has been 
raised may be divided into three sections. The adequacy of the notice 
calling the meeting for an election by the residents of the District is 
considered, followed by a section on the requirement of an election. In 
. some States, the board is authorized to select the site, but a number of 
cases have been located in which this authority has been challenged. 
Notice of the Election. Reed v. Acton45 began as a writ of entry, and 
a trial without jury resulted in a judgment for the owner.· -The Town filed 
exceptions which were sustained on appeal. The warrant for the Town me'eting 
held on March .4, 1872, had stated that one of the purposes of the· meeting 
was to see ff the Town would vote to build a schoolhouse and would" instruct 
the selectmen to take or purchase land. At the meeting, the vote was .to 
build the schoolhouse., and a sum was appropriated for the buildings not 
45117 Mass. 384 (1875). 
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including the .cost of the land. The March meeting was adjourned to April, 
and on April 1, 1872, the town meeting voted that the selectmen purchase or 
take the Heywood lot which was part of the plaintiff's property. The owner 
challenged these proceedings on the basis that the selectmen had been 
authorized to .act under the April 1 vote, but that the warrant.ifor that 
meeting did not mention the subject of taking pr:operty for school purposes. 
The court held that because the March meeting was adjourned to April, matters 
begun in March may be acted upon at the later meeting if there were no 
intervening rights of other parties. The court recognized that a condition 
precedent to taking the lot was that the Town vote on the Location and that 
the subject matter for the meeting be stated in the warrant ev·en though it 
must often be in general terms. The court held that the adjournment was not 
to an indefinite meeting as it was the uniform custom to meet on the first 
Monday of the month. 
The notice for the election in Thompson v. Trustees46 proposed two sites 
to be voted upon. At the meeting, no votes were cas.t for the two sites 
proposed, but the site sought by the Board had a majority of the votes. In 
consideration of the appeal by the owner, the court held that the notices were 
not required to specify the site and that this was surplusage in the notice. 
The site sought by the Board was selected at a special meeting called by 
five freeholders in the case of In re Application to Condemn Land in Rock 
Qounty~7 The owner complained that one of the freeholders was not a citizen. 
The evidence, which showed he came to the United States from Norway when 16 
46 ( ) 218 Ill. 540, 75 N.E. 1048 1905 • 
47121 Minn. 376, 141 N.W. 801 (1913). 
years old,he voted since 1896 in the District, and naturalization of his 
father before the freeholder came of age, was considered sufficient to 
justify the.trial court's conclusion that he was a citizen. The court also 
held that the site could be changed at a special meeting as well as at the 
annual meeting of the District. 
A judgment of condemnation was reversed with directions to dismiss in 
Trustees v. Hoy~. 48 The statute49 provided that the Board could not locate 
a school site unless authorized to do so by a majority of votes cast at an 
election called in pursuance of a petition signed by not less than 500 voters 
or one-fifth of the voters of the District. The court thought the record 
should show the filing of this petition as it was a condition precedent to 
the power of the Board to call an election. The evidence presented at trial 
was a petition with less than 500 signatures which recited that the signers 
were legal voters constituting one-fifth of the voters of the District. An 
affidavit regarding the signatures and the minutes of the Board were also 
introduced as evidence. The court held that these items were not valid 
evidence that the signers constituted one-fifth of the legal voters of the 
District. The affidavit was rejected because it did not state that the 
affiant had any knowledge on the subject. The court was unwilling to assume 
or infer that the affidavit was correct. The minutes of the Board were 
rejected because there was no statement that the Board had found the fact 
that one-fifth of the legal voters had signed the petition to call the 
meeting. The court called the recital of due notice in the resolution a 
48311 Ill. 532, 143 N.E. 59 (1923). 
49 1919 Laws, p. 926, School Law, Sec. 127. 
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mere conclusion of the law and held that facts must be stated from which the 
court was able to say the conclusion was true. 
An· order dismissing. a petition to condemn property was affirmed in 
Bierba~ Vo Smith50 because the records of the Board did not show that 
notices of the special election called on May 18, 1923, had been postedo No 
site received a majority of the votes at the meeting, so the Board selected 
the site in question. The secretary of the Board filed a certificate of 
posting notices on May '10, 1923, which stated that on May 3 .at least ten 
notices had been posted, and a copy of the notices was attached. The co1;1rt 
stated that giving notice was a jurisdictional requirement. Without giving 
notice the Board had no power to act, whatever the result of the electiono 
The acts of a board must be manifested by its record, and unless the record 
showed that notice had been given as required by the statute, the election 
was void.· A valid election to select the site was considered a condition 
precedent to the maintenance of condemnation proceedings,to secure such siteo 
Selection of the Site~ th! Electorate. Harris v. Marblehead51 began 
as a writ of entry by an owner who had received the property through· deviseo 
The case was,:.:re;served for fhe '. decision :of the :i fuih·courti and resulted in a 
judgment .for the owner, partly because of a failure by the condemnor to show 
any vote by the Town designating the site condemned. The court held that 
designation of the site could not be delegated to officers of the Town. 
At a meeting of voters ·to decide on the site, a majo:dty of votes were 
cast 11 for locating a new schoolhouse on the hill at the south end of Sixth 
50 . ( · ) 317 Illo 147, 147 N.E. 796 192.5 
51 10 Gray 40 (Mass. Sup. Ct.· 1857). 
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Street in Peterson's field. 11 The owner in Petersburg School District v. 
Peterson52 challenged the condemnation of his property on the basis that 
this designation by the voters was too indefinite. The statute53 provided 
that the Board should call a meeting of voters to decide on selection, 
purchase, exchange or sale of school sites. Shou.ld an owner refuse to sell 
his property, the site could be obtained by eminent domain, and, if at the 
meeting of the voters no site were selected, the Board may act on its own. 
According to this statute, the court held that a general designation of 
the site by the voters was sufficient. The owner argued that as the statute 
pertained to eminent domain, it should be construed strictly. The court was 
of the opinion that when the question was whether the statute conferred 
power to condemn, then it should be strictly construed, but that a strict 
construction could not be invoked in carrying out the provision of the statute 
where the power was plainly conferred. 
The Board was prevented from condemning property in Board of Education 
_of City of Detroit v. Moross54 because the court found it had been the policy 
of the State since 1846 to require voters to designate school sites. The 
Board maintained that the wording of the statute that "whenever a site for a 
schoolhouse shall be designated, determined, established or enlarged, in any 
manner provided by law1155indicated legislative recognition that meetings were 
not required in all Districts. The general eminent domain act, under which 
52 ( . ) 14 N.D. 344, 103 N.W. 756 1905 •. 
53 1899 Rev. Codes, Secs. 701-703. 
54151 Mich. 625, 114 N.W. 75 (1907). 
55comp. Laws 4728, Sec. 2. 
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the Board brought the action, stated that its provisions were to be in force 
in every school district, township, city, and village in the State except 
as inconsistent with direct provisions of special acts. The court found 
that the school statute requiring qualified voters to designate a .•ite 
applied in this case. 
On a motion to·require the District to make its petition more certain, 
judgment for the owner was affirmed in School District No. l v. Oellien. 56 
The petition had averred that a "majority of qualified voters and taxpayers 
of said school district, at said annual meeting, voting by ballot, voted in 
favor of said proposition." The motion was designed to determine ff the 
District was averring that a majority at the meeting or a majority all 
qualified voters had ·favored the proposition. The statute provided that 
"whenever a majority of the qualified voters and taxpayers of any School 
District, at any annual or special meeting, called for that purpose, 11 57 
determined it was necessary to have additional grounds, the Board could 
take property by condemnation. The court interpreted this statute to mean 
that a m~jority of all qualified voters in the District must favor the 
proposition, and unless a majority of those present at the meeting was 
also a majority of the voters in the District, the vote would be insufficient. 
The rationale for this interpretation was legislative intent to require the 
assent of voters and taxpayers before the District was subjected to the 
expense and damages resulting from condemnation proceedings. The court 
thought the District had practically conceded the correctness of the trial 
56209 Mo. 464, 108 S.W. 529 (1908). 
57 1899 R.S. Sec 9772, 1906 Ann. Stat. 4483. 
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court action ey its erief which presented the case for a majerity of those 
present at the meeting being sufficient. The petition was found to be 
indefinite and uncertain enough that the owner did not know what. to plead. 
While the court emphasized the commas setting off the phrase, 11 at any annual 
or special. meeting," in the statute, it did not put the same construction on 
the petition of the District, where the ph~:-'ase was also set off by c·ommas. 
The court specu.lated that if the District meant that a majority of those 
in attendance had favored the proposition, the owner could have success-
fully interposed a demurrer. If the District were alleging that a majority 
of all qualified voters had supported the plan, the owner would be forced to 
answer, and he was entitled to know what to plead. 
In re Hemenway58 reversed a judgment for the Trustee on the basis that 
the conditions prescribed to authorize condemnation had not eeen met •. Accord-
ing to the statute59 a new site must be chosen at a special meeting called 
for such purpose and by written resolution in which the site was described. 
The notice of the meeting contained a description of three sites to be 
considered but no written resolution for adoption. The minutes of the meeting, 
however, did show evidence that a resolution had.been adopted. Probably the 
major greurid for reversal of the judgment for the Trustee was that the statu-
tory requirement that the School Commissioner give consent in writing to a 
new site was not met. There was evidence of letters showing the opinion of 
the School Commissioner that a change was desirable. The school authorities 
suggested that because this was a new District, the consent of the School 
58134 Appo Div. 86, 118 N.Y.S. 931 (1909). 
59 1894 Laws, Ch. 556, p. 1214. 
Commissioner was not required. The court observed that the District was 
altered nine years earlier, that two School Commisi;ioners had held office 
since then, and that this case did not involve .a site for a new district. 
The objection by the landowner was considered appropriate. 
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The answer of the defendant in Willan v.· Hensley School Township60 
challenged the signatures of the petition to change the site, but the trial 
court action of denying the answer was upheld on the basis that this answer 
was i:rrelevant and impertinent. !twas not considered a cause of defense· to 
an action in eminent domain. The court observed that the answer of the 
defendant was possibly appropriate to secure a review of the proceedings 
before the County Superintendent. 
At the special meeting called to vote on addition of 2·.27 acres to the 
existing site in the town of Cashmere, a standing vote was t.aken instead of 
by ballot as directed in the law. The court in State ex rel. School District 
No. 56 of Chela~ County v. Superior Court61 held that the statute62 was 
directory instead of mandatory.· There was no requirement in the statute that 
polls be opened, that judges be appointed, or that the ballot be in secret 
and none of the requirements of a formal election were made essentia.l. The 
court found no direct provisions that would make the election void nor any 
provisions from which it could be implied that the election was void. Unless 
it appeared that the election did not fairly represent the will of the voters, 
the court was willing to let the election stand and held that it was valid. 
60175 Ind. 486, 93 N.E. 657 (1911). 
6169 Wash. 189, 124 Pac. 484 (1912). 
62 1909 Laws, p. 349. 
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The question of whether the vote of the people was required for acquisi-
tion of property to add to an already existing site was raised in Trustees 
Vo McMahon.63 The court held that the Board was not required to submit the 
question of how much ground would be necessary for the school site. The 
Thompson case64 was cited as authority that the only limitation on the power 
of the Board to purchase or condemn a site was that the location must be 
submitted to the voters. Where the location was already determined, no 
election was required. 
The statute construed in Trustees v. Berryman65 provided that a petition 
signed by at least 300 voters or one-fifth of the voters of the District must 
call for an election to authorize the Board of Education to acquire a site, 
and that no site should be on the ballot unless petitioned for by ten voters 
and the location, size and price to be paid for the site be stated on the 
balloto 66 If the property was to be condemned, the ballot was to state a 
maximum estimated price and in no case could the Board of Education purchase 
property for a greater sum. The petition presented to the Board by the ten 
voters asking that the property in question be selected fixed the maximum 
estimated cost at $600 •. At the jury trial on the condemnation proceedings, 
. the testimony as to the value of the property sought by the Board ranged from 
$1,000 to $2,000. The jury verdict awarded the owner $500 for his land and 
$400 damages. A motion in arrest of the judgment on the basis that the award 
63 265 IlL 83, 106 N.E. 486 (1914). 
64218 Ill. 540, 75 N.E. 1048 (1905) 0 
65325 Ill. 72, 155 N.E.· 850 ( 1927) 0 
661925 R.S. Cho 122, seco· 136, P• 2325. 
was greater than had been authorized was overruled, but on appeal the 
decision of the trial court was reversed. The Trustees argued that the 
price authorized by the ten petitioners did not include damages,or that 
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the provision in the statute did not apply in case of condemnation but only 
in case of purchase. The court, pointing out that language used in the 
statute was to, be given 11 its ordinary meaning, 11 said that purchase covered 
both voluntary and involuntary purchase and that the purpose of the election 
was to get the view of the people on the amount of expenditure. The maximum 
estimated price referred to in.the statute included damages, in the opinion 
of the court. A point was raised by the Trustees that an owner might be 
able to prevent condemnation of his property by petitioning with the help 
of nine friends to have his land considered at a price less than what a jury 
would award. The court said this argument should be addressed to the legis-
lature as the intent of the legislature that the people say what the cost of 
the site should be seemed clear, and it was the duty of the court to administer 
the law as it was found. A dissenting opinion recognized that the Board was 
limited to payment of $600 by the statute and the election held in pursuance 
of the statute, and that the Board may not be able to make payment of a jury 
award which was a condition precedent to taking possession. In the opinion 
of the dissenter, the Board had a right to judgment that the property could 
be taken upon paying the compensation as there was no prohibition on accept-
ance of contributions or donations and .no statute or public policy would 
prevent donations. The dissent pointed out that it was no defense to condem-
nation proceedings that the condemner had no funds with which to pay for the 
land or authority to incur indebtedness. Neither the owner nor the court had 
authority to inquire into the ability of the owner to pay, according to '' 
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the dissenter. In his opinion, the trial court had propei"'~Y overruled the 
owner's objections regarding the right to condemn and this right must be 
presented to the court before the jury had been empaneled. Eminent domain 
was a special statutory summary proceeding in which the sole object;was to 
ascertain the amount to be paid, according to the dissenter. 
Golowich v. Union Free School District67 involved two cases tried together. 
--- ---
The District, claiming that Second Street was a public way, wanted to use it 
as a means of ingress and egress to the school property. If not a public way, 
the District maintained, it was entitled to cord emn the property. Owners of 
the residential lots on either side of the street held title to the fee to 
the center of the street, subject to the rights of other lot owners to use 
the street also. The first case was an injunction by these owners to enjoin 
the District from using the private street, and the injunction was granted. 
The second case was an action by the District to condemn the street, which 
was dismissed. These moves by the trial court were affirmed on appeal. The 
injunction was granted because there had been no complete dedication of the 
street as a public way without acceptance by the municipality, and the court 
found no reason to imply that the municipality had accepted,Second Street as 
a public way. The action to condemn was dismissed because the District had 
not taken the preliminary steps outlined by the statute68 for voting on an 
addition to a school site. The District conceded it had not proceeded in 
accordance with the statute. Its contention that under another provision it 
had power to designate the site without submitting the question to the 
6725 Misc. 2d 867, 206 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1960). 
68Ed. Law Sec. 416, subd. 3, Sec. 1709, Sub do 6. 
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electorate was rejected by the court. The fact that the street had appeared 
on plans approved by the electorate at the time the school site was established 
did not give the District the authority to· ;purc'base or condemn the street. At 
the time the District acquired the site as a gift, the impression was that the 
street was a public way. 
Selection .:4. the Site h the School Authorities. lbtceptions of the owner 
in Jordan v. School District No. s69 were based on evidence that the location 
of the lot should be changed by the jury to land owned bY. another. The District 
contended that the jury had no power to change the location of the lot and that 
this evidence should be excluded. The court held that, according to the 
statute,70 municipal officers were to decide where on the lot the schoolhouse 
should be placed, but not the boundaries of the lot. Conditions precedent to 
laying out a lot and appraising damages were that the location be legally 
designated and the owner refuse to sell. In this case, the designation having 
been legally made by the District, the jury could not change it. The statute 
also provided that if the owner should be aggrieved at the location of the lot 
or the damages awarded, he may apply to the County Commissioners and have the 
matter tried by a jury. The court said 11 location 11 here referred only to 
adjusting the boundaries to render them less inconvenient to the owner, but 
not to authority to place the lot anywhere in the District as that would 
settle the rights of a third party without notice. 
69 60 Me. 540 (1872). 
70R.s. ch~ 11, Sec. 32, 33, 34. 
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The owner's actien of trespass and ejectment was successful in Howland 
v. School District ;No. 171 because the record showed no vote of the District 
to erect a schoolhouse. On April 14, 1875, a meeting of the District was 
held to consider repair of the schoolhouseo On May 22, 1875, at a special 
meeting, the District voted to locate the schoolhouse on the grounds of the 
old building, and the Trustee was empowered to petition the School Committee 
to lay out a lot of land of a suitable size. The court held that a vote to 
locate a site was not a vote to erect a building. The vote by the District 
to locate the site was a nullity because the power was in the School Committee. 
The court thought that it was clear the School Committee did not have authority 
to appoint appraisers untii after the District had voted to erect a schoolhouse. 
· The case was before the court at a later date72 and this time, .the proceedings 
were quashed at the trial court level because the vote to build the school-
house preceded the selection of the site by the School Committee. On appeal, 
the court held that the statute did not expressly provide that the vote to 
construct a building should precede selection of the site, but only that both 
measures should precede next steps. The statement in the preceding case that 
11 the statute contemplates that the selection of the site shall precede the 
vote to build" was regarded as only an inference from the order which was 
mentioned in the statute, and the Board was not commanded to fo.llow that order. 
The court was of the opinion that if the legislature had intended to presc.tibe 
the order, it could have done so. There was nothing to warrant adding the 
requirement that the steps proceed in .a certain order by judicial construction. 
7115 R. I. 184, 2 At lo 549 (1885) o 
7215 R.I. 184, 8 Atlo 337 (1887). 
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Connnenting on notice of the meeting of the District, the court added that 
while the notice may not have been sufficient at connnon law, it was satis-
factory under the statute, and the record of the District Clerk that the 
meeting was duly and legally notified was prima facie evidence of :the validity 
of the notice. 
The question of which of the school statutes,if any, authorized the 
District to condemn property was raised in School District of Columbia v. 
Jones. 73 In the statute relating to country ~chool districts which elected 
three directors, express authority to condemn after selection of the site 
by a majority of the qualified voters of the district was granted. The statute 
for city districts provided that they should enjoy the same corporate powers 
as other districts, except as provided. It appeared that the District had 
been operating as a city district since 1872, electing. six directors. There 
may have been some doubt about formal incorporation as a city district, but 
the defendant w:as prevented from attacking the corporate capacity of the Dis,-
trict. The court held that the phrase in the statute "except as herein 
provided" was authority for the board of a city district to select the siteo 
Munn v. Independent School District of Jefferson74 was an action brought 
to enjoin the District from condemning the property, The opinion related that 
the statement of facts had required 366 paragraphs, that there were·27 assign-
ments of error, a 28 page motion to dismiss the appeal, and a 450 page abstract. 
The result of the case, however, turned on the validity of the act of the 
Board of Directors in locating a new schoolhouse. The court did not consider 
73229 Mo. 510, 129 S.W. 705 (1910). 
74188 Iowa 757, 176 N.W. 811 (1920). 
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it appropriate to inquire into the wisdom of the Board's choice, but only 
into the power and authority of the Board to take the property which was 
found in express terms of the statute. At the time bonds were voted for the 
new schoolhouse, the Board contemplated construction of the building on an 
old site. An increase in the amount of bonds that could be issued was 
authorized by a majority of the voters after a new site was selected. The 
court held that there was no implied promise of the Board to use the old 
site and commented that the Board had made an effort to carry out its pledgeo 
The dismissal of the petition for injunction was affirmed, and the court 
added that since the building was actually constructed, the injunction would 
have been an idle ceremony. 
The owner in Cunningham v. Shelby Coun1=_y Board of Education75 raised 
the issue that there had been proof at the trial that the site was not 
conveniently located. The court cited authority that it was not its duty 
to select the site, and concluded that while the proof showed the site was 
not in the exact center of the District, it failed to prove an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the Board. 
The trial court was held to have exceeded its authority and usurped 
the function of the School Board by taking judicial notice of the danger of 
a gas line on the property sought by the Board in Pike County Board of 
Education v. Ford.76 The appellate court found no evidence of fraud, collu-
sion or abuse of authority in the action of the Board in selecting the site. 
75202 Ky. 763, 261 S.W. 266 (1924). 
76279 S.W. 2d 245 (Ky. App. 1955). 
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The controversy over the site in Hyde County Board of Education v. 
Mann77 resulted from a consent judgment in an earlier case which incorporated 
a resolution of the Board that the site be within a half mile of a certain 
junction. The State Board of Education allocated $164,484 for a new consoli-
dated school and approved a 15.32 acre site selected by the County Board on 
recommendation of the State Board. The Board purchased 3.©4 acres and adver-
tised for bids for a building on this tract. The rest of the property was 
sought in condemnation proceedings, but one of the owners resisted the taking 
because he claimed his property was not all within the half mile radius 
specified in the consent judgment. The uncertainty developed because the 
highway junction was formed by a 11Y11 type intersection. The trial court's 
conclusion that either junction could serve as the point from which the half 
mile radius could be measured was approved.· Considering the objective to 
be accomplished, the court found no purpose to be served in specifying one 
site over another within 1,000 feet, as most of the students would ride on 
the bus to school • 
. A brief cemment of the court in County Board of School Trustees of 
DuPage County v. Boram78 was that the Board may select and purchase sites 
without referendum according to the 1959 Code. 
77250 N.C. 493, 1Q9 S.E. 2d 175 ( 1959). Other issues involving the same 
factual situation were litigated in Topping v. North Carolina State Board of 
Education, 249 N.C. 291, 106 S.E. 2d 502 (1959), discussed in Chapter VI.o 
78 26 Ill. 2d 167, 186 N.E. 2d 275 (1962). 
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The Resolution of the Board. 
Nelson v. Ottawa County School District No. l79 held that the statute 
did not require the School Board to make a record stating that the Board 
deemed it necessary to appropriate land. The oourt affirmed a judgment for 
the District denying an injunction to prevent the condemnation. 
A resolution of the Board to condemn property for construction of a 
gymnasium, passed two days before the act requiring the high school to offer 
two hours of physical training per week, was consider~d in Kern County Union 
High School District v. McDonald.BO In support of the action of the District, 
the court held that it was not necessary to allege that a resolution had been 
adopted. The requirement of the statute that the complaint contain a statement 
of the right of the District to take the property had reference only to the 
legal right atid authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. This power 
was not restricted by the verbiage of the resolution. 
The owner in Board .2,_f Regents v. Palmer81 challenged the timing of ~he 
resolution of the Regents, but the court held that having joined issue on 
the merits, he could not object·to proceedings which were not required by 
the statute. The court held that it was not necessary that the Board pass a 
resolution to condemn the property as a condition precedent to institution 
of the suit. 
79100 Kan. 612, 164 Pac. 1075 (1917). 
80180 Cal. 7, 179 Pac. 180 (1919). 
81356 Mo~ 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
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The steps outlined by the court for condemnation in Spanntv. Joint 
Boards of School Director~82 were (1) selection, (2) disagreement on price, 
(3) decision on amount and location, (4) entry, possession and occupancy by 
going upon the land, and (5) designation and marking of boundary lines. On 
March 31, 1952, the Joint Board informed the owner that they desired20 acres 
of: his 118 acre:~farm for a site for a joint secondary school. After negotia-
' ' 
tions for the site failed, the attorney met with the Board to outline the 
steps that needed to be taken to exercise the right of eminent dem~in. The 
minutes of the meeting. showed that a .motion and appointment of a committee 
to take possession of the property were unanimously approved. A carbon copy 
of what was captioned "Resolution Appropriating Certain Lands Adjoining the 
Darlington Township-Darlington Borough Joint Consolidated Elementary School" 
was appended to the minutes but was unsigned. The owner on appeal insisted 
that no resolution of condemnation had been adopted by the Joint Boards. 
The trial cou~t had found as a fact that the resolution condemning the property 
had been unanimously adopted and concluded that the Board's action complied 
with requirements of the statute .. The evidence that the resolution had been 
adopted was reviewed by the appellate court, and the dismissal of the bill 
in equity to restrain the condemnation was affirmed. ·The owner also .argued 
that the act of the .joint board was void as it was not indicated in the record 
how each member had voted, but in answer to this argument, the court said it 
was not necessary to record each member's vote when the decision was unanimous. 
The suf,ficiency of a resolution. adopted by the Board in Pike County .Board 
of Education v. ,Ford83 was ch~llenged by the owner. The Board resolved to 
~ 
82 381 Pa.· 338, 113 A.· 2d 281 (1955). 
83219 s.w~ 2~245 (1955). 
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emptoy attorneys to prosecute the action for condemnation of approximately 
11 acres of land on John's Creek. ~ile the resolution did not specifically 
direct condemnation, the c.ourt held that it had the necessary effect and 
stated that in dealing ~ith proceedings of governing bodies on such questions, 
technical strictness was not required. 
The Sufficiency of Notice to th~ Owner. 
The sufficiency of the notice given by the Town to the Trustees was at 
issue in Trustees of Belfast Academy 'v. Salmond.84 It was thought that the 
reasonableness of the notice depended upon the circumstances of the case, and 
here, where a majority of the Trustees were in residence, seven days was 
adequate notice of the intention of the Town to lay out a way diagonally across 
the Academy lot. 
The District's action of tort against the owner was unsuccessful in 
Norton Eighth School Distric1=_ v. Copeland85 because the court held the District 
had not acquired sufficient title to maintain the action •. According to the 
facts stated, Copeland had no notice of the selection of his lot, its appraisal, 
or approval of the selection by a town meeting. It was held that the owner 
should have had the opportunity to appear before the selectmen to offer evi-
dence especially on the question of compensation. 
The facts in _Q.qchran v. _Independent School District of Counci 1 Bluffs86 
led to a holding that adequate notice had not been given to the owner. On 
8411 Me. 109 (1833). 
852 Gray 414 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1854). 
8650 Iowa 663 (1879). 
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November 7, 1871, the plaintiff, who brought an action to quiet title, pur-
chased the property in.question at a tax sale and held only a certificate 
of tax purchase. Proper entry of the tax sale had been made. On January 18, 
1872, the property was condemned by the District with notice to specific 
parties but not to the plaintiffo Compensation of $316066 was paid to one 
named Graham. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that he had no personal 
or actual service, no notice of the condemnation or evidence of possession 
by another party, nor had he received any portion of the condemnation moneyo 
The District alleged that it had no knowledge of the plaintiff's claimo 
The District said the code provided for notice only to the owner and that 
the plaintiff was not the owner when the condemnation proceedings were beguno 
The court found that the plaintiff had made a valid purchase and could not 
constitutionally be deprived of his property without compensation or noticeo 
He could not get notice by publication because he was a resident of another 
county. 
A Pyrrhic victory was won by the .mortgagee in Leavitt Vo Eastman', 87 a case 
which was heard on report from the Superior Court and resulted in a judgment 
for the mortgagee and an award of one dollar in damages. The District had 
voted to locate a schoolhouse on the property by a two-thirds majority. 
Municipal officers staked out the lot and appraised damages. The school 
authorities entered the premises, removed a fence, and built the schoolhouseo 
The court explained that the statute should be fully and strictly construed 
and that notice of the proceedings was of chief importance. The landowner 
may have felt no interest in the hearing on the location, for which he 
8777 Me. 117 (1885). 
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received notice, as he may have been willing for the school to be on his 
land, but he may have wished to be heard on the extent of the property taken 
or the amount of damages. The court thought he should be allowed to assume 
that a new hearing would be held for these purposes. It was suggested that 
the plaintiff had actual notice, but the court said that since legal transfer 
of land was involved, all of the formalities of the statute should be fully 
observed. 
The District appealed from a decision increasing the damages in Haggard 
Vo Independent School District of Algona. 88 Its appeal was based partly on 
the contention that the District had not received sufficient notice that the 
owner was taking the case to the District Court. The court held that the 
notice which had been directed to the District and served upon the President 
of the District was sufficient. Recital of the .name of the President of t;he 
Board in the notice was surplusage, and the court pointed out that it was 
not a personal summons. 
The testimony that the owner had no notice was uncontradicted in Aldredge 
v. ~chool District No. 16.89 Aldredge brought the action to recover use and 
possession of his property, and the trial court entered judgment for the 
District. The judgment was reversed on appeal, the court being of the opinion 
that if the statute were construed to deny the owner notice th~t proceedings 
were pending, it would be unconstitutional as a denial of due process of lawo 
If the statute were interpreted to imply the requirement of notice, the 
requirement had not been met in this case. Due proce'ss, explained the court, 
88113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
8910 Okl. 694, 65 Pac. 96 (1901). 
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meant in due course of legal proceedings according to rules and forms estab-
lished for the protection of private rights. The court observed that any 
proceeding under the common Jaw or statutory law for the appropriation of 
private property required notice to the owner. Within the next two years, 
Stillwater became a City of the First Class and the Board of Education again 
attempted to condemn the property in question90 and gave notice to the owners 
by publication for four weeks and by registered mail. The Sheriff proceeded 
to oust the Bqard on the basis of the former case, and an action was begun 
by the Board to enjoin the Sheriff from executing the writ of ouster. The 
owner demurred to the complaint, and judgment was entered for him. The 
judgment was affirmed because the court found that the statute did not 
provide for notice and that language in the former opinion was not interided 
to decide the question of whether there might be an implied duty to give 
notice. Three classes of cases were suggested by the court. First, those 
in which no notice was necessary, citing the Buchwalter91 case; second, 
those in which it was presumed that notice was intended and any reasonable 
notice had been held sufficient; and third, those in which a statute without 
provision for notice had been declared void as a violation of due process of 
law. The condemnation proceedings were held void because the statute failed 
to provide notice and it could not be inferred. In a subsequent action, the 
Board was successful in condemning the property in question. 92 
90Bqafd~'G>f:;'.Elducaeicm of .. City'.ofCSe,illwater v. Aldredge, 13 Okl. 205, 
73 Pac. 1104 (1903). 
91Buchwalter v. School District No.:~' 65 Kan. 603, 70 Pac. 605 (1902). 
92Aldridge v. Board of Education of City of Stillwater, 15 Oklo 354:1 82 
Pac. 827 ( 1905). 
The Buchwalter case referred to i.n the preceding paragraph was an 
ejectment action to recover possession of one acre on which a schoolhouse 
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had been erected. A judgment for the District was affirmed, the court 
holding that it was not necessary that the owner receive notice. The land 
was taken by emi:lnent domain and for a public purpose, and the only limitation 
on the District was that it pay full compensation. Neither the statute nor 
the constitution was found to require notice, and notice was of no concern 
to the citizen as the right to take the property existed independent of notice. 
According to the court in Byfield v. City of Newton93 the statute provided 
that failure to give notice would not affect the validity of proceedings, and, 
therefore, a mistake in the date of recording of the order of. taking was of 
slight consequence to the owner. A defective notice would have no different 
effect from no notice at all. 
The adequacy of service of process by publication was considered in Brown 
v. Doby.94 The Board sought to condemn a site in Stanly County and the land-
owners were resident in Davidson County. Notice was first served on October 1, 
1954, by the Sheriff of Davidson County. The owners brought an.action in the 
Superior Court of Stanly County for a temporary injunction, which was later 
dismissed. The Board petitioned for the appointment of appraisers, and then 
the Sheriffs were unable to find the owners to serve summons, so the Board 
filed for service by publication, allowing until January 25, 1955. On January 
22, the owners made a special appearance through counsel and moved to dismiss 
the proceedings for want of jurisdiction over the persons by service of process. 
93 247 Mass. 46, 141 N.E. 658 (1923). 
94 242 N~C. 462, 87 S.E. 2d 921 (1955). 
268 
The motion was overruled by the Clerk and an'appeal taken to the Judge, 
who affirmed the Clerk's decision and decreed that the owner had been suitably 
served. On the appeal, the owner insisted that the statutory provision for 
service of process on non-resident owners implied that residents were amenable 
only to personal service, but this argument was rejected by the courto The 
owners also challenged the Clerk's finding that the owners could not be found 
in the state. The court referred to a four page narrative of unavailing 
efforts by the Board and the officers of Davidson County to locate the owners. 
To decide the matter, the court stated that the statutory requirement as to 
proof of diligence was simply a pleading or affidavit which would state that 
after due diligence, personal service could not be had within the state. This 
case also had a sequel which was decided in favor of the Board. 95 
In another North Carolina case, Burlington City BQard of Education v. 
Allen,96 the court, in discussing the issue of its jurisdiction over the 
person of the owner, explained that an eminent domain action was a political 
and administrative measure of which the owner was not entitied to notice. 
Notice was sent by certified mail to the parties in the case of In re 
Armagh Township School Distt:i:ct,97 but the appeal of the owners.from a dis-
missal of their exceptions to the appraiser's report was based on the fact 
that they had not received a copy of the report or notice of the time and 
place the report had been filed. The court held that the statute providing 
that parties interested have at. least five days notice of the filing of the 
95Bro'wn v. Doby, 244 N.C. 746, 94 S.E. 2d 895 (1956). 
9
~243 N.C. 520, 91 S.E. 2d 180 (1956). 
97411 Pa. 395, 192 A. 2d 338 (1963). 
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report did not require that they receive a copy of the report or that the 
place of its filing be·specified~ There was no evidence that the owners had 
made any effort to examine the report •. After the report was filed, the 
owners had 30 days to file except ions, and the court was of the opinion that 
the legislature could also have imposed the requirement the owners sought 
if it had intended to do soo 
An Effort to Purchase the Propertyo 
Where the statutes or precedents require the agency seeking private 
property for public use to make an effort to pu1rchase it before condemnation, 
questi1ms of what facts show that the condemnor and the owner have been unable 
to agree on a pri:ce for the property are raised. 
Evidence of an Attempt to Purchase. The opinion in Tr±nity College:,.·vo 
Hartford98 referred to the fact that the President and the Treasurer of the 
College had refused to take any action on the proposal that had been made to 
open a street through College property. The court found that the highway 
committee had made an attempt to agree on a price and dismissed the petition 
of the College for an injunction. 
The petition for condemnation alleged, and the court found, that the 
District had made a bona fide effort to negotiate for purchase of the property 
in School District of Clayton v. Kelsey.99 The owner complained that the 
finding of the court was not based on substantial evidence. At a meeting of 
.the Board on.April 19, 1944, the Superintendent was authorized to offer the 
9832 Conn. 452,(1865). 
99 . 355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W. 2d 860 (1946). 
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owner $15,000 for the property. This offer was made by letter, and the owner 
-~ 
replied by letter, declining the offer. Other parties had appeared before the 
Board, and the owner who complained here w_as advised that she could also appear. 
Testimony was noted that the owner had said she would turn down three times the 
amount offered. Minutes of the Board stated that an attempt to agree on a 
price wi~h this owner had not been successful. The judgment on the verdict for 
the District was affirmed. 
The fact that the President of the Board called on the owner, was unable 
to negotiate for purchase of the property, and informed the owner that the 
Board would institute proceedings to take the property by eminent domain was 
considered sufficient in Payne v. Deercreek Board of EducationlOO to meet the 
requirement: of the statute that the Board make an effort to purchase the 
property before condemning it. 
The Kelsey case was cited as authority for the statement that an inability 
to agree on a price for the property was a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
condemnation which must be pleaded and proved in Caruthersville School District 
v. Latshaw. 101 The petition for condemnation was filed July 22, 1948,. and an 
answer to the petition on July 26. The next day, the Board amended its 
petition to allege an inability to agree on the damages and to include in the 
petition a resolution that the Board had made an offer to the owner. On July 
29 an amended answer was filed admitting an inability to agree. After 
commissioners had been appointed, the owner on September 7, filed anether 
amended answer and, on October 19, a third amended answer, both of which denied 
l0076 N.E. 2d 734 (Ohio App. 1947). 
101360 Mo. 1211, 233 S.W. 2d 6 (1950). 
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the allegation that the condemnor and the owner had been unable ta agree on 
a price. The answer of Octeber 19 was subsequently withdrawn. After a change 
of venue and a cemmissioner 1 s report of compensation at $28,000, which was paid 
to the court, a final judgment in condemnation was entered on February 7, 1 949 o 
On appeal, the court held that the essential allegation that the parties had 
been unable to agree was sufficiently stated in the petition and that there 
was no specific requirement that the court enter in the record a finding of 
that facto Nor did the order appointing the cemmissioners require the court 
to find that the parties had been unable to agree, because express provision 
for such finding was not found in the statute. The court was of the opinion 
that the facts as stated showed the answer of the owner admitted an inability 
to agree at the time the cemmissioners were appointed. While jurisdiction 
could not be conferred by consent by the parties, the ceurt found no reason 
why the owner may not admit existence ef a fact essential to the ceurt 1 s 
jurisdiction. 
The amount of the purchase price was not the majer factor in the 
breakdown of negotiations in Town of West Hartford v. Talcett. 102 In this 
case, the Town refused to guarantee that its zoning authority would extend 
a business zone to the north to include a portion of the property owned by 
the defendant which was not taken in the condemnation proceedings. Becau.se, 
the Town had refused to make this guarantee, the owner maintained on appeal 
that there had been no effort to purchase the property. .The court held that 
it was sufficiently established that the condemnor had exhausted all reason-
able efforts. While the authority to condemn was to be strictly construed 
102 138 Conn. 82, 82 A. 2d 351 (1951)., 
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in favor of the owner, the court thought the statute should be enforced to 
effectuate the purpose for which it had been e.nacted. A letter of the owner's 
counse 1, dated February 7, 1949, had stated; 11 My ·clients are not willing to 
ml'lke the substantial sacrifice which an .acceptance of either of your offers 
would ·entail ••• any further discussions would be fruitless. 11 The order 
appointing commissioners to assess damages was affirmed. 
Evidence that the parties were unable to agree on.a price was found in 
three visits to the owner in Spann v. Joint Boards of School Dir@ctorsio3 
Each time the connnittee of the Board called, the awrier informed them the 
property was not for sale. On appeal, the owner complained that he had never 
been tendered a specific sum and that the Board did not offer an ultimatum of 
a final price. The court held that tender was excused where it would be a 
useless ceremony, and the Chancellor's finding that the parties had been 
unable to agree on the price was affirmed. 
The court in Pike County Board of Education v. Fordl04 thought it would 
be unable to conclude as a matter of law that there was ·.no good faith effort 
to negotiate. The Bo.ard had offered $5 ,000 for the property, which the court 
thought was inadequate and, if on a take it or leave it basis, would not be 
a good faith offer. The letter also stated; however, that the Board would be 
happy to receive a reasonable offer from the owner. The verdict of the jury 
awarding $15,35© damages was set aside by the trial court, but this action 
was reversed on appeal. 
A letter from the Board's attorney offering $500, which was not answered, 
103381 Pa. 338, 113 A. 2d 281 (1955). 
104. . 279 S.W. 2d 245 (Ky. App. 1955). 
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and an informal meeting with the owner were considered sufficient attempts 
to negetiate for purchase of .the property in County Be,ard of Schoel Trustees 
· 105 v. Batchelder. At the informal meeting, the owner stated he was negotiating 
with an oil company for a service station on the north end of the tract. The 
representative of the Board promised to meet with him again, but no meeting 
was ever held. Because the owner did not submit proof that the offer was not 
a bona fide offer, the court held that the :!3oard had made a sufficient effort 
even though the amount might have been ,inadequate. The verdict of $4,750 and 
judgment of condemnation were affirmed. 
In Golowich v. Union, Free School Dist:dct106 the Board was seeking to 
condemn a street to which title was held by residential owners on either side. 
Part of the basis on which the condemnation was denied was that the Board had 
not introduced sufficient evidence at the trial that it had negotiated for 
purchase of the rights. The owners of the street conceded .that the Board had 
made an offer of $100 to each owner, and minutes of the Board showed a 
recommendation that the Board authorize the President to effer $10© to each 
owner.and, if refused, to preceed with condemnation •. A resolution in accord 
with the recommendation was passed. Recognizing that. the title to the street 
bed may have substantial value, and that the burden was en the Bqard to 
establish a bona fide but unsuccessful attempt to acquire the property, the 
court stated that 11 A merely formal or perfunctory attempt to· purchase is not 
sufficient ·to comply with the requirement of the statute.11107 Because the 
l057 Ill. 2d 178, 13© N.E. 2d 175 (1955). 
lOf:>25 Misc. 2d 867, 206 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1960). 
107206 N.Y.S. 2d at 445. 
burden of the evidence was not sustained, the condemnation petition was 
denied without prejudice. 
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The judgment for condemnation was affirmed in Wampler v. Trustees of 
Indiana University108 contrary to the owner's contention that the Trustees 
had made no good faith effort ·to purchase the property as required by the 
statute. An effort to purchase was regarded as a condition precedent to the 
right to maintain an eminent domain action, and the burden was on the 
petitioner to show a good faith effort. The owner complained that he had 
not been offered what he considered the market price of the property. Other 
adjoining lots had been purchased for $18,000, $21,000 and $25,000, so the 
court thought an offer of $30,000 for the owner's property in question was 
evidence that the University had made a reasonable effort. The court stated 
that prior Indiana decisions had not followed a market value theory suggested 
by a highway case cited by the owner. The court thought that if a reasonable 
offer had been made honestly and in good faith, with a reasonable effort to 
induce the owner to accept it, the requirements of the statute were met. 
Each case would have to be determined in the light of its own circumstanceso 
On the first contact by the University in this case, the owner had stated he 
did not want to sell. Subsequent contacts led to offers of $25,000 and 
$30 ,000. · On July 14, 1955, the owner said he did not want to sell, but would 
take $50,000 for his property. On July 17, 1957, the Trustees offered $30,000 
by registered mail along with a notice of their intention to condemn the 
property if not accepted. .Supporting the University's claim that it made no 
further attempts to purchase the property because of the $50,000 offer, the 
. l08241 Ind. 499, 172 N.E. 2d 67, 90 A.L.R. 2d 204 ( 1961). 
court said·: 
In our judgment the statute ••• does not contemplate 
an impossibility to purchase at any price, however large, 
but merely an unwillingness on the part of the owner to 
sell only at a price which in the petitioner's judgment 
is excessiveo In such an event the attempt to agree need 
not be pursued further than to develop the fact that an 
agreement to purchase is not possible.at any price which 
the condemnor is willing to pay.1©9 
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Problems of Agency in the Attempt to Negotiateo A Trustee who had been 
appointed to ask the School Committee to select a lot reported he was unable 
to get any price on it in Howland v. School District Noo 2_. llO In this 
third time the case was before the Rhode Island Court, it was held that 
refusal to give the Trustee a price was not a refusal to give the District a 
price. The Trustee had no authority to represent the District, and acceptance 
of his report could not amount to. adoption of his agency. There was nothing 
to show that the owner had rec.eived the Trustee as a :representative of the 
District or intended to have his refusal regarded as an indication he did not 
want to negotiate. A motion to quash the proceedings was granted. 
At the trial of Connecticut College for Women v. Alexander111 the owner 
denied that the College had made any effort to ,agree with him regarding the 
price for the property, but the judge found that the effort was proved. On 
appeal, the owner said the judge's finding was not supported 1:,y the evidence 
and the court agreed •. A Trustee of the C0llege, with the College's attorney, 
went to the owner's house where a daughter-in-law said to see the owner's son. 
l09172 N.E. 2d at 71. 
llG\6 R.I. 257, 15 Atl. 74 (1888). 
lll85 Conn. 602, 84 Atl. 365 (1912). 
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The son refused to fix a price on the property and declined the offer made 
by the Trustee and the attorney. The court found nothing in the evidence 
to show that the owner's son was an agent of the owner to agree on price or 
that the owner or his son had been informed that the Trustee was an agent 
of the College. The rationale for the holding was that the owner was entitled 
to know by whom the land was sought and for what purposes. It was speculated 
that he might react differently to a party who had the power to take the 
property by condemnation. While the evidence was recognized as meager, the 
court thought it failed to show a sufficient attempt and a resulting failure 
to agree on price. 
Some complex relationships were reviewed in Chicago v. Jewish Consump-
tives Relief Society. 112 The evidence showed the Business Manager of the 
Board of Education had corresponded with the attorney of the Society, after 
being referred to him, advising him that the Board was considering purchase 
of the Society property and enclosing a proposal of sale form. The attorney 
replied with an offer to sell the property at $125,000. The Board's inspector 
of school property replied the Bo.ard would consider an offer of $82,500. At 
the trial, the attorney testified that the President of the Society was his 
sister and that he had not consulted the members or officers of the Society 
regarding the negotiations. When surmnons were served on the President to 
condemn the property in July, 1925, it was the first time the President or 
officers knew that the Bo.ard was considering this site. The court held that 
the Board must prove that the agent with whom it dealt was acting within the 
scope of his authority and that such proof could not be by acts or declarations 
112323 Ill. 389, 154 N.E. 117 (1926). 
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of the agento Since there was no evidence that the attorney had an agency 
authorizing him to agree on a price with the Board, the evidence was considered 
undisputed that he was not such agent. The judgment for the City was reversed 
b~cause the Bo~rd had not shown sufficient attempt to purchase the property 
from the owner. 
Inability to Secure Title Except _!!y Condemnation. In School District of 
Columbia Vo Jones,113 the owner maintained that no attempt had been made to 
negotiate for purchase of his property. The court pointed out that the statute 
p:rovided the District ~ay condemn the property if it 11 for any other cause cannot 
secure a title thereto. 11 114 Under this clause, the petition of the District 
had stated the facts of an earlier case in which the interests of the parties 
were detailedo Since the interest of a minor was involved, the Board could 
gain title in no way other than by condemnation. Therefore, it was unnecessary 
to negotiate for the :purchase of··t.he. property. 
In Trustees v. Clippingerll5 the Board attempted to avoid the require-
ment of negotiation for purchase by claiming.that the diverse and uncertain 
interests of the owners made it impossible to acquire ;he property by any 
means other than condemnation. On August 29, 1945, Myers, the sole devisee, 
contracted to sell the property to the Bo.ard for $6 ,800, and the Board was 
given immediate possession.· Myers agreed to convey title within six months 
but was unable to do so because the will was not probated until May 24, 19480 
In the meantime, the Board removed buildings, graded and filled the lot, began 
113229 Moo 510, 129 S.W. 705 (1910). 
1141906 Ann. Stat. 9772. 
115404 Ill. 202, 88 N.E. 2d 451 (1949)0 
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condemnation. proceedings,and wrote to the owner cancelling the con.tract due 
to failure to deliver titleo · 'rhe court affirmed the dismissal of the petition 
for condemnation on motion: of the owner, explaining that the Board cauld not 
repudiate a contract, gamble on a smaller award of compensation,and otherwise 
elect to abandon the proceedingso The Board must have known delivery of the 
title could not be made until the will had been probated, the court·thought. 
Possession under the terms of the contract after the time limit had expired 
was considered evidence that the time limit was waived. There was no provi-
sion in the contract that time was of the essence. 
Evidence 'I'hat Negotiations Would Be Futile. The evidence in Nelson v. 
Ottawa County School District No. 1116 showed that the owner had said he would 
not sell unless he were forced to do so. The court said the District did not 
h~ve to try to purchase the property, because when it was useless to make a 
tendet, none was required. 
Dismissal of a suit to condemn was reversed in Ft., -~ Independent 
Sc;:hool District v. Hodgell7 because of evidence that the owner would reject 
any offer less than $2,000. The undisputed facts in the recordwere that 
the agent of the District had asked the owner for a price several times but 
never received one. The agent attempted to contract for purchase of the 
property at a price of $1,500. The owner testified that he thought $2,00© 
was about right, but the agent was not authorized to enter into an agreement. 
The attorney for the Board wrot·e to the owner that the Board had authorized 
condemnation and that if the owner desired, he may agree to the terms that 
116100 Kan. 612, 164 Pac~ 1075 (1917)0 
11796 s.w. 2d 1113 (Tex. App. 1936). 
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had been offered. The owner testified that he did not remember receiving 
the lettero The court approved the doctrine that where it appeared from the 
record that the parties could not have agreed ,upon an amount, it was not 
necessary tomake a formal effort to agree. Suggesting that common sense 
should be read into the statute, the court was not willing to permit the 
owner to evade condemnation by refusing to name a price. 
The Bo.ard' s allegation that it was unable to acquire the property. it 
needed by purchase was denied by the owner in Red Springs City Bqard of 
Education v. McMillan.,118 The preliminary negotiations were approved by 
the trial judge, and on appeal the court found the record replete with testi-
many that the owner would not sell to the school at any price. ':'An offer made 
under such presence would be a vain thing which is not required by law. 11 119 
Because the District had difficulty in ascertaining the true owner and 
was faced with a single demand over what it was willing to pay, the court 
held in County Board of School Trustees of DuPage County v. Boraml20 that the 
statute did not require an offer and it was not necessary where it was clear 
an offer would be futile. Boram had refused to negotiate because he said he 
had signed an option contract with Luehring, a real estate broker. Luehring 
offered to sell ~he property at $6 ,500 per acre. The President of the Bo.ard 
wrote to him to ask for a letter stating his demand, and Luehring treated it 
as an offer and replied that he would accept. Other than this, there was no 
evidence of an offer to negotiate, by either party. 
118250 N.c; 485, 108 s.E. 2d 895 (1959). 
119 . . . · 108 s.E .• at 898p 
12026 Ill. 2d 167, 186 N.E. 2d 275 (1962). 
Jurisdictions in Which it Has Been Held That No Attempt To Purchase Is 
Required. While there may be a number of States in which the statute does 
not require an attempt by the school or college to purchase the property it 
needs before condemning it, three cases have been located in which the 
court has stated explicitly that the statute did not require an attempt to 
agree on a purchase price. These cases are In~ Application To Condemn 
Land in Rock County, 121 People v. Pommerening, 122 and Union Sc.hool District 
of City of Jackson v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys.123 
Corporate Existence of the Condemnor. 
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In three Missouri cases, the owner attempted to defeat condemnation 
proceedings by a School District by showing that the District was not legally 
;,organized. In the first of these cases, Orrick School District v. Dorton124 
a judgment for the District was reversed due to failure of the District to 
show that it had been organized as required by the statute. The court noted 
that in some other states, notably Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, and Arkansas, 
it had been held that corporate existence could not be put at issue in a 
condemnation action. In fact, Missouri cases had held that corporate existence 
could not be attacked collaterally, but in this case, the court apparently 
thought a collateral attack was not involved, though it did not .explain why. 
The fact that the owner had been a resident of the District for 10 years, 
121121 Minn. 376, 141 N.E. 801 (1913). 
l22250 Mich. 391, 230 N.W. 194 (1930). 
123322 Mich. 165, 33 N.W. 2d 807 (1948). 
124125 Mo. 439, 28 S.W. 765 (1894). 
paying school taxes and attending meetings, did not estop him from denying 
the corporate existence. 
A result that would seem the. opposite of the Dorton case was reached 
in School District No. 35 v. Hodgins,, 125 where a judgment for the District 
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was affirmed. The petition to condemn the property was filed on June 20, 1899, 
and on July 5, 1899, the owner appeared to file an affidavit denying the 
corporate existence of the District. After a hearing which resulted in a find-
ing for the District and appointment of commissioners who reported the value 
of the property at $ 250, the .owner filed exceptions on the basis that the 
District.was not a corporation under the Missouri law. A general denial was 
entered by the District, and at the trial counsel for the District showed the 
steps that had been taken to form the District. The trial court found that it 
was. legally formed ~ith authority to condemn the property. On appeal, the 
issue was raised again, and the court held that the regularity of the proceedings 
that led to formation of the District.were not properly i~volved in condemnation 
proceedings. In the opinion of the court, an affidavit denying corporate exist-
ence called only for a showing of a certificate and not that it was obtained 
rightfully. The right to assail the validity of the District did not belong 
to a citizen, but only to the State in quo warranto proceedings. Any other 
policy, the court thought, would be ruinous, because a corporation-would find 
itself either with or without existence according to the whim of a jury. The 
Dorton case was not mentioned in the Hodgins opinion. The opposite results 
may have been due to the possibility that the District in the Dorton case did not 
introduce evidence or contest the issue, but elected to stand on its pleadings, 
but this is not clear from the case. 
125180 Mo. 70, 79 S.W. ·148 (1904). 
The contention that the District was not legally organized was not 
seriously urged by the owner in Columbia School District v. Jonesl26 as 
his brief did not deal with the matter as a separate point. The court did 
hold, however, that the corporate capacity of the District could not be 
assailed in a collateral proceeding, but only be considered at the call of 
the State in quo warranto proceedings. 
Funds for Payment of Compensation. The opinion in Long v. Fullerl27 
noted that no evidence had been introduced regarding the ability of the 
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condemnor to pay for the property, but that the power of the School Directors 
to levy taxes afforded adequate security to the owner. 
The power of the Board to condemn property for school purposes and the 
constitutionality of the statute under which it proceeded were uphelg by 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Wendel v. Board of Education,128 but on a 
writ of error to the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, the decision 
was reversed because the District had not averred t;:hat the amount tobe paid 
for the property had been fixed by the Board of School Estimate. The higher 
court noted that the Supreme Court had overlooked this second ground of 
appeal even though it had been mooted before that court. The New Jersey 
· statutes provided that when a board of education decided it was necessary 
to raise money topurchase land or erect schoolhouses, it should prepare 
a statement for the Board of School Estimate which would certify the amount 
to the financial board of the city for appropriation or bond issue.129 
126229 Mo. 510, 129 S.W. 705. 
127 68 Pa. St. 170 (1871) • 
12875 N.J.L. 70, 66 Atl. 1075 rev. 76 N.J.L. 499, 70 Atl.. 152 (1908). 
1291903 Gen. School Law, Secs. 73-76 
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The Board of Education was powerless to contract for purchase of property 
until after action of the Board of School Estimate. The court thought that 
the power to condemn could not exist where there was no power to purchase. 
A fundamental requisite of either the power to condemn or to purchase, the 
court said, ~as the ability to pay the agreed price or the amount fixed by 
the award of the commissioners. The petition in a proceeding to condemn 
property must state all jurisdictional facts, and unless the petition showed 
the existence of the right of condemnation, the order appointing conunissioners 
could not properly be made. 
In Territory of New Mexico v. Crar:yl30 the court held that the absence of 
an allegation that the Board of Regents had funds to pay the condemnation award 
was not fatal on a motion to c\ismiss or demurrer. In this case, a judgment 
dismissing the action was reversed. 
In re Applicati.on to Condemn Land in Rock Countyl31 involved a statute 
which provided that the Board could not expend funds or incur liability beyond 
the amount that had been appropriated. The court stated that at the trial 
there had been no showing that the Board had the money on.hand or that it had 
been appropriated, but that if a failure to have a sufficient sum defeated the 
proceedings, it would have to be a defense to be proved by the owner. 
The owner in Cochran v. Cavanaughl32 attempted to enjoin condemnation by 
the University Board of Regents partly on the ground that there was a deficiency 
in the State Treasury. The court dismissed this argument with the observation 
l30l5 N.M. 213, 103 Pac. 986 (1909). 
131121 Minn. 376, 141 N.w. 801 (1913). 
132252 S.W. 284 (Tex. Appo 1923). 
that the statute provided that the University could not take the property 
until damages and costs had been paid. 
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Jury v. Wiestl33 was a case in which the District had procured taxpayers 
to restrain the District from continuing condemnation proceedings which had 
begun several years earlier on the basis ~hat the constitutional debt limit of 
the District would be passed. The finding of the Chancellor that there was a 
contract to purchase was reversed. Considering the second ground of the appeal, 
the court found the District could raise sufficient revenue without extending 
its debt beyond the constitutional limit. The unused portion of available 
millage was to be considered an asset in calculating the extent to which the 
indebtedness of the District may be increased, and the court said it was 
imperative for the School District to levy its unused millage to pay the 
amount ;fixed as damages. Neglect of tre District to levy taxes would not 
render the owner's claim void, and the court referred to a duty of the District 
to i.ncrease taxes. The statute134 provided that funds which may be raised by 
taxation should be pledged and made security where a school district condemnedo 
The argument by the owner that the District could not begin condemnation 
before electors had voted taxes or bonds was considered in Union School District 
of City of Jackson v. Starr Connnonwealth for Boys~135 The opinion stated that 
the trial court had properly held that the showing of $50,000 in the building 
fund, which had been authorized by electors, obviated the need for the District 
to show that further taxes or bonds had been voted. 
l33326 Pao 554, 193 Atlo 5 (1937). 
13424 P.S. Sec. 692, School Code Sec. 606. 
l35322 Mich. 165, 33 N.W. 2d 807 (1948). 
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The owner I s objection in Seb~ v. Independent School District No.· 3136 
was based on his statement that the Board members had to borrow money on their 
own personal notes to make the condemnation.award. In.answer to the objection, 
the court held that the landowner could not inquire into the source· of the 
money to pay the award and all that was required by the statute was that he 
receive just compensation •. 
One of the grounds for appeal in Spann v. Joint Boards of Schodl Direc-
torsl37 was that the joint boards had no aHured plan of financing. The court 
pointed out that the Boards were acting on the approval of the State Depart-
ment of Education .and that financing of the project would be partly by the 
State Public School Building Authority. On this point, the owners had amended 
their complaint to show themselves as taxpayers seeking relief. The court held 
that there was no requirement.that the Boards have funds on hand and that it 
was conjecture that the debt limit would be exceeded. 
Mercer Islan~ $chool District v. Victor Scalzo, Inc. 138 was an original 
proceeding for certiorari to review a district court·order denying the School 
District I s petition for condemnation. . At the hearing, the owner clai~ed that 
the School District budget was expended and t.hat if the property were acquired, 
the District would be unable to pay for it. The trial court was reversed 
because .. it was error to admit evidence of the budget statu~ at that stage of 
the proceeding.· The three stages suggested by the court were, (1) adjudica-
tion of public use and necessity, (2) assessment of damages, and (3) payment, 
entry and dominion. The court did not suggest at what stage the owner could 
136208 Okl. 83, 253 P. 2d 559 (1953). 
137381 Pa. 338, 113 A. 2d 281: (1955). 
l3854;wash. 2d 539, 342 P. 2d 225 (1959). 
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raise the question of the ability of the condemnor to pay, if at any stage. 
QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
This section is designed to mention·only the cases in which the specific 
questions of jurisdiction and venue have been raised. It should be noted that 
the jurisdiction of the court is questioned by many of the other procedurijl 
or substantive issues that are raised. The cases dealing with venue will'be 
considered first in chronological order, followed by those in which the 
jurisdiction of the court was mentioned. 
The owner in Kirkwood v. School District No • .?_139 contended that it was 
error to deny his application for a change of venue on the ground that the 
judge was prejudiced, but on appeal, the court held that venue was left to the 
discretion of 1;he judge and that there was no apparent abuse of that discre-
tion in this case. 
The owner complained in Cochran v. Cavanaugh140 that because the 
guaranty bond had been signed by 1,600 Austin residents, the act authorizing 
the government to appoint a committee to purchase land adjacent to the State 
University was invalid. It was not clear from the opinion, but apparently 
his argument was based on the possibility of a biased jury, as the court met 
the argument with the suggestion that the owner could get a change of venue. 
A change of venue from Adair County to Schuyler County was approved in 
Board of Regents v. Palmer.141 The court explained that the owner was entitled 
13945 Colo. 368, 101 Pac~ 343 (1909). 
140252 s.w. 284 (Tex. App. 1923). 
141356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947). 
to but one change of venue, and that by that change, the Circuit Court 
gained jurisdiction of the sub.j;ect matter. 
In a short opinion, the Kansas City Court of Appeals denied its own 
jurisdiction in Consolidated School Distric~ No. £ v. 0 1Malley. 142 It was 
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noted that the Supreme Court had ruled that the Court of Appeals had juris-
diction in a condemnation proceeding involving less than $7,500, but here, 
the cause was transferred because the title to real estate was involved. 
This hblding was later approved by the Supreme Court.143 
Another Missouri case, State v. Moriarity}44 mentioned that the Kansas 
City Court of Appeals had jurisdiction as the amount exceeded $10,000~ii.n. 
controversy. The 0 1Malley case was not mentioned in the opinion. 
ISSUES REGARDING EVIDENCE 
The issues regarding evidence in school and college eminent domain cases 
may be divided into two categories: those dealing with the admissibility of 
evidence at the trial, and those in which the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict has been questioned. 
Admissibility. 
The oral testimony of the Trustee that he acted within his authority as 
agent for the District to condemn the property was considered inadmissible in 
l42 232 Mo. App. 1116, 115 S.W. 2d 171 (1938). 
143343 Mo. 1187, 125 S.W. 2d 818 (1938) • 
l44361 S.W. 2d 133 (Mo. App. 1962). 
Howland Vo School District No.·~~145 The court said that 
The District and the School Committee, in condemning land 
for school purposes, perform a public function, j,tldicial 
in its nature.at'\d their records are the proper proof of 
their acts.146 · 
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In Wood Vo Syracuse School District147 the Board objected to testimony 
by the owner until he had given evidence to show that he was the owner. The 
Board's objection was overruled and on appeal by ~he District, the action of 
the trial court was affirmed. The Board had paid the commissioners award to 
the County Treasurer, and the court was of the opinion that as the proceed-
ings had been instituted by the Board, the.question of ownership could not be 
raised • 
. A brief comment in Board of Education of City of Minot v. Park District148 
indicated that evidence of the minutes of the Board of Education w~s admissible 
in determination of the amount of land necessary as the question was for the 
court, the jury hearing only the issues on the amount of damages. 
Sufficiency. 
On appeal, the verdict finding the value of the property taken at $250 
and damages to the part not taken at $7,750 was reversed in San Pedro, 1•!• and 
§.•1•B:·•. Co. v •. Board of Education of Salt Lake City!49 This was. a proceeding by 
a railroad to condemn school property in which a strip off the south end of the 
14516 R.I. 257, 15 Atl. 74 (1888). 
14615 Atlo at 76. 
147 108 Kan. 1, 193 Pac. 1049 (1920). 
14810 N.W. 899 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
14932 Utah 305, 90 Pac. 565 (1907). 
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school lot was taken. At the trial, the Board contended that the taking 
had necessitated abandonment of the property for school purposes. Evidence 
was presented that passenger trains passed over the tracks, but not during 
school hours, and that there were no freight trains on the line, although 
both might use the line during school hours in the future. All the teachers 
and the principal testified that the railroad interfered with successful 
operation of the school!> but none had said it was impossible to continue. 
There was also evidence that other schools in the City were located about 
the same distance from railroad tracks. The jury answered 11Yes 11 to the 
question; 11 Do you find from the evidence that the property of the defendant 
not taken has been wholly destroyed for school purposes?" The court found 
that the finding the property was wholly destroyed was not supported by 
direct evidence but, in fact, just the contrary. Suggesting that no enter-
prise was unaffected by others in city life, the court revieW!-d :the ev'iaence 
that the efficiency of the school had been destroyed and pointed out that even 
if that fact were established, it was not tantamount to total destruction. 
The Board had introduced the evidence that 32\% of the students failed to be 
promoted in the City, while in the school near the railroad, only 25% had 
failed. The court thought this evidence showed that there ~ere many factors 
to consider regarding efficiency of a school, and that estimates of the 
teachers were unreliable and did not amount to the degree of proof necessary 
to support the finding that the property was wholly destroyed for school 
purposes. The court thought the Board must show that it was impractical 
after a reasonable effort to continue holding school in this building. There 
was no showing that the efficiency of the school was impaired or that the 
physical threat involved could not be overcome by reasonable effort and diligence. 
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The hazard of attributing all the results of the school to the railroad 
wasc pointed out with the· suggestion that allowance should aho be made for 
the natural ability and diligence of both students and teachers. The instruc-
tion which told the jury that the Board·might abandon the property under any 
conditions other than total destruction was considered prejudicial error. 
W):iile the conditions which were necessary to destroy the property for school 
purposes must be left to the jury to some extent, the court pointed out that 
there must be substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
The owner complained in School District Ef Borough of Lewisburgh v. 
Harrisonl50 that the District had not introduced evidence it had actually 
taken possession, occupied, and used the property for school purposes. The 
minutes of the Board were in the record, and the court found that the minutes 
were admissible as evidence of the action of the District. The minutes showed 
that the Board had discussed the necessity of acquiring additional land five 
years earliE!l:."and that a tentative selection of the land in question had been 
made two years prior to the time litigation was begun. The minutes showed 
a final selection of the property of this owner was made on June 11, 1923. 
On November 10, 1924, the Board made an offer which was rejected. On June 8, 
1925, the Board stated its maximum amount and set a deadline for acceptance. 
On July 6, 1925, the Board appointed a committee to enter the premises with 
its solicitor and surveyor and passed a resolution to condemn the property. 
The entry of the committee was recorded in the minutes of July 17, 1925. 
The court held that there was no requirement in the statute that the District 
do anything further in order to obtain title to the property. 
150290 Pa. 258, 138 Atl. 760 (1927). 
The owner suggested in Payne v. Deercreek Board of Education151 that 
the Board had acted in bad faith in attempting to take his property. The 
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court pointed out that the evidence showed the school had 135 children enrolled 
on a school site of 1/4 acre including the playground. With the permission of 
prior owners, the school had used the property in question as a playground until 
it was acquired by the owner in 1945, When the owner, who was the plaintiff 
in the action to enjoin appropriation, secured the property, he enclosed the 
lots and put 80 hogs in the enclosure. The court thought this evidence did 
not show bad faith on the part of the Board. 
Without explaining the objection of the owner, the court in Town of 
West Hartford v. Talcottl52 stated that while there may have been technical 
errors concerning the introduction of evidence, they were not of such nature 
that the case should be reversed. 
The reluctance of the appellate court to disturb the findings of the trial 
court was mentioned in Independent School District£~ Boise City v. Lauch 
Construction Co.153 The court found no evidence of fraud, oppression or abuse 
of discretion by the District. Even though the evidence at the trial was 
conflicting, the findings of the trial court could be substantiated and the 
judgment was affirmed. 
THE RIGHT OF THE CONDEMNOR TO DISCONTINUE PROCEEDINGS 
Most of the case reports use the term "abandonment" to describe the 
15176 N.E. 2d 734 (Ohio App. 1947). 
152138 Conn. 82, 82 A. 2d 351 ( 1951). 
15374 Idaho 502, 264 P. 2d 687 (1953). 
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condemnor I s act of withdrawing from the proceedings •. A few refer to 
11 discontinuance 11 as the term indicating that the condemnor no longer wishes 
to secure the property by eminent domain. In this study, the latter term is 
used in order to avoid confusion with abandonment of premises for school 
purposes. 
The earliest case located on this topic, Moravian Seminary v. Borough 
of Bethlehem, 154 dealt with the right of a borough council to discontinue 
proceedings to condemn property of a private school for an extension of a 
street. On October, 1889, the Borough passed an ordinance to extend Main 
Street through the Seminary grounds. Viewers were appointed, and then 
proceedings were quashed for irregularities and the ordinance repealed. In 
July, 1890, a new ordinance was passed, and the Seminary appealed from the 
report of the Viewers that the property was worth $15,000. On November 28, 
1891, a jury verdict was handed down for $35,000, and on the same day, 
judgment on the verdict was rendered. In January, 1892, the Borough secured a 
rule to show cause why the proceedings should not be discontinued. The 
Seminary answered that the Borough was powerless to discontinue proceedings at 
that stage, and made a claim for its expenses in defending against the action 
of the Borough. The Master appointed by the court found the costs of the 
Seminary amounted to $745 and attorney fees amounted to $2,242~75. He 
recommended discontinuance on payment of costs only, as he did not consider 
attorney fees a. legal liability. An earlier case was cited construing the 
law to be that where the owner has a judgment, all questions are concluded 
for him, and subsequent aoandonment cannot affect his rights at law. 
154153 Pa. St. 583, 26 Atl. 237 (1893). 
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The court found, however, that the application to discontinue the proceedings 
was not after judgment because the judgment was null, having been entered on 
the same day the verdict was rendered, and it could not have stood in the way 
of a motion for new trial. While there was no record of a motion for a new 
trial, the brief of the Seminary apparently referred to one, and the court 
thought it was warranted in assuming that a motion for new trial was pending 
when the discontinuance was authorized. While the power of the trial court 
to discontinue the proceedings was upheld, the appellate court thought the 
terms imposed were not proper or adequate, as the Borough should be required 
to repeal the ordinance as a condition precedent to discontinuance and to pay 
the costs and expenses of the Seminary. 
Anything less than that would be visiting upon the 
plaintiff the consequences of the ill-advised or reckless 
proceedings inaugurated and prosecuted by at least a 
majority of the borough council. In justice and equity 
all the costs and expenses of the proceeding should be 
borne by themselves, but inasmuch as we have no means of 
reaching them, we must impose said costs and expenses on 
the municipality which they represent, or, perhaps, 
misrepresent.155 
The action by the Seminary for a mandamus execution was not granted because 
the judgment had been held invalid. The court set a limit of 60 days within 
which if the ordinance had not been repealed and costs and expenses paid, the 
Seminary could apply for a mandamus execution. 
After a jury trial resulting in a verdict for the defendant of $18,000, 
the School Trustees filed a resolution to abandon the proceedings, but judgment 
15526 Atl. at 239. 
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was rendered over their objection in Evans v. Plymouth Congregational 
Church of Whiting.156 In reversing the trial court, a statutel57 providing 
that after payment of the appraiser's award the title should vest at once 
was construed. A proviso that if the Trustees filed an exception to the 
appraisal, the title would vest, and subsequent proceedings would affect 
only the amount of the appraisal did not prevent the Trustees from 
discontinuing the proceedings. The general rule that the condemnor may 
discontinue proceedings any time before rights had vested was mentioned 9 
and the court was of the opinion that the time of vesting of rights should 
not be hastened by judicial construction. Until the legislative act was 
made plain, the court suggested that doubts should be resolved in favor of 
the condemnor. 
An action for damages of $9,107.66 was brought against the District as 
a result of dismissal of condemnation proceedings, and the judgment for the 
District was affirmed in Meadow Park Land Co. v. School District of Kansas 
City.l58 The statute under which the District had proceeded provided that 
schools should follow the procedure outlined for railroad, telegraph and 
other corporations. The court referred to railroad cases in which it had 
been held that costs up to and including the filing of the report by the 
appraisers were to be paid by the condemnor, but there was no provision for 
payment of expenses of the defending party. In one case in which the condemnor 
had been liable for damages, the action had been prolonged for nine years, and 
lS6189 Ind. 381, 127 N.E. 406 (1920). 
1571914 Burns Ann. Stat. 6635. 
l58257 S.W. 441 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1923). 
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this case was distinguished. The provision in the statute for abandonment 
after 10 days from the appraisers report, the court thought, implied the 
right to discontinue the proceedings at an earlier stage •. A controversy 
had developed as to whether restrictive covenants in the title of the 
property sought by the District should be considered in assessing. damages. 
Apparently the connnissioners had reached agreement, but before their report 
was filed, the School District. protested, and the court discharged the corn-
missioners. The School District then moved for dismissal of the proceedings. 
The court cited cases to show that where there had been no unnecessary 
vexatious prolonging of the proceedings, expenses had not been allowed. In 
this case, the action was begun on December 11, 1920,and dismissed December 
21, 1921. The land company alleged that the Board had procured a protest 
a~ainst the report of the connnissioners which would have set a value on the 
property of $100,000. The court pointed out that the land company had no 
vested interest in the unreported sum and that the right of the Schoel District 
to dismiss the action must be available te the Board as public officials 
cha~ged with the public interest. 
In re Board of Education of City of Detroitl59 also mentioned the impor-
tance of the right to discontinue proceedings te enable a public agency to 
safeguard the public interest. The trial ceurt, in this case, denied a motion 
to discontinue the proceedings before the verdict. The statute provided that 
the Board was witheut power te discentinue the proceedings after cenfirmation 
ef the verdict, and the court thought this was a clear recognition of the 
right ·to discontinue before the verdict was cenfirmed. Therefore, en appeal, 
159 . 242 Mich. 658, 219 N. W, 614 (192.8). 
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the verdict was vacated and the case remanded with directions. The motion 
to discontinue was made because the Board believed the expense of acquiring 
ten of the lots in question was not justified. 
In Whittier Union High School Qistrict v. Beckl60 the request for 
dismissal with prejudice filed by the District was due to the fact the 
property had been acquired by purchase. The court observed that the issues 
between the parties had been settled out of court so there was no necessity 
for a judgment of condemnation. Having acquired the property, the District 
could hardly be said to have abandoned efforts to secure it, the court said, 
and the District's good faith was shown by its purchase. The issue raised 
by the defendant was that the dismissal was in effect an abandonment, which 
was prevented by the Code of Civil Procedure in order to prevent an owner 
being harrassed by a series of suits to condemn his property. 
The connnents in Hooper v. Board of Education of Detroitl61 concerning 
discontinuance must be regarded as dicta. A resident of a hotel sought by 
the Board for the use of Wayne University brought the action to restrain the 
Board from purchasing of the hotel. The condemnation proceedings brought by 
the Board earlier had been discontinued. The court commented that because 
the Board was a State agency it had the right to discontinue condemnation 
proceedings any time before confirmation of the jury verdict. 
The Beck case was distinguished from Torrance Unified School Dist~ict 
v. Alwagl62 on the basis that in the former case the owner forfeited any 
l 6045 Cal. App. 2d 736, 114 P. 2d 731 (1941). 
161315 Mich. 202, 23 N.W. 2d 692 (1946). 
l62145 Ca l. App. 2d 596, 302 P. 2d 881 (1956). 
rights by selling the property to the condemnor. In the Alwag case, the 
District dismissed the action because it had been advised by the highway 
division that the State planned to condemn a strip through the middle of 
the property. The judgment of the trial court awarding costs but denying 
attorney fees was reversed on the issue of the attorney fees. The owner 
insisted that dismissal of the action by the District constituted an 
abandonment within the meaning of the Code provision which would entitle 
him to costs and expenses. The District argued that this provision was 
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not applicable where there was no bad faith, and the District had terminated 
its action only on discovery that the land was no longer suitable. The 
court explained ;hat while the provision of the Code was designed to defeat 
the practice of expensing the owner into submission by successive actions, the 
legislature could have specified that bad faith or just cause was to be the 
test. The State decided on the freeway route one month before the action was 
filed and if the Board was aware of this decision, the court thought, the action 
was in bad faith. If the Board was unaware of the State's action, then the 
court thought the Board should be in a better position to know of the action 
than the owner. 
The problem of the finality of the appraiser's report was raised in 
Ragland v. Davidson County ~~ard of Education. 163 The condemnation petition 
was filed by the Board in the County Court on August 3, 1956. On November 
12, 1956, the court ordered the report of the appraisers that the property 
was valued at $97,725 to be filed. With the consent of the owner, the Board 
entered the property to make percolation tests and concluded that the land 
163203 Tenn. 317, 312 s.w. 2d 855 (1958). 
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was not suitable for its use. On December 14, 1956, the Board appeared 
before the County Court to ask for a voluntary non-suit .which was granted, 
On December 18, the owner moved to set aside the non-suit. The order denying 
his motion was affirmed. The owner contended that the authority of the County 
Judge had ended with the November term, but the Board pointed out a statute 
which provided that when any case was undetermined at the time the term 
expired, the term should be e~tended and continued. Because there was 
provision for appeal from the County Court. to the Circuit Court, where the 
proceedings could be heard as if a new trial, the court found that the pro~ 
ceedings were not final at the end of the November term of the County Court. 
The court suggested, citing a number of railroad cases, that :the order for the 
filing of the appraiser's report should not be considered a final order, even 
though the Board was in possession, where the enterprise was found impractical 
and the owner had not suffered damage. The court noted that the District had 
no idea of discontinuing the proceedings in order to secure a lower compensa-
tion award. Referring to the Ragland case, Roady cormnented in a law review 
article that: 
The result reached in this case appears to extend 
somewhat the tendency to liberalize condemnation proceedings 
for the benefit of the condemning .authority. The court 
recognizes that it is moving away from the strict common law 
view favoring the property owner, but apparently feels that 
this is in accord with the spirit of the legislation simpli-
fying procedure and that no injustice can be done the 
property owner so long as he can recover such damages as the ·, 
good faith action of the condemning authority in abandoning 
may have caused him.164 
The owner moved to strike the condemnor's motion to dismiss proceedings, 
164Thomas G. Roady, Jr. flReal_ Propert~ - __ 195't T~nnesse~ _Survey, 11 
12 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1318 at 1326. 
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and trial on this issue resulted in a judgment for the District in Center 
School District v. Kenton.165 Conunissioners had reported the·value of the 
property at $17,500, and both parties filed exceptions . asking for a jury 
trial. The jury assessed compensation at $33,000 plus $1,155 interest. 
Within' 10 days of the verdict, the District moved to dismiss the action with-
out prejudice at its own cost. On appeal, the owner did not contest the 
right of the condemnor to discontinue, as the statute· provided · clearly for 
this right. The owner was also seeking attorney fees and interest, both 
of which were denied. The court distinguished the cases involving condem-
nation by private corporations, holding that public agencies were exempt 
from liability for expense of litigation or losses incurred by the landowner 
when the condemnation action had been begun in good faith. The court refused 
to apply in retrospect an act which had been passed after the proceedings 
were instituted. This act provided for payment of interest in the case of 
abandonment of condemnation proceedings. The owner also maintained that the 
dismissal should not be without prejudice. The court noted that the District 
would be prevented from beginning a new action within two years and,therefore, 
the owner was protected from vexatious litigation. If the District acted in 
good faith, the court thought it should not lose the right to institute a 
new proceeding for condemnation of the same property where action had been 
discontinued before compensation .was· mare or before rights had been vested. 
This opinion was citicized in one of the law review conunents. 166 The writer 
thought the condemnor's ability to abandon might coerce the landowner into 
165 ( ) 345 S.W. 2d 120 Mo. Sup. Ct. 1961. 
166746 Minnesota L. Rev. 655. 
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giving up his right to just compensation. It was suggested that the party 
better able to bear the burden of the litigation cost should pay it, and 
that the cost of the litigation could better be distributed by the condemning 
authority. The distinction in public and private agencies was also criticized 
by the reviewer. It was suggested that the requirement that private agencies 
pay attorney fees was based on the fact that these costs could be passed on 
and distributed widely. The reviewer also suggested that requiring the 
condemnor to pay attorney fees would lessen the chance of harrassment of the 
owner. 
An Illinois statutel67 provided that if the petitioner dismissed pro-
ceedings before the order fixing the time within which compensation was to be 
paid or failed to make full compensation within the time set, the court may 
order payment of costs and fees. In County Board ~f School Trustees of 
DuPage County v. Borarnl68 the court recognized that while the statute did 
not provide that failure to pay constituted an abandonment, it was obviously 
the intent of the legislature to protect the owner from possible harrassment. 
The case was decided on the point that the award of compensation had not 
finally been determined, so there was no abandonment in the Board's failure 
to pay. The facts recited in the opinion showed that both parties and the 
trial court were confused about when the time period for payment of the award 
would begin to run. The complicated series of events involved will not be 
described here, but it can be noted that the court found that the compensation 
had not been determined with finality due to an appeal by the owner. The time 
1671961 R.s. Ch. 47, sec. 10. 
16826 Ill. 2d 167, 186 N.E. 2d 275 (1962). 
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for payment of the award did not begin to run until the court had finally 
disposed of · the case. 
ASSIGNMENT OF COSTS AND FEES 
The issues regarding payment of costs and fees by a condemnor who moves 
to dismiss the proceedings have been mentioned in the previous section. 
A few cases have raised questiorsof who should be responsible for costs and fees. 
The judgment was modified to allow costs of the trial to the owner in 
Petersburg School District v. Peterson.169 While the owner had not moved at 
trial to secure payment of his costs, and they were not provided for in the 
statute, the court was of the opinion that to hold that he must pay his own 
costs would nullify the constitutional guarantee of just compensation. The 
District claimed that it was too late to raise the question on appeal, but as 
the owner had not waived his right to costs at the trial, and the matter 
pertained to the judgment, the court allowed the owner his costs as part of 
the compensation. 
Costs were taxed to the Board in Jones v. School Board of Liberty 
Townshipl70 and the owner moved for payment of $150 in attorney fees also. 
In this case, the court held that reference to the statute on taking of 
property for internal improvements in the statute under which the Board pro-
ceeded was only to point out the method for appeal. As attorney fees were not 
taxable as costs except by express statutory provision, and the School Code 
did not provide for attorney fees, they were not granted ;o the owner. 
169 ( ) 14 N.D. 344, 103 N.W. 756 1905. 
170140 Iowa 179, 118 N.W. 265 (1908). 
In Kirkwood v. School District No. 7171 the District filed a cross 
error plea on the basis that the cost of the proceeding had been taxed to 
the District. The court did not decide the issue because it found no ex-
ception taken by the District at the trial to the award of $25 damages. 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF CONDEMNATION 
Because the right of appeal was granted by the statute the court in 
Krcmar v. Independent School District of Cedar Rapids172 held that notice 
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of the appeal must be in substantial compliance with the method prescribed in 
the statute, and that service of notice of the appeal on the Secretary of the 
Board and the Sheriff of the County was not sufficient. The notice 
should have been served on the County Superintendent, but it had been served 
on the Sheriff because of provisions in the statute on condemnation for 
internal improvements. The court thought it was idle ceremony to serve an 
unnecessary party, that the functions of the Sheriff were essentially 
different from those of the County Superintendent, and that it would be 
unreasonable to hold that notice of appeal served on the Sheriff was 
sufficient when he was in no way connected with the action. 
Dicta in Huber v. Stee1173 explained that the landowner had no absolute 
right to appeal and that the legislature was under no constitutional duty to 
grant a right of appeal. The point was made in response to the owner's 
argument that he was deprived of his property without compensation because the 
17145 Colo. 368, 101 Pac. 343 (1909). 
l72192 Iowa 734, 185 N.W. 485 (1921). 
17314 Del. Ch. 302, 125 Atl. 673 (1924). 
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judge had discretion to appoint new freeholders until a fair and equitable 
award was made. The court was of the opinion that the legislature "being 
bound to grant no right of appeal whatever, ••• acted entirely within its 
province when it chose to grant the right to this limited extent. 11 174 
The appeal in Davis v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County175 was 
considered premature. The court connnented that there was no right to appeal 
in a case involving special limited statutory jurisdiction unless provided 
by the statute. The only right to appeal was from a final judgment on 
questions of necessity and compensation. In this case, the owner had filed 
a plea in bar of the petition to condemn and appealed from the sustaining of 
a demurrer to his plea in bar. 
Two appeals were taken from the application of the Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama to condemn property. The first appeal, Denson v . 
Board of Trustees ~f University of Alabama176 was to the Supreme Court from 
the Probate Court decree that the property be taken by the University. The 
Trustees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that there was no 
s tatutory provision for an appeal direct from the Probate Court to the 
Supreme Court. The owner also sought a writ of mandamus to review the order 
of the Probate Court. The appeal was dismissed and the writ denied because 
the court found that the proper avenue of appeal was to the Circuit Court 
and that the Supreme Court would not issue supervisory writs if any inferior 
court had the authority to afford ample relief. Seven months after the Board's 
174125 Atl. at 675. 
175166 Md. 118, 170 Atl. 590 (1934). 
176247 Ala. 257, 23 So. 2d 714 (1945). 
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application to condemn was granted by the Probate Court, the owner appealed 
to the Circuit Court where the appeal was dismissed as unauthorized and 
premature. The case then went to the Supreme Court on original petition of 
the State for mandamus to require the Circuit Court judge to rule on a 
petition for mandamus to be directed to the Probate Court judge. The writ 
was denied in Ex parte Stat~ ex rel. Denson. 177 The action of the Circuit 
Court judge was supported because the record did not substantiate the owner's 
claims, and the discretion of the judge would not be overturned unless the 
relator could show an overriding reason why the writ should be granted. As 
dicta, the court added the statement that the appeal could have been dismissed 
because of laches, as the statute allowed 30 days for appeal. 
The judgment and order appointing commissioners to ascertain the amount 
of compensation was held not appealable in Union Free School District No. 10 
v. Baumgartner. 178 
The right of the owner to appeal fran an order authorizing the District 
to take possession of the property was upheld in San Francisco Unified School 
District v. Hong Mow.179 The compensation to the owner had been assessed at 
$17,500 plus $47.09 costs, and judgment was entered for that amount. The 
award was paid into the court and an order issued authorizing the District ~o 
use the property for purposes for which it had been condemned until final 
conclusion of the case. The court held that the owner's appeal from this 
order was not barred by other sections of the Code. 
177248 Ala. 161, 26 So. 2d 563 (1946). 
178277 App. Div. 998, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 151 (1950). 
179123 Cal. App.· 2d 668, 267 Pa. 2d 349 (1954). 
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The owner moved to dismiss the appeal of the School District which 
assigned error to the instructions on the basis that the District had not 
paid the award and therefore had "constructively abandoned" the proceedings 
in North Kansas City School District of Clay County v. Peterson-Renner, Inc. 180 
The court held that the District was not bound to pay prior to its appeal 
in order for the court io have jurisdiction over the appeal. 
The Relationship of the Trial to the Appeal. 
The question of whether the railroad should be enjoined from' .taking 
University property because of possible injury to the University was not 
considered in Universi~ of Minnesot~ v. Northern Pacific ,gy; Co. 181 
because the appellate court was of the opinion it could not come to a 
conclusion different from the trial court. There was no evidence in the 
record, so the court was unwilling to assume that different findings of 
fact should have been made. By some source, the appellate opinion did 
mention that the trial court had found that the railroad would not disturb 
the University any more than loaded wagons traveling over nearby streets. It 
was also mentioned that another railroad was already located closer to the 
University and that the Company which sought the property intended to lay its 
road in a cut 30 feet deep, separated by a street from the campus, and six to 
eight hundred feet from any present building. Possible interference with 
astronomical instruments was suggested, but there was no clear measure of how 
far away the railroad had to be to avoid interference. 
180369 S.W. 2d 159 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
l8l36 Minn. 447, 31 N.W. 936 (1887). 
306 
l~deeendent School District of Oakland v. Hewittl82 was an action to 
quiet title, and·· on appeal the defendant tried to put the sufficiency of the 
condemnation proceedings by which the District claimed title at issue. The 
court said that no evidence on the Board's attempt to purchase or the vote 
on funds to authorize condemnation had been introduced at the trial, so 
these questions were not appropriate on appeal. The District sought to 
quiet its title, secured by condemnation begun in 1889, because the defendant 
claimed to have purchased the property for taxes on December 1, 1890, and he 
held a tax deed executed December 21, 1893. A statute had provided that all 
lands exempt from taxes, which included school district land, should not be 
affected by any sale made for taxes. The trial court required the District 
to pay the amount the defendant had bid for the property at the sale with 
interest. 
Because the pleadings had not been attacked at the trial, the court in 
Kirkwood v. School District No. 7183 did not allow the owner to raise the 
question of site selection on appeal. 
An explanation of new procedure was included in the opinion of Wood v. 
Syracuse School District. 184 The court noted that it was no longer neces-
sary for a party to save an exception, but that by the revised code, the 
only requirement was that the record should show that a party had objected 
to a ruling of the trial court. 
l82105 Iowa 663, 75 N.W. 497 (1898). 
18345 Colo. 368, 101 Pac. 343 (1909). 
184108 Kan. 1 9 193 Pac. 1049 (1920). 
A claim by the owner that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the judgment was unsuccessful in Hilton v. Cramer185 because the owner's 
brief did not contain all the evidence presented at the trial. 
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The owner challenged the propriety of a nunc pro tune (now for then) 
amendment of the final judgment in Lipsc~b v. Bessemer Board of Education.186 
The opinion did not s~ate what the amendment was, and the court found the 
record incomplete, so that the trial court must be presumed to have made the 
amendment on the basis of some information not before the court on appeal. 
The motion for new trial had not mentioned error in rulings on evidence 
or in refusing to allow the owner to show land values as grounds for appeal, 
so he was prevented from raising these issues in County Board of School 
Trustees v. Batchelder!87 The court also supported the Board's argument that 
the owner by failing to object to testimony of his own witnesses on cross 
examination had waived the right to object and noted that the owner had offered 
no citation of authority that the Board's motion to strike the testimony had 
been incorrectly overruled. The owner did not make any objection at the time 
the testimony was made. 
The court in .!!Y_de County Board of .Education v. Mannl88 held that the 
instructions given by the trial court would be presumed correct because the 
instructions were not repeated in the record on appeal. The record did not 
contain information about what answer could have been given to questions to 
18550 S.D. 274, 209 N.W. 543 (1926). 
186258 Ala. 47, 61 So. 2d 112 (1952). 
1877 Ill. 2d 178, 130 N.E. 2d 175 (1955). 
188250 N.C. 493, 109 S.E. 2d 175 (1959). 
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which the Board's objection had been sustained. 
SUMMARY 
The issues discussed in this chapter have been somewhat arbitrarily 
classified as procedural, but this classification has not been intended to 
suggest that the issues are less important than those that might be con-
sidered substantiveo The general topics of the chapter involved parties, 
pleadings, conditions precedent, jurisdiction a~d venue, evidence, discon-
tinuance, costs and fees, and appeals. 
A group of Illinois cases illustrate the influence of the statutes on 
the question of the proper parties to prosecute condemnation actions for 
schools. In that State, property is held in trust for schools by trustees 
or municipal corporations. The decisions have consistently held that the 
party holding title, rather than school authorities, should initiate the 
proceedings. The authority of the party prosecuting condemnation proceed-
ings for a state college or university has been upheld where the State or a 
State Board of Regents has been involved. Other cases lead to the conclusion 
that interests of third parties must be substantial before they can affect 
proceedings to condemn prope~ty for a school or college. 
A liberal view has been taken by the courts regarding the pleadings in 
most school and college condemnation cases. It has been held uniformly that 
where the condemnor is required to allege the purpose for which the property 
is sought or that the property is necessary, a general statement is sufficient. 
Amendment of the pleadings has been approved in each case located where it 
has been an issue. Generally, a defendant is not required to answer the petition 
for condemnation, but in most of the cases where he has done so, his right to 
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raise issues by pleading has been supported. 
Several issues classified as conditions precedent to the right of a 
school or college to acquire property by condemnation have been identified. 
These deal with site selection, the resolution of condemnation, notice, 
preliminary negotiations, corporate existence, and availability of funds. 
Two Illinois cases were decided for the condemnee because the notice 
of the meeting of electors to select a site was inadequate, but otherwise, 
the issue has been decided in favor of the schools. Where an election to 
select a site is required by statute, its terms must be followed, and the 
cases seem to have been decided according to the facts presented rather 
than by consistent legal principles. In jurisdictions where the site is 
selected by school authorities, their discretion has generally been respected. 
In some States a resolution of the school board to condemn property is 
not necessary. Where it is a condition precedent to the right to condemn, 
the courts have been permissive regarding the board's expression of its will. 
One of the opinions on the issue of notice suggested that the cases fall 
into three classes; those in which no notice is required, those in which 
intent to give reasonable notice was sufficient, and those following.a strict 
view that the statute must provide for notice and its provisions be carefully 
observed. The validity of notice given has been upheld in all the recent 
cases located. 
An attempt to purchase is required as a condition precedent to the right 
of condemnation by statutes in a number of States. In only one case was the 
evidence of an attempt to purchase considered insufficient. An offer of $500 
where the compensation verdict was $4,750 was upheld, as well as an offer of 
$5,000 in .a case resulting in a verdict of $15,350. Some of the cases refer 
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to good faith as·the criterion for evaluation of the board's offer. At 
least three cases have been lost, two by schools and one by a college, 
because of lack of agency to negotiate for the owner. Some of the statutes 
provide that if the school cannot secure title for a reason other than 
inability to purchase, it may do so by condemnation, but this provision 
will not substitute for an .attempt to negotiate where the owner is capable. 
If it is clear that the owner would refuse to sell at any price, the courts 
have said that no offer is required. 
Three Missouri cases have involved a challenge to the corporate existence 
of the school district, the oldest holding that the condemnation proceedings 
were invalid, and the two more recent cases holding that corporate existence 
may not be questioned except by the State. 
The question of whether the school or·college had funds to pay the 
compensation award was considered an inappropriate issue for th1e owner to 
raise in all but one of the cases located on the subject. A specific 
statutory requirement that ,the Board of School Estimate certify the amount 
required was involved in that case. 
Venue and jurisdiction have not been significant issues in the attempts 
of schools and colleges to take property by eminent domain, apart from the 
issue of jurisdiction being raised in connection with other questions. 
Evidence has been challenged on grounds of both admissibility and 
sufficiency to sustain the verdict in school and college condemnation cases. 
Minutes of board action have generally been held to be admissible. Some of 
the opinions refer to a reluctance of the appellate court to disturb a 
finding or verdict of the trial court. In one of the cases involving taking 
of school property by a railroad, the verdict was upset because contrary to 
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the evidence on the amount of damage. 
The attempts of a school or college to discontinue condemnation proceedings 
have generally been successful. There is a conflict of authority on the ques-
tion of whether a school or college is liable for costs and expenses upon 
discontinuance of proceedingso In the school and college cases not involving 
discontinuance, the problems of costs and fees have apparently been litigated 
infrequently, and the authority located could not be considered conclusive on 
this question. 
It has been held that there is no absolute right to appeal from a 
condemnation award, and this right is frequently governed by statute. The 
right to appeal may arise only at appropriate stages of the proceedings and 
then perhaps only to a particular tribunal. On appeal, the courts have 
consistently held, issues may not be raised which were not raised at trial. 
When the record has been insufficient to give the appellate court the informa-
tion necessary to a decision, the finding of the trial court has usually been 
upheldo 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to identify and describe the legGl issues 
and factual situtations involved in appellate decisions in which a school 
or college has sought to exercise the right of eminent domain. A total of 
144 school or college condemnation cases were located. An additional 64 
c~ses in which significant eminent domain issues were discussed were included 
in the study. Of these 64 cases, 24 were actions for injunctive relief, 
twelve were actions to determine ownership when property was abandoned for 
school use, and the remainder were actions for ejectment, entry, damages, 
trespass, prohibition, mandamus, or other relief. Twenty-three cases 
illustrative of those distinguishable from school and college eminent domain 
actions were discussed. The search for cases in point resulted in location 
of only 21 in which a college or university was a party and the pleadings 
were for condemnation. Another seven college cases involving eminent domain 
issues were included in the study, and five college cases were cited to dis-
tinguish those on eminent domain. The judicial opinions were analyzed, and a 
narrative was developed which summarized the facts, decisions, and rationale 
of the case law. Findings were presented according to a topical plan within 
which chronological order was observed. 
This chapter is designed to provide a statement of general conclusions 
that may be drawn from the cases. Generalization from the findings of the 
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study involves the hazard of inaccuracy due to a number of variables. Among 
these are constitutional and statutory provisions, the facts of the cases or 
of new situations, jurisdictional rules, and the influence of legal precedents 
and principles relating either to eminent domain in general or to application 
to schools or colleges of the law of property, contracts, agency, or any number 
of other topics. 
While the right of eminent domain has been referred to as a sovereign 
right, a number of limitations have been imposed upon exercise of the right 
by schools and colleges. Some of the limitations stem from constitutional 
provisions, such as the requirement that when private property is taken for 
public use, just compensation must be paid. Other limitations are a result 
of legislative enactment, such as provisions that an attempt must first be 
made to purchase the property, or that not more than a certain amount of land 
may be condemned. Limitations have also been imposed as a result of the 
legal traditions or precedents--the common law; for example, a requirement 
that the owner receive due notice of proceedings to take his propertyo One 
requirement that seems to be uniformly recognized is that there must be some 
form of legislative delegation of the right of eminent domain to a school or 
college, with a possible exception in the case of the constitutional state 
universities. 
Some of the eminent domain decisions affecting schools and colleges 
have emphasized the protection of private rights, and others have stressed 
the importance of the educational enterprise to society. No cases were 
located concerning the right of a privately organized school of less than 
collegiate grade to exercise the right of eminent domain, and the cases 
dealing with condemnation by private colleges or universities are in conflict 
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to some extent. A general conclusion from the study must be that with 
legislative delegation of authority and a clear showing of necessary public 
use, the right of a school or college to take private property has been upheld. 
Where the public nature of the institution can be established, the taking may 
be for a wide variety of specific purposes. The determination of what is a 
public use has generally been considered a judicial function. 
The requirement that the property be necessary for the uses of the 
school or college has been interpreted liberally, the most important restric-
tion appearing to be that the property will be put to use within a reasonable 
time. The discretion of the legislature or of an administrative board 
regarding the necessity for condemnation:has usually been respected, but the 
judiciary is not without authority to review this determination. 
In general, similar principles regarding condemnation have been applied 
to educational institutions regardless of their grade level. Because of the 
fact that so few college or university cases were located, this conclusion 
must be regarded as tentative. The eminent domain cases seem to illustrate 
a possible effect of a closer relationship of colleges and universities to 
the state legislature than the public schools have as the latter are usually 
governed in part by a local uni~ of some type. One of the cases, in order 
to support the condemnation proceedings of a university, referred to the 
legislative authorization granted to the public schools. 
There is conflict of authority regarding the nature of estate taken 
by a school or college as a result of condemnation proceedings, but there 
seems to be a trend, as a result of both judicial interpretation and legis-
lation, toward finding that condemnation results in taking of a fee simple 
absolute estate. 
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~n only one recent case could it be said that a school or college has 
been successful in condemning property already devoted to another public use. 
A few other cases have indicated that it may be done. Zoning ordinances will 
not prevent condemnation of property for school purposes. Public projects, 
such as railroads, highways, and flood control, have been considered "more 
necessary" than schools for purposes of land use as litigated in condemnation 
actions. 
Market·value is the generally accepted standard for the compensation 
a school or college has been required. to pay for the property taken by 
eminent domain. Damages may be allowed for injury to property of the 
condemnee not taken, and any benefit to him from having a school located 
near the remdning portion has usually not been considered. Evidence of the 
value of tqe property has been contested in a number of cases, and the 
decisions have usually depended on the facts of each ~ase. Where the property 
of a public school or college has been taken, recent cases have developed the 
substitute cost theory of damages on the basis that the property has no market 
value. 
Issues raised in the school and college eminent domain cases concerning 
parties, pleadings, site selection, notice, the resolution of condemnation, 
negotiation for purchase, corporate existence, availability of funds, juris-
diction, venue, evidence, discontinuance or abandonment of proceedings, costs, 
fees, and appeals were arbitrarily classified as procedural issues and dis-
cussed in Chapter VIII. Because of the diverse nature of these issues, the 
reader is referred to the chapter summary for a brief review of the findings. 
A general conclusion to be drawn from the study is that there is consider-
able variation among the States regarding the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain by schools and colleges. These variations are due in part to 
differences in wording of the statutes, and there seem to have been few 
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other logical explanations for the variations offered in the cases. Some of 
the variations in statute~, both within a State and·between States, are due 
to differences in school district organizationo While it may be beyond the 
scope of this study, the impression is inescapable that there could be 
greater uniformity between States and greater clarity within the States 
without sacrifice of important private or public rightse A study which would 
concentrate on legislative history of school and college eminent domain 
Statutes would provide additional important background information for revision 
of statutes. Because of the variations that now exist, institutions contem-
plating proceedings to take property by condemnation would be well advised to 
seek legal counsel in the early stages of their planning processes. 
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